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PIERCE, MICHAEL G. The Supreme Court of North Carolina and 
the Public Schools. (19 87) Directed by: Dr. Joseph E. 
Bryson, Pp. 309 
An examination of American public education clearly 
evinces the authority of the states in the management and 
operation of their public schools. It is apparent that the 
state courts — specifically, the highest state courts as 
evidenced by the decisions of the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina — have played a significant role in defining the 
state's role in public education. This study provides 
insight in the areas of (1) governance, (2) employees, 
(3) pupils, (4) torts, (5) finance, and (6) property as they 
have been adjudged by the Supreme Court of North Carolina. 
The following questions were proposed for this study: 
(1) What are the landmark decisions of the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina affecting the public schools? (2) What legal 
principles affecting the public schools have been 
established by the decisions of the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina? (3) How do the decisions of the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina parallel or give direction to the development 
of the. public schools of the state? (4) What are the trends 
or emerging issues evident in the decisions of the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina affecting the public schools? 
The following general conclusions can be made 
concerning the Supreme Court of North Carolina and the 
public schools: (1) The Court has considered more questions 
related to finance than to any other issue; (2) The Court 
established an approval rate of fifty-eight and one-half 
percent for the decisions of lower court decisions; (3) The 
decisions of the Court on taxation stymied the growth of the 
public school system for a while and reflected the major 
involvement of the Supreme Court in the schools; (4) Boards 
of education exercise discretionary power which the Court 
will usually not restrain — the most pervasive legal 
principle identified; (5) The Court gives meaning to the law 
and limits its interpretation showing no attempt "to make" 
law; (6) Boards of county commissioners and boards of 
education have prescribed roles in the operation of the 
public schools; (7) Boards of education must always act in 
the best interest of students; (8) Boards of education must 
respond to alternative settings for the compulsory education 
of children and to questions concerning rights of personnel 
in employment. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Role of the Federal Government 
and the States in Education 
The federal government has no inherent power. Any 
authority it does embody must be delegated in or implied 
inside the Constitution of the United States. The power 
which the federal government has in education is inferred 
from the Preamble to and a clause within the Constitution 
itself. 
We the people of the United States, in Order to 
form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure 
domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, 
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings 
of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain 
and establish this Constitution for the United States 
of America.^ 
The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect 
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts 
and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare 
of the United States; . . .2 
The founding fathers disagreed on the meaning of the 
general welfare clauseJames Madison asserted that it 
gave no substantive powers to the federal government while 
•^-Preamble, U. S., Constitution. 
^u. S., Constitution, art. I, sec. 8, cl. 1. 
^Lee 0. Garber and Newton Edwards, The Public Schools 
in Our Government Structure, 2d ed. (Danville, 111.: The 
Interstate Printers and Publishers, Inc., 1970), p. 4. 
2 
Alexander Hamilton believed that it gave to Congress broad 
and extensive powers to tax and to spend.4 According to 
Hamilton, such authority was not restricted by the delegated 
powers in the Constitution. In 1936 and 1937, respectively, 
the Supreme Court of the United States accepted the Hamilton 
interpretation^ and expressed the opinion that Congress may 
tax and spend for purposes related to the general welfare.® 
Limitations on this power of the federal government to 
control education and the extent to which Congress may tax 
and spend for it have never been fully determined. 
Whether the federal government will refrain in the 
future, as it has rather generally done in the past, 
from exercising the power to control educational policy 
which may be vested in it remains to be seen.7 
Since the Constitution of the United States has no 
delegated powers in education, it is, therefore, an accepted 
principle that the states have full and complete control 
over educational policy unless otherwise restricted by 
federal or state constitutions. Education, then, is a power 
reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment. "The powers 
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
4Ibid. 
^United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1 (1936). 
^United States v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619 (1937). 
7Garber and Edwards, p. 9. 
3 
respectively, or to the people."8 Edward C. Bolmeier states: 
"The express provisions for the establishment, 
organization, and control of public education are contained 
in the state constitutions and statutes. . .".® 
Accordingly, all state constitutions expressly provide for 
the creation of a state system of public education.-̂  The 
Constitution of North Carolina both encourages education and 
calls for a uniform system of schools in the following 
sections of Article IX. 
Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary 
to good government and the happiness of mankind, 
schools, libraries, and the means of education shall 
forever be encouraged.H 
The General Assembly shall provide by taxation and 
otherwise for a general and uniform system of free 
public schools, which shall be maintained at least nine 
months in every year, and wherein equal opportunities 
shall be provided for all students. 
Responsibility of the Federal and State Courts 
The courts consider cases arising from the laws 
affecting education. These laws adhere to the following 
8U. S., Constitution, amend. X. 
^Edward C. Bolmeier, The School in the Legal Structure, 
2d ed. (Cincinnati: The W. H. Anderson Company, 1973), p. 
111. 
^Legislative Drafting Research Fund of Columbia 
University, Constitutions of the United States National and 
State (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 
July 1985) . 
11-N. C., Constitution, art. IX, sec. 1. 
I^ n.  c . ,  Constitution, art IX, sec. 2, cl. 1. 
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hierarchy in ascending order: regulations by local boards 
of education, actions by state education agencies, state 
statutes, state constitutions, federal statutes, and the 
federal constitution. There are two systems of courts in 
the United States: federal and state. Federal courts are 
limited only by the grant of judicial power in the United 
States Constitution.-*•3 They hear cases involving citizens 
of different states or the states themselves, cases 
concerning federal law, and cases representing appeals from 
decisions of the highest state courts. Such appeals are 
based on the provisions in or meaning of the United States 
Constitution. If a case represents both a federal and a 
state law question, then the federal courts determine the 
state questions according to the court rules of that state. 
State courts hear almost every type of case with the 
exception of those assigned to the federal judiciary. They 
are bound not only by their own state constitutions and laws 
but also by the United States Constitution and federal laws. 
If state courts must determine a federal question, they 
follow the rules of the governing federal court and they may 
determine federal law in the absence of a federal 
decision. 
13William D. Valente, Law in the Schools (Columbus, 
Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1980), p. 14. 
14Ibid. 
5 
The courts play an important role in American society. 
They embody judicial review: the power to hear and to 
decide cases and to declare laws unconstitutional. To cite 
Bolmeier once again: 
The state judiciary . . . has no authority or 
responsibility to legislate. The proper function of 
the courts is threefold: (1) they rule on the 
constitutionality of legislative enactments, (2) they 
interpret laws, and (3) they settle disputes. 
By interpreting the laws within jurisdictions and settling 
disputes, state courts may determine the intent of the 
legislatures when enacting a particular law.^® Neither the 
authors of state constitutions nor members of state 
legislatures could foresee the questions or controversies 
which might arise later concerning their actions. 
Statement of the Problem 
Whereas education is a state rather than a federal 
function, the states have control over it. In carrying out 
this function, the individual states show fundamental 
similarities. Differences exist in form rather than 
substance and in degree rather than basic approach.^ with 
such similarity the states naturally influence one 
l^Bolmeier, p. 112. 
Edmund Reutter, Jr. and Robert R. Hamilton, The 
Law of Public Education (Mineola, New York: The Foundation 
Press, Inc., 1970), p. 8. 
•^Ibid., p. vi. 
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another. As a consequence, there is a need to better 
understand the role of the State of North Carolina in public 
education. What provides the basis for this understanding? 
According to Richard Strahan, 
The fact that education plays such an important 
role in our society has prompted numerous court cases 
which have been required to define its function. In 
addition to the ideas which have been contributed by 
educational theorists or philosophers, the courts have 
had to formulate a theory of education based upon what 
they deem to be the fundamental nature of our society 
and to insure the public welfare. 
Since the courts are called upon to define the function 
of education and since most of the cases involving public 
education are heard in state courts,^ it is important to 
have a basic understanding of North Carolina court decisions 
which have affected the public schools. This review should 
come from those decisions determined by the state's highest 
court, the Supreme Court of North Carolina. Such a 
framework can provide a means for analyzing cases, 
synthesizing judicial interpretations, and compiling a 
record of judicial decisions which not only will define the 
purpose and direction of public education in North Carolina 
but will also identify the role of our state's highest court 
in the development of the North Carolina public schools. 
•^Richard D. Strahan, The Courts and the Schools 
(Lincoln, Nebraska: Professional Educators Publications, 
Inc., 1973), p. 36. 
•^Valente, p. 14. 
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Examining specific topics within decisions of the Supreme 
Court of North Carolinacan provide an important reference 
for educators, parents, students, legislators, and the 
public-at-large. 
Questions to be Answered 
The purpose of this study is to have a basic 
understanding of the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
decisions affecting the public schools. Listed below are 
four key questions to be answered through this study: 
1. What are the landmark decisions of the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina affecting the public schools? 
2. What legal principles affecting the public schools 
have been established by the decisions of the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina? 
3. How do the decisions of the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina parallel or give direction to the development 
of the public schools of the state? 
4. What are the trends or emerging issues evident in 
the decisions of the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
affecting the public schools? 
Scope of the Study 
This study represents a reading of decisions of the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina from 1810 through 1986. 
Only those cases which were first listed in the case notes 
of the Public School Laws of North Carolina and were then 
listed in the schools category of the North Carolina Digest 
or West's South Eastern Digest were studied. 
These cases on the public schools were reviewed in the areas 
of (1) governance, (2) employees, (3) pupils, (4) torts, 
8 
(5) finance, and (6) property. Cases of a general education 
nature were studied if they had some significance for the 
public schools. 
Methods, Procedures, Sources of Information 
This study utilized North Carolina Reports as the 
primary source of court decisions for the period studied. 
Cases are grouped under the following major headings 
developed for legal research reporting by the National 
Organization on Legal Problems of Education: 
(1) governance, (2) employees, (3) pupils, (4) torts, 
(5) finance, and (6) property.20 NOLPE organizes its 
reporting system into two additional headings: bargaining 
and higher education. These have not been selected for this 
study since the State of North Carolina prohibits collective 
bargaining and since the public schools include only 
elementary and secondary education, usually terminating with 
the twelfth grade. The statute reads thus: 
Any agreement, or contract, between the governing 
authority of any city, town, county, or other 
municipality, or between any agency, unit, or 
instrumentality thereof, or between any agency, 
instrumentality, or institution of the State of North 
Carolina, and any labor union, trade union, or labor 
organization, as bargaining agent for any public 
employees of such city, town, county, or other 
^Ophilip K. Piele, ed., The Yearbook of School Law 1984 
(Topeka, Kansas: National Organization on Legal Problems of 
Education, 1985). 
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municipality, or agency or instrumentality of 
government, is hereby declared to be against the public 
policy of the State, illegal, unlawful, void and of no 
effect.21 
A broad, but thorough history of the development of the 
public schools in North Carolina is reported to provide a 
reference point for determining landmark decisions and the 
role of the Supreme Court of North Carolina in this 
development. 
Since it was essential to determine whether a need 
existed for this research, a search was made of the 
Comprehensive Dissertation Index. It revealed only one 
dissertation which related to the subject of this study, "A 
Summary and Analysis of North Carolina Court Decisions 
Relating to Professional School Personnel and Public School 
Pupils.However, it is limited to cases concerning 
teachers and pupils originating in North Carolina. Not only 
did it focus on decisions of the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina, but it also looked at decisions from United States 
District Courts and the United States Court of Appeals. It 
was helpful only to the extent that it revealed the scope of 
a related study which was limited to two very specific 
21N. C. Gen. Stat. 95-98 (1975). 
22wayne Quinton, "A Summary and Analysis of North 
Carolina Court Decisions Relating to Professional School 
Personnel and Public School Pupils" (Ph. D. dissertation, 
Duke University, 1968). 
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areas, involved decisions other than those of the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina, and was completed nineteen years 
ago. 
Due to the fact that this study was limited to North 
Carolina, sources such as Readers' Guide to Periodical 
Literature, Education Index, and the Index of Legal 
Periodicals proved of little help. In fact, two computer 
searches from the Educational Resources Information Center 
(ERIC) failed to produce information which was directly 
related to this specific study. The librarian of the North 
Carolina Supreme Court was contacted for assistance and 
could provide no help in locating secondary sources for a 
review of literature related to this study. The law school 
journals from the University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill, Duke University, Wake Forest University, North 
Carolina Central University, and Campbell University 
reported information found in the primary sources and seldom 
focused on cases of the Supreme Court of North Carolina. 
Fortunately, primary and secondary sources were available 
for tracing the development of the public schools in North 
Carolina. 
Cases coming before the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
were located in the North Carolina Reports. These were also 
located in the North Carolina Digest and West's South 
Eastern Digest 2d. Due again to the fact that this study 
was limited to North Carolina, research sources 
11 
customarily used in legal research such as Corpus Juris 
Secundum, American Jurisprudence, the National Reporter 
System, the American Digest System and the NOLPE School Law 
Reporter were not used. All cases were read and categorized 
according to the NOLPE legal reporting system. 
Definition of Terms 
For the purposes of this study, the following selected 
terms are defined: 
Public Schools: Public schools are established 
under the laws of the state, in the various districts, 
counties, or towns, maintained at the public expense by 
taxation, and open with or without charge to the 
children of all the residents of the town or other 
district. 
Governance (Govern): Governance is to direct and 
control, rule, or regulate by authority from 
established laws or by arbitrary rule. 
Employees: Employee refers to some permanent 
employment or position; a person working for salary or 
wages. 
Pupils: A pupil is a youth or scholar of either 
sex under care of an instructor, tutor, or teacher. 
Torts: Tort is a private or civil wrong or 
injury. It may be the infraction of some public duty 
by which special damage accrues to the individual. 
Three elements of every tort action are existence of 
legal duty from defendant to plaintiff, breach of duty, 
and damage as proximate result. 
Finance: Finance is generally considered to be 
money resources. 
Property: Property is that which belongs 
exclusively to one and represents rights which are 
guaranteed and protected by the government. It is also 
12 
commonly used to denote everything which is the subject 
of ownership.^3 
Design of the Study 
The remainder of the study is divided into five major 
parts. 
Chapter II traces the historical and major development 
of education, specifically the public schools in North 
Carolina. 
Chapter III looks at the organization and development 
of the Supreme Court of North Carolina including a review of 
the available literature concerning it. 
Chapter IV analyzes the principles and concepts found 
in cases which have been decided by the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina. 
Chapter V is a detailed analysis of particular cases 
selected for their authoritative or illustrative value. 
Chapter VI reviews and summarizes information provided 
in the preceding chapters and answers the questions posed in 
the introduction. 
The Appendix contains a listing of the constitutional 
provisions concerning the North Carolina public schools and 
the Supreme Court of the State of North Carolina. 
3̂Henry Campbell Black, Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth 
ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1951), pp. 1512, 
824, 617, 1399, 1660, 758, 1382. 
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CHAPTER II 
EDUCATION IN NORTH CAROLINA 
Overview 
The history of the public schools in North Carolina is 
a story of vision, frustration, and fulfillment. 
The State emerged from the colonial period with no 
public schools but saw them created in the first half of the 
Nineteenth Century. They collapsed with the end of the 
Civil War and the Reconstruction Era did little to further 
the cause of education. A particular hindrance was a 
conservative North Carolina Supreme Court which steadfastly 
stymied efforts until 1907 to provide through special taxes 
the support of public schools. 
The beginning of the Twentieth Century was a 
progressive era for the cause of education. While the Great 
Depression brought financing problems to the schools, they 
remained open. The State was forced to accept full 
responsibility for a uniform system of public education. 
The latter half of the Twentieth Century saw successful 
racial integration of the schools. This period also saw a 
strong commitment to comprehensive and quality education in 
order to meet the needs of students and to encourage the 
professional development of teachers and administrators. 
14 
The history of education in North Carolina is a march 
to excellence. 
The Church of England established schools in early 
North Carolina, and teachers were usually clergymen. Those 
who were not had to meet specified religious qualifications 
in order to teach. Education meant an elementary level 
instruction, with an apprenticeship system. Together they 
represented the first approach to a formal system of 
education in the state. Over a period of time, the Assembly 
authorized schoolhouses and made provisions for their 
financing. Although advocates of education believed that 
the Constitution of North Carolina of 1776 called for the 
establishment of public schools, the Assembly did not 
provide for them, even though it did charter academies. 
North Carolina entered a progressive era after the War 
of 1812. It recognized government's role in bringing about 
the virtues of Jacksonian Democracy. Archibald D. Murphey, 
"Father of Public Education in North Carolina," advanced a 
system of public education as early as 1817. Although the 
specifics of the plan were not approved by the General 
Assembly, it did approve a Literary Fund for the public 
support of the schools in 1825. This was the action which 
many thought had been called for in the Constitution of 
North Carolina of 1776. 
The first common school law was enacted in 1839. 
Although structure and standards for a public school system 
were evolving, organizational and financing problems 
inhibited the development of a true public school system. 
To address the leadership needs of the system, the General 
Assembly authorized the position of general superintendent 
of the common schools. The first state superintendent was 
Dr. Calvin Henderson Wiley, who served until the end of the 
Civil War. He provided effective leadership by introducing 
new ideas, improving the quality of teachers, applying 
standards to the expenditures of money, and rallying support 
for the schools. 
Nevertheless, the end of the War saw the closing of the 
common schools and the collapse of the common school system. 
The period of Reconstruction and the latter years of the 
Nineteenth Century were a difficult time for education. The 
economic, social, political, and legal changes brought about 
by the Civil War and its aftermath impacted adversely on the 
cause of the public schools. Although the Constitution of 
North Carolina of 1868 and subsequent legislation spoke to 
the importance of education, little was actually 
accomplished. 
County commissioners were empowered to levy a special 
school tax to support a four months' school term. But in a 
stunning blow to the cause of education, the North Carolina 
Supreme Court rejected such a levy in Lane v. Stanly and 
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Barksdale V. Commissioners of Sampson County. This action 
stymied public school financing for many years. It was the 
result of public indifference, a hatred for taxation, little 
concern for illiteracy, and the conservative, reactionary 
philosophy of the times. 
Although the state-wide administration of the schools 
fell in disarray due to carpetbagger rule, there were some 
advances in education. The Freedmen's Bureau aided the 
cause of Negro education. The graded school movement 
advanced the development of education. Improvements in 
teacher education and training continued. 
The beginning of the Twentieth Century found a renewed 
interest in education. Governor Charles B. Aycock and 
educator Charles D. Mclver among others led a campaign in 
support of public schools. Efforts were made to equalize 
financing for the school districts of the state. The North 
Carolina Supreme Court had by now reversed its earlier 
decisions and permitted county officials to levy the special 
school tax needed to fund a mandated term. Teacher training 
and certification improved. A State Board of Examiners 
prepared questions, graded examinations, and certified 
teachers. The raising and distributing of proceeds from 
special school taxes on the basis of race ended. New 
initiative strengthened the public schools. Black schools 
shared in this development, although they generally suffered 
in comparison to those for whites. As a consequence of the 
17 
Depression, the state finally assumed full responsibility 
for a uniform system of education. Regulations were adopted 
for bus transportation, and the administration of the state 
school system was further clarified. 
The last thirty-five years has seen the end of 
segregation and an emphasis on new and expanded programs to 
meet the needs of young people. The adoption of the Basic 
Education Program promises an adequate education for every 
child in North Carolina. Teacher training and certification 
standards continue to improve, and a career plan offers hope 
for improving the status and compensation of teachers. 
These developments represent a sincere commitment to 
education based on equity and quality. 
Colonial North Carolina 
Although there were no public schools in colonial North 
Carolina, early missionaries of the Church of England tried 
to establish a church and a school in every settlement of 
the colony. As a result, elementary education was provided 
by private tutors who were usually clergymen. Students 
traveled to Virginia, the Northern Colonies, England, or 
Scotland for advanced studies.1 
^Hugh T. Lefler, ed., North Carolina History Told By 
Contemporaries (Chapel Hill, N. C.: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1965), p. 156. 
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Public education was first mentioned in a law of the 
province providing for the compulsory education of destitute 
orphans; this was a Christian effort to make sure that 
orphans would not become an economic burden. They were 
bound to someone who was not only to teach them a trade but 
also to teach them to read and to write. 
At a court held in the house of Thomas White, 
February 26, 1694, little William Pead, a 
five-year-old, destitute orphan boy of old Albemarle 
County in North Carolina was bound to the Honorable 
Thomas Harvey and Sarah, his wife. It was written in 
the records of the court that the said Thomas Harvey 
should teach the little fellow to read before he became 
twenty-one years of age. This is the first time we 
find in our public records any official statement of 
what should be taught a child in North Carolina.2 
By the end of the 1600's this apprenticeship system was 
in place. In addition to providing a minimum of formal 
schooling for orphans, it provided assistance for poor 
children, free illegitimate children, girls and boys. It 
implied the existence of schools or a means of education.-^ 
The Assembly of 1745 authorized other public buildings 
and a schoolhouse for Edenton. Penalties collected under 
the act and monies already on hand in town treasuries from 
the sale of town lots (and from the future sale of same) 
provided financing. Other funds came from private donations 
2M. C. S. Noble, A History of the Public Schools of 
North Carolina (Chapel Hill, N. C.: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1930), p. 198. 
^Edgar W. Knight, "One Hundred Years of Public 
Education," North Carolina Education, February 1936, p. 195. 
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to town commissioners, who could sue and collect from 
delinquent subscribers. Due to state aid and its 
recognition as a public institution, the building in Edenton 
was considered a "public" schoolhouse.^ 
In 1754 the Assembly appropriated^6,000 for a "public 
school," although it was not known what was exactly meant by 
the term. Control and regulations were to remain with the 
governor, council, and Assembly. Whatever the intent, the 
appropriated money was never used to support a public 
school: "The good which resulted from this appropriation 
was that the Assembly had gone on record in favor of at 
least one public school for the province at the expense of 
the public treasury."5 
In 1766 the Assembly made a corporate body out of the 
subscribers who in 1764 had given to a fund for building a 
schoolhouse and teacher residence in New Bern. For the 
first time in North Carolina, the term "public school" was 
applied directly to a local educational institution.® It 
received town lots and the proceeds of a tax on all rum and 
other liquors from the Assembly. This act of incorporation 
also provided benefits for the education of the poor who 
could not educate their children: 
^Noble, p. 11. 
5Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
®Ibid., p. 14. 
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This was the beginning of free public education in the 
state, a beginning that has expanded into a public 
school system supported almost entirely by public 
taxation and devoted to the education of all the 
children of the state.7 
The Assembly action of 1766 had two specific implications 
for education in the province: the beginning of state aid 
to education and the beginning of free admission for poor 
children into tax-financed schools. The state aid to 
schools incorporated by the Assembly usually came from the 
gift of public land, money from the sale of town lots, or a 
liquor tax. Two trends in North Carolina's early education 
began to emerge. Indigent orphans were apprenticed not only 
to learn a trade but also to learn to read and write, and 
the Assembly chartered private schools and provided 
schoolhouse sites. These two actions eventually blended 
together into a single tax-supported system of free public 
schools for all white children. 
Prior to the American Revolution, the chief test of 
teachers was a religious one. Teachers had to be members of 
the established Church of England. This requirement was 
especially true if a teacher taught in a school chartered by 
the Assembly. In 1730 the instructions to the first 
governor appointed by the Crown indicated that no one could 
7Clyde A. Erwin, "The Growth of Public Education," 
North Carolina Education, February 1936, p. 216. 
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teach or maintain a school who did not have a license from 
the Lord Bishop of London. As a consequence, the basic test 
to be a teacher was a religious one. 
On 18 December 1776, delegates meeting in Halifax, 
North Carolina, approved a constitution which said: 
That a school or schools shall be established by 
the legislature, for the convenient instruction of 
youth, with such salaries to the masters, paid by the 
public, as may enable them to instruct at low prices; 
and, all useful learning shall be duly encouraged and 
promoted in one or more universities.® 
This forty-first article of the North Carolina Constitution 
of 1776 was a literal copy of section forty-four of the 
Pennsylvania Constitution adopted 28 September 1776 except 
that the North Carolina copy left out "in each county" after 
the word established. North Carolina and Pennsylvania were 
the first states to call for the establishment of schools in 
their free constitutions.^ 
Although the advocates of education believed this 
constitutional provision meant the establishment of public 
schools, the legislature did not provide them. Its failure 
to establish public schools came from an abiding hatred of 
taxation.10 Even if the state founders may have 
®N. C., Constitution, art. 41 (1776). 
9U. S., Bureau of Education, Chapter from the Report of 
the Commissioner of Education for 1896-97, "Chapter XXIX. 
Beginnings of the Common School System in the South," by 
Stephen B. Weeks, (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1898), p. 1389. 
l^Clyde A. Erwin, p. 217. 
22 
envisioned schools for those who could afford them and who 
wanted to go to school, they did not commit themselves to a 
system of universal public education. Nevertheless, the 
principle of state aid and endorsement of schools was 
established: 
It is well to note that the educational clause in 
our first constitution never contemplated the 
establishment of any kind of school supported entirely 
by public taxation, such as the schools provided for in 
the school law of 1838-39 and maintained free of 
tuition from 1840 to 1865. The original idea was 
simply to help in some way by paying enough to the 
teacher to enable him to lower his rates of tuition and 
thus place his school in reach of a greater number of 
people.H 
While the legislature did not respond to the implied 
authorization for public schools, it did provide for 
subsidized academies. These were usually private, chartered 
by the state, sectarian, and open only to boys. Of the 177 
chartered before 1825, only thirteen were for girls and only 
a few provided instruction for free Negroes. Financing 
usually came from lotteries.^ 
In 1760 the first academy in North Carolina was 
established in Wilmington by the Reverend James Tate. In 
that same year, Crowfield Academy (which was the forerunner 
of Davidson Academy) was established. Queen's College, an 
English institution known by its American name, Liberty Hall 
Academy, in Charlotte, was the last school to seek a 
•^Noble, p. 27. 
•^Lefler, p. 168. 
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charter from the Crown and the first to receive one from the 
the newly formed State. The second school chartered by the 
State was Science Hall, Hillsboro, and it was given the same 
privileges as Liberty Hall Academy. It was allowed to raise 
money by lottery: "This is probably the first instance in 
the history of the free State in which the aid of the-
government to schools extended beyond the mere formal 
granting of charters."13 
If there were to be a fund for schools, it had to come 
from means other than a public school tax. As a 
consequence, lotteries were used in the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centures to finance not only academies, but also 
churches, bridges, canals, and other public works. 
Warrenton Academy, Warren County, chartered in 1786, 
was to have $3,000 raised by lottery and the town commission 
was directed to use monies on hand for the school. This was 
the first instance in North Carolina of local taxation for 
schools.14 jn addition to lotteries, other funding for 
academies chartered by the state came from the outright gift 
of land income from property, exemption from taxation, and 
authority to raise subscriptions. Because funding by 
lottery generated debate on the morality of gambling, it was 
prohibited by law in 1834. 
13U. S., Bureau of Education, p. 1389. 
14Ibid., p. 1393. 
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An act was passed by the legislature in 1800 providing 
" for public schools in New Hanover County. There is no 
indication of the exact nature of the public support. 
However, the trustees were given the right to hold land and 
the school was called a "public school." Between 1790-1840 
over three hundred academies were chartered in North 
Carolina. Eventually, they would be supplanted by public 
graded schools and high schools: 
The general character of these acts is the same. A 
number of persons, sometimes including representative 
men of the State as well as those of local prominence, 
were given corporate powers and absolute control over 
the management and direction of the school, and were 
usually made cooperative. The schools generally had 
power to grant certificates, but the right to grant 
degrees was specifically denied. These acts also gave 
power to the trustees to sue for and recover by action 
of debt or otherwise the sum of money which had been 
subscribed for the schools but on which payment had 
been refused. In some cases the pupils and teachers 
were exempted from service in the militia. Some were 
named for the most prominent benefactor, and provision 
was made for this in case a person should claim such 
distinction at any time in the future. The trustees 
usually chose the teachers. There was sometimes 
exemption from taxation. In the earlier charters 
special provision was made that such were not to be 
considered as any of the academies for which provision 
had been directed in the constitution. 
The North Carolina Constitution of 1776 mentioned no 
qualifications for teachers. Even though the denominational 
test had been eliminated, teachers still had to meet certain 
moral and religious qualifications. These remained the 
basic requirements for teaching until the beginning of 
l^Ibid.t p. 1392. 
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the nineteenth century. Academic qualifications generally 
required some knowledge of reading, writing, and 
"ciphering. 
Nineteenth Century to the Civil War 
North Carolina entered a progressive reform movement 
following the War of 1812. It placed great importance on 
the common man and reflected the impact of Jacksonian 
Democracy. The historical implications are as follows: 
The most revolutionary feature of the new movement was 
its repudiation of the prevalent philosophy that 
government is a necessary evil and its bold acceptance 
of the concept that a democratic government is the 
servant of the people and their most effective agency 
for self-development. The leaders of the new movement 
also believed that the state government should take the 
lead in a positive constructive program for the 
development of the state and for the solution of its 
problems. ' 
Recognizing this role of government, the need for 
universal education for all white children, and the 
fulfillment of Jacksonian Democracy, Archibald D. Murphey, 
"Father of Public Education in North Carolina," worked for 
public schools, academies, and colleges. The first great 
advocate of public education in North Carolina, he submitted 
to the General Assembly in 1817 plans for a system of public 
James E. Hillman, "Teacher Certification," North 
Carolina Education, February 1936, p. 206. 
l^Hugh t. Lefler and Albert Ray Newsome, North 
Carolina: The History of a Southern State, Revised ed. 
(Chapel Hill, N. C.: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 1963), p. 313. 
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education. He urged the establishment of a corporate body 
which would distribute state funds according to the numbers 
of whites in an area and which would provide for 
administration of the schools.18 
The corporate body proposed by Murphey would become 
known as the Literary Board and would eventually be composed 
of the governor, the chief justice of the North Carolina 
Supreme Court, speaker of the state senate, speaker of the 
state house, the state treasurer, and their successors. 
Among its corporate powers would be those to create 
districts, to establish schools, to appoint local school 
officers, to determine the qualifications for teachers, and 
to establish teacher salaries. Curriculum responsibilities 
included setting the course of study and the use of 
examination results for the promotion of pupils from 
elementary to high school to college.-^ 
The graded school system which Murphey also proposed 
would have had students progressing from primary schools to 
academies and on to the university. The curriculum in those 
schools would have consisted of reading, writing, and 
arithmetic. Boys could have advanced to the academies, 
where the course of study would have included classical 
languages, mathematics, geography, astronomy, and history. 
l^Lefler, p. 164. 
•^Lefler and Newsome, p. 315. 
From the academies white males could have gone to the 
university. Murphey wanted primary schools established in 
each township, the source of funding for the primary schools 
and academies being a combination of state and local 
resources. Murphey believed that tuition should be charged 
to those who could afford to pay, but all white children 
were to be eligible for primary schools.20 
Murphey advocated state development of textbooks. In 
addition to reading, writing, and arithmetic, he believed 
that the Bible should be taught using the Old and New 
Testaments. Moreover, the curriculum could be expanded if 
the local community or teacher wanted to enhance its 
reputation through the program it offered. 
His plan had two major shortcomings: it was a 
combination of charity and tuition, and it discriminated 
against females and Negroes. As a result, the legislature 
refused to enact Murphey's proposal. However, agitation 
continued for the establishment of some type of public 
supported school system. 
Finally, in 1825, the legislature approved a Literary 
Fund, which called for funds for school support from both 
state and local resources. This combined approach to the 
funding of our public schools has continued to the present. 
20Ibid. 
2̂ Noble, pp. 199-200. 
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Called "An Act to Create a Fund for the Establishment of 
Common Schools," but commonly referred to as "The Literary 
Fund Law of 1825," it became law on 24 January 1826.22 
North Carolina was the third state after Virginia to approve 
such a fund for the support of the common schools. The 
monies for the fund came from dividends on bank stocks, the 
unexpended balance from sales of land, $2,100 in cash, 
dividends from navigation companies, license taxes, and 
money from the United States given to North Carolina for the 
removal of the Cherokee Indians.23 
The implementation of the finance legislation came from 
agitation by advocates of education and reformers rather 
than from the general public. As with other Southern 
states, North Carolina represented factors inhibiting such 
development: a sparse population, an absence of local 
governmental and administrative units directly responsible 
to the people, lack of ways and means for supporting 
schools, capital in land and slaves, few sources of 
taxation, and a population with a strong adversity to 
taxes.24 
No distribution of monies from the fund was to be made 
until it had accumulated a sufficient balance to be used by 
22ibid., pp. 45-46. 
23william K. Boyd, "The Literary Fund in North 
Carolina," North Carolina Education, February 1936, p. 203. 
24lbid. 
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the schools: "This bill passed both Houses, but while it 
was a beginning of an earnest endeavor for public schools, 
years were to pass before the income was sufficient for an 
practical purposes."25 
The Literary Fund signaled an end to private schools 
and the importance of the common schools. It also 
represented the first time that the state actually provided 
funding for the schools called for in the Constitution of 
North Carolina of 1776. However, the monies for the 
Literary Fund came from state investments and not from 
taxation. There remained the belief that taxes could be 
used only for specific governmental activities, of which the 
common schools were not yet a part: 
In 1834 the fund amounted to $139,403.99 1/2, which was 
invested in 1,200 shares of stock in the Bank of the 
State of North Carolina. There were other investments 
in 1835. As yet nothing had been done for the schools. 
The literary board, in fact, seemed to look on itself 
as little more than an agent for the investment of 
funds, and its reports are almost entirely financial in 
character. Further, the State, corporations, and 
individuals looked on the fund as a reserve on which 
they could draw in time of need. As a result, there 
were none to urge the cause of the schools. 
In response to this lack of action, the state 
legislature in 1836-1837 made changes in the Literary Fund. 
Its board was altered and the legislature designated the 
25samuel A'Court Ashe, History of North Carolina. 
Volume II. From 1783 to 1925 (Spartanburg, S. C.: The 
Reprint Company, 1971), p. 300. 
26u. s. Bureau of Education, p. 1419. 
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study of the common schools of North Carolina. The board 
was also to submit a plan for the common schools which would 
address the condition and needs of the state. 
As the result of an educational revival which began in 
1836 and which was due in part to the receipt by the state 
of a part of its national surplus, the first common school 
law was ratified on 8 January 1839. Known as the Cherry 
Bill, it was entitled "An Act to Divide the Counties of the 
State in School Districts and for other Purposes" and was an 
endorsement of much of what Archibald D. Murphey had 
proposed in 1817.27 Thus, North Carolina adopted a common 
school system supported by the Literary Fund and county-wide 
school tax. The tax, which had to be approved in a vote of 
the people in each county, was voted in by sixty-one of 
sixty-eight counties, generally by large majorities.^ 
In 1846 Rowan and Edgecombe were the last counties to 
vote in favor of this contributory tax and, as a 
consequence, schools were free to every white child in North 
Carolina. The first payments from the Literary Fund were 
made during 1838-1839 to Tyrrell County, Cherokee County, 
Richmond County, and Macon County. The first public school 
27s. Huntington Hobbs, Jr., North Carolina, Economic 
and Social (Chapel Hill, N. C.: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1930), pp. 248-249. 
^^Noble, p. 300. 
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in North Carolina opened on 20 January 1840 in Rockingham 
County.29 By 1846 every county had at least one public 
school: 
In its very first section this law called upon the 
people to vote for or against a tax for the support of 
common schools, a tax which was to yield one dollar for 
every two dollars that should be furnished from the 
Literary Fund. And the vote thus called for was so 
worded as to put the voter squarely on record as being 
for or against the education of the masses. He who 
favored the cause was to vote a ticket with the word 
"school" written on it, and he who opposed was to vote 
a ticket with "no school" written on it. This blunt 
and direct method no doubt won many votes for the 
schools in the election which followed for, as a rule, 
one does not like to say on his ballot that he wants 
"no school."3° 
The School Law of 1839 was filled with good intentions 
and pointed the state in the right direction. However, it 
did have significant omissions. While county officials had 
discretionary authority to establish schools, nothing was 
stated about the provision of schoolhouses. In addition, 
nothing was delineated about teachers, their qualifications, 
or who would actually employ them. In fact, the term 
teacher was not in the 1839 law. The School Law of 1839 
included no indication of when schools should begin or what 
should be taught. In fact, little was provided to guide and 
direct the central board in its relationship with county 
superintendents, school committeemen, or teachers. No 
2^Lefler and Newsome, p. 351. 
•^Noble, p. 60. 
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specific duties were given to district committeemen. In 
general, they were to assist county superintendents in 
school matters in their districts: 
In counties which voted for schools the justices of the 
county courts elected not less than five nor more than 
ten persons as superintendents of common schools. 
These superintendents were to divide the county into 
common-school districts of not more than six miles 
square and were to appoint for each school district not 
less than three nor more than six school committeemen, 
whose duty was to assist the superintendents in matters 
pertaining to the schools in their respective 
districts. 
The law of 1839 was weak in providing supervision or 
delineating the organization and administration of the 
schools. There was no state administrative control and no 
state superintendent until 1853. Until that time the 
Literary Board served as chief executive of the school 
system. Management was left to local officers. Counties 
had no uniformity of organization and many local reports 
were not made; in addition, 
The novelty of public school, the conservatism of the 
people and their dislike of taxation, the persistence 
of the idea that public schools were associated with 
charity, the lack of adequate equipment and trained 
teachers, and the hostility of the private schools and 
academies helped to bring discouraging results from the 
new system. It seemed that the political leaders were 
willing to allow the school system to drift and 
disintegrate. 
In 1840-1841 the legislature mandated the first school 
tax in all counties and made it the responsibility of the 
3-1-U. S., Bureau of Education, p. 1421. 
•^^Lefler and Newsome, p. 352. 
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county courts, who had the authority and power to levy a 
school tax which could not be more than one-half of the 
funds from the Literary Fund. The distribution was to be 
based on the federal population in the state with slaves 
counted as three-fifths.33 
As a consequence of this distribution system, counties 
with large numbers of slaves received more money although no 
schools were established for the slaves. This inequality 
meant that more money went to white children in the east 
than to those in the west. The legislature of 1844-1845 
made the tax discretionary, but the legislature of 1854-1855 
made it mandatory. It also provided that the total monies 
in a county from the tax and the Literary Fund had to be 
divided equally among the districts. An 1856-1857 law 
directed the board of county superintendents, with the 
advice of the state superintendent, to divide funds to the 
districts on a per capita basis. Only white children were 
counted. Then in 1858-1859 the legislature enacted a law 
requiring the division of funds in order to provide equal 
facilities for the education of white children.34 
The legislature of 1840-1841 specified other changes in 
addition to those concerning taxation. The Literary Board 
33ibid., p. 351. 
34Noble, p. 144. 
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would administer the Literary Fund, send distribution of the 
fund to counties, prepare and send forms to county officials 
to show progress of schools, and potentially provide 
penalties for those county officers who did not comply with 
the law.35 Counties which had voted a tax for schools in 
1838 could appoint no less than five and no more than ten 
superintendents of common schools to hold office for one 
year. 
A board of county superintendents was to establish 
school district boundaries, hear appeals from districts, 
distribute funds to districts, provide general supervision 
and control of the schools, and determine the number of 
teachers needed. The chairman of the superintendents was to 
send to the Literary Board reports from the school 
committees and to submit such other reports as the Board 
required. The free white electors in each school district 
were to elect by ballot three men as school committeemen to 
serve terms of one year. They were to be a corporate body 
in charge of the schools with the following duties: provide 
schoolhouses, take a census of those between the ages of 
five and twenty-one, employ teachers, and visit the schools. 
This action in 1841 is considered by many to be the real 
beginning of a state-wide system of education in North 
Carolina in spite of its administrative problems: 
35u. s., Bureau of Education, p. 1422. 
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Thus it will be seen that the common schools were under 
the joint control of what might be called a tri-board 
system. The Literary Board controlled and directed the 
Board of County superintendents, and it, in turn 
controlled and directed the school committee which was 
the local body of control. But nowhere along the line 
of this chain of Literary Board, Board of County 
Superintendents, and school committee was there the 
touch or directing hand of any single officer clothed 
with any definite and effective administrative power. 
The legislature in 1840-1841 required school committees 
to get "suitable" teachers as monies were available for 
employing them. By 1844-1845 the committees were required 
not only to employ suitable teachers but also to consider 
the qualifications and moral character of those who were 
employed to teach.^7 in 1846-1847 the legislature empowered 
the board of county superintendents to appoint committees of 
five members to examine the mental and moral qualifications 
of applicants who had to be approved or "certified" before 
they could teach.^8 By 1852 the legislature required boards 
of county superintendents to have examining committees. The 
first state superintendent in 1854 could require teachers to 
be examined in reading, spelling, writing, arithmetic, 
grammar, and geography.3® 
3®Noble, p. 84. 
37Ibid., p. 205. 
s., Bureau of Education, p. 1430. 
•^Noble, p. 203. 
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By 1850 important advances had been made for the 3,000 
common schools in the state. The average term of the common 
schools was three and one-half to four months. The average 
teacher's monthly salary was $26, and the total cost of the 
state's common school system was $278,000 with $100,000 
coming from local taxes and the remainder from the Literary 
Fund.40 
In spite of these major advancements, problems 
persisted. Some counties would not levy a tax and the 
monies coming from the Literary Fund were often inadequate. 
In some counties committee members took the money which was 
available for schools and used it for themselves. There was 
no system for holding committee members accountable for 
their actions.41 in some places it was difficult to find 
people to serve as school committee members. Even when 
people could be found to serve as committee chairmen, they 
often failed to make the reports which were required and 
could then be fined for neglect.42 
Other problems faced the common schools about 1850. 
There were incompetent teachers, and many teachers were 
fired capriciously. Since most students came from among the 
very poor, the common schools received an unsavory 
40Lefler and Newsome, p. 363. 
41u. S., Bureau of Education, p. 1438. 
42Ibid., p. 1437. 
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reputation. In some cases the schoolhouses were occupied by 
the destitute seeking shelter. Older students often forced 
out younger ones, and overcrowding also resulted from more 
students attending in the fall when they were not needed on 
farms. 
One explanation for these problems was the lack of 
leadership. Until 1853 the Literary Board actually served 
as the chief executive of the state common school system, 
but the operation of the schools was left to local officials 
with no training or experience. As a consequence, the state 
legislature on 4 December 1852 created the office of General 
Superintendent of Common Schools for the State. This 
officer was to be chosen by the legislature for a two-year 
tenure. The legislature selected Dr. Calvin Henderson Wiley 
as the first state superintendent, and he began his duties 
on 1 January 1853. Through his eminent leadership, the 
common schools of North Carolina became a beacon among the 
Southern states.^3 
The duties specified for Dr. Wiley included receiving 
reports on the numbers of certificates awarded to male and 
female teachers by county chairmen. He obtained reports on 
the conditions of the schools and reported them to the 
governor and legislature. Dr. Wiley supervised the schools 
adeptly and enforced the laws concerning schools. He also 
^Lefler and Newsome, p. 363. 
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gave school committeemen information on teacher 
qualifications, distributed forms, compiled school laws, and 
established other necessary institutions.44 
One of the most critical issues which Dr. Wiley faced 
was the training and certification of teachers. Until this 
time the only act of certification was examination in each 
county by a committee of no more than five to determine 
mental and moral qualifications of teachers and to issue 
one-year certificates to those who passed such scrutiny. 
This certification was important since salaries were 
contingent upon this endorsement.45 
To improve the certification of teachers, Braxton 
Craven, president of the Normal College in Randolph County, 
published in 1850 a plan for the preparation and education 
of teachers.46 The state legislature in the same year gave 
the school the authority to issue certificates. Its 
recipients, thus, had the right to teach in any of the 
common schools in the state. With such a certificate, 
teachers did not need to undergo any additional examination 
by county school committee members. In return for a loan 
from the state, this Normal College continued to prepare 
44jj. S., Bureau of Education, p. 1430. 
45Ibid. 
46Knight, p. 197. 
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teachers until 1859, when it became Trinity College and 
ended this particular relationship with the state. 
By 1855 there were 2,995 school districts in the 
State.48 On 10 February 1855 the state legislature passed a 
new education law. It was a revision and reenactment of the 
basic school law without the return to the old decentralized 
former system. This new law defined sources of revenue for 
the Literary Fund and regulated the common schools as they 
had been previously.^ As a result of this new education 
law, the duties of the superintendent "were directed largely 
to introducing new ideas, to improving the quality of the 
teachers, and to securing punctuality and faithfulness in 
the disbursement of money."^0 
Civil War 
North Carolina entered the Civil War Era with one of 
the best public school systems among the Southern states. 
It was already providing students with a good foundation 
(albeit elementary) in reading, writing, arithmetic, 
geography, grammar, North Carolina history, and United 
States history. Improvements continued on 23 December 1864 
with the legislature on passing a graded school bill which 
47Ibid. 
48Noble, p. 158. 
s., Bureau of Education, p. 1441. 
50Ibid. 
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would enlarge and extend upon the common schools. It 
established a graded school in any common school district 
whereby students who had completed instruction in the common 
schools could go on to advanced study. For the first time 
the schools, including primary and graded, were termed "the 
public schools of North Carolina" and 
When funds would justify, the school was to be divided 
into the primary and high school departments, and it 
was the duty of the superintendent to recommend a 
course of study for the higher departments. So­
under the leadership of Dr. Wiley, the schools in North 
Carolina remained open during the Civil War. Concerned that 
the Literary Fund might be used to finance the war, he 
successfully rallied officials and the legislature to 
protect the fund. In 1861 a bill was introduced into the 
General Assembly to use the school fund for military 
purposes, but it was rejected. This attitude prevailed 
during the war, enabling the schools to remain open although 
there were reduced financial resources and fewer teachers. 
In the spring of 1861 the finances from the Literary Fund 
were temporarily diverted making disbursements late that 
year. Nevertheless, after this occasion disbursements were 
paid regularly. 
With the end of the Civil War, the common school system 
in North Carolina collapsed. Most of the principal in the 
51Ibid., p. 1459. 
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Literary Fund had been retained in state banks and railroad 
stocks, which were considered the best investments at the 
time.52 unfortunately, the end of the war brought about the 
collapse of the state's banking system. As banks failed, 
the investments in them were worthless. Railroad stocks 
paid no dividends.̂ 3 Some of the county chairmen had 
invested county school funds in Confederate bonds, which 
were of no value at war's end.^4 In his last report of 18 
January 1866, Dr. Wiley recommended that any monies left in 
the Literary Fund be paid directly to the schools; however, 
these funds were inadequate to salvage the loss of other 
revenues. 
Dr. Wiley remained in office as state school 
superintendent until the Constitutional Convention Ordinance 
of 19 October 1865 abolished all offices which were in 
existence as of 26 April 1865. He saw the pre-eminent 
Southern school system come to devastation along with almost 
every other institution. But it had taken great courage to 
start a system of common schools and to bring to fruition a 
public school system in North Carolina: 
The introduction of a school system in North Carolina 
was a courageous undertaking. The people were 
s., Bureau of Education, p. 1460. 
53soyd, p. 284. 
S^Ibid. 
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conservative, there were few nearby examples of public 
education effort, and the experiment was a novelty.55 
Reconstruction Era 
The Reconstruction Era following the Civil War was a 
difficult time for the cause of public education in North 
Carolina. Partisan politics, carpetbagger rule, concerns 
about freedmen, fear of mixed schools, and poverty created 
indifference toward the public schools. These conditions 
and the loss of the Literary Fund contributed to the feeling 
of demoralization.5® State railroad and state bank 
investments were sold at low prices and any securities held 
in North Carolina or the Confederacy were worthless. The 
conservatives who were in control made no appropriations for 
the schools and virtually assigned responsibility for public 
education to the counties. Although General Assembly action 
in 1866 approved school support through taxation, few 
counties levied any taxes for the schools.57 
The Constitution of North Carolina of 1868, necessary 
for the state's readmission to the Union, devoted an entire 
article to education. It provided for an elective 
superintendent and required the General Assembly, through 
taxes or otherwise, to provide for a general and uniform 
system of free public schools open to children ages six 
55Knight, p. 196. 
5®Lefler and Newsome, p. 499. 
57Ibid. 
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through twenty-one.^8 However, legislation never provided 
for a free and uniform system of public schools. Such a 
system did not occur until 1933, when the legislature 
extended the term of school to eight months and accepted the 
responsibility for underwriting a minimum program.̂ 9 
Although the Reconstruction Constitution and 
legislation advocated a minimum term and provided various 
ways to raise and distribute money, inequalities still 
existed. The limit set by the Constitution on property 
taxation aided in the inequity. The Constitution provided 
that the ad valorem tax could not exceed 66-2/3 cents on 
$100 of property, and the poll tax could not exceed $2.^0 
Disparities were further exacerbated with the graded schools 
of the 1870's because wealthy districts levied local"taxes 
to provide for the graded schools. 
County commissioners were given the financial 
responsibility to maintain and operate the schools and were 
to be indicted if they did not provide at least a four 
months' school term and at least one school in each 
district.The legislature was empowered to pass a 
58Ibid. 
J. Henry Highsmith, "Secondary Education in North 
Carolina," North Carolina Education, February 1936, p. 220. 
^Erwin, "a State Supported School System," North 
Carolina Education, February 1936, p. 234. 
^Lefler and Newsome, p. 499. 
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compulsory attendance law. This Constitution and the School 
Law of 1869 re-enacted many of the school laws from 1839 and 
the subsequent ante-bellum period. Three major changes were 
a school term of four months, provision for a general school 
tax, and education for Negroes. 
In 1869 the state legislature approved a poll tax of 
$1.05 on every male between the ages of twenty-one and 
fifty. Seventy-five percent of this tax was to be paid to 
the state treasury in order to finance the public schools.̂2 
Also $100,000 was approved to pay teacher salaries. The 
aggregate of these amounts would presumably assure a four 
months' school term.unfortunately, these funds were 
never provided, for there was a shortage of monies in the 
treasury: 
The 1869 school law, a very intelligent and 
liberal one for its day, might have produced an 
excellent school system had the act been rigidly 
enforced. But the effective school system envisioned 
by the authors of this law was only partially 
established. The fact that the administration of the 
school system was in the hands of Superintendent of 
Public Instruction, the Reverend S. S. Ashley. . ., a 
carpetbagger from Massachusetts, and his assistant, 
J. S. Hood, a Negro carpetbagger, created suspicion and 
lack of confidence. The State's financial resources 
were limited, schoolhouses were few and in bad repair, 
and none of the State's appropriation of $100,000 was 
immediately available for schools. The collection of 
62Noble, p. 315. 
^Hugh T. Lefler, History of North Carolina. Volume II 
(New York: Lewis Historical Publishing Company, Inc., 
1956), pp. 640-641. 
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poll taxes was incomplete, and many townships failed to 
provide schools in accordance with the law."4 
Charles Coon, who studied school support and North 
Carolina courts, identified three difficulties facing the 
development of the public school following 1868.65 First 
were the indifference to the problem of illiteracy and 
widespread repugnance for taxation necessary to alleviate 
it. Second, 
. . .centers around the singularly narrow and 
reactionary interpretation placed by our highest court 
during all those thirty-six long years upon section one 
of Article V of our State Constitution as it read 
before it was amended in 1922, which interpretation 
resulted in such a limitation of taxation as to render 
impossible any adequate financial support of the 
pathetically meager minimum four months school term 
prescribed by the Constitution of 1868. ° 
Third was the conservative interpretation placed on Section 
7, Article VII, which held that the cost of schoolhouses and 
the support of the schools was not an essential municipal 
expense except under certain conditions. Streets, bridges, 
utility plants, town halls, fire stations, market houses, 
and slaughterhouses were considered the necessary expenses. 
The principle of public taxation had been approved, but 
the application of that principle of the needs and 
changed conditions of the state proved very difficult. 
The theory of the law enacted was that through taxation 
a school fund sufficient to furnish comfortable 
64 Ibid., p. 641. 
^^Charles L. Coon, "School Support and Our North 
Carolina Courts 1868-1926," The North Carolina Historical 
Review, July 1926, p. 3. 
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schoolhouses and pay the salaries of teachers for four 
months would be provided. But this theory was never 
realized as fact. Under the law the township committee 
gave the township trustees an estimate of the 
additional amount of money needed to meet the expenses 
of a four months term. If after a vote of the people 
the township trustees failed to levy the tax then it 
was the duty of the county commissioners to levy and 
collect it.°7 
The General Assembly provided the machinery in 
1868-1869 to establish public schools and the means to 
support a four months' school term. However, this 
commitment was nullified by public distaste for taxes, 
indifferent public attitude about illiteracy, and opposition 
from local officials and the courts. While some local 
officials tried to carry out the law, many did nothing.̂ 8 
In Township Number 3 of Craven County, the people voted 
against a township level in regard to the establishment of 
public schools. Despite their vote, the county 
commissioners levied the necessary tax. In return, angry 
citizens sought an injunction against this levy and its 
collection, claiming that it was not a necessary expense and 
disregarded the equation of taxation provisions of the 
Constitution. 
The Superior Court which heard the Craven County tax 
case ruled against the citizens. On appeal, the North 
Carolina Supreme Court in Lane v. Stanly reversed the 
^Erwin, "A State Supported School System," p. 234. 
®^Coon, p. 7. 
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decision of the Superior Court.69 The decision held that 
townships could not tax for school purposes, that counties 
could not levy township taxes for school purposes from 
general county taxes, and that any county tax for school 
purposes must observe the equation of taxation. No tax was 
levied, and the four months' school term died insofar as it 
was dependent upon any additional tax from the township to 
supplement the state funds. This decision of 1870 served to 
retard educational progress in the State: 
Indeed, the enemies of the schools won a great 
victory by virtue of the provisions of that memorable 
case of Lane v. Stanly. They had secured the opinion 
of our highest court that the people, acting through 
their General Assembly, could not exercise their taxing 
power for schools over the townships (school districts) 
through the county commissioners, even in aid of the 
school term those same commissioners were made 
indictable for not maintaining, because schools for 
townships (school districts) and for other 
municipalities created by the General Assembly were not 
such a necessary municipal expense for which taxes 
could be levied without the approval of a majority of 
the qualified (registered) voters.^0 
Another factor affecting the low state of public 
education in the state following the Civil War was the talk 
of mixed schools for whites and Negroes. There is no 
evidence that any desegregation actually took place during 
this period. In fact, there were no public schools for 
69Erwin, p. 234. 
^Coon, p. 9. 
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Negroes prior to 1865.The Constitution of North Carolina 
of 1868 made no reference to the separation of the races in 
the school; however, the Constitution was amended in 1875 to 
provide for separate schools for whites and Negroes.The 
legislature in 1877 approved two normal schools, one for 
each race. The normal school for whites was a summer 
session at the University of North Carolina, while the one 
for blacks was established in Fayetteville.73 
Efforts for the education of blacks in North Carolina 
came from a variety of sources. Humanitarian organizations 
and churches from the North worked to help illiterate 
Negroes and to establish schools for blacks. The Peabody 
Fund expended money for teachers and normal schools, while 
the Rosenwald Fund assisted with construction of 
schoolhouses. The most active educational agency for Negro 
education was the Freedmen's Bureau. 
The United States Congress approved an act for a Bureau 
for the Relief of Freedmen and Refugees on 3 March 1865. It 
was organized in North Carolina on 15 July 1865 and operated 
until 1 January 1869. The Freedmen's Bureau opened 431 
71w. F. Credle, "Schoolhouses During the Century," 
North Carolina Education, February 1936, p. 271. 
^Lefler and Newsome, p. 502. 
73Knight, p. 197. 
7̂ Lefler, North Carolina History Told by 
Contemporaries, p. 329. 
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schools for blacks, employed 439 teachers, and at one time 
had more than 20,000 students enrolled in its schools.75 
But it was greatly resented. 
Recovery from Civil War 
The first tangible movement toward recovery in 
education came about in the towns and cities of the 
state from 1870 on. While some limited private 
endowments had been available and while the common 
school fund had been established, schools failed to 
function because of the lack of a sound taxation system 
to provide the funds. This placed the responsibility 
for the development of education squarely upon local 
shoulders.76 
Greensboro accepted this challenge and became the first 
school system in the state to establish a system of graded 
schools. Its city charter, which was amended in May 1870, 
called for a school district coterminous with corporate 
limits which would operate graded schools for an eight 
months' school term.77 It also approved special local funds 
to supplement state monies. In May 1875 the charter was 
amended again, obligating the district to an increase in 
taxes for the benefit of public schools.78 
During the years 1875-1885, free public graded schools 
were established in Greensboro, Raleigh, Salisbury, 
75Ibid., p. 328. 
76G. B. Phillips, "The Development of the Graded 
Schools," North Carolina Education, February 1936, p. 211. 
77Ibid. 
78Ibid. 
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Goldsboro, Durham, Charlotte, Wilmington, Fayetteville, and 
Winston-Salem. This movement gained strength with 
legislative action in 1876. The towns and cities which 
established graded schools usually adopted special taxes for 
their support. Legislation in 1881 and 1883 made additional 
provisions for graded schools, whereupon more communities 
approved special taxes in order to better their school 
facilities. Empowering trustees to act for the graded 
schools was the beginning of the special charter systems 
which existed until 1933. They are today's city 
administrative units. 
The graded schools ". . .became the light set upon a 
hill urging and beckoning on the whole program of 
educational endeavor."79 The communities which adopted 
graded schools extended the school term and generally 
improved education in their areas. Graded schools made 
possible instruction in music, art, physical education, and 
vocational education. An emphasis was placed on supervision 
and trained school personnel, and according to G. B. 
Phillips, "curriculum building and curriculum supervision 
[became] a direct result of the graded school system 
sponsored by some communities in the state."8° Equipment 
standards and buildings were better planned. Since systems 
^^Ibid. 
80Ibid., p. 212. 
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with graded schools paid higher salaries, they attracted 
teachers with better qualifications. Graded schools 
improved conditions for both students and teachers, 
eventually, facilitating special classes, health programs, 
testing activities, study groups, and additional teachers to 
reduce student-teacher ratios. 
By January 1877, with Democrats again in control of the 
State government, the legislature approved eight and 
one-third cents tax on property and twenty-five cents poll 
tax to be levied annually by the county commissioners for 
the support of the schools. In addition to these state and 
poll taxes, a tax on liquor was to go to the school as well 
as the revenues from fines, forfeitures, and penalties.81 
Legislation in 1877 enabled county commissioners to levy 
annually a special tax to maintain one or more public 
schools in each school district for a four months' school 
term. The levy could be undertaken only if other revenues 
provided were insufficient and if it had been submitted to 
and approved by the voters. However, this direction was not 
mandatory upon the commissioners. 
By 1881 the legislature increased the property tax to 
twelve and one-half cents on $100 and approved a poll tax of 
thirty-seven and one-half cents.82 Of particular 
81Noble, p. 384. 
82Ibid., p. 389. 
importance, it changed the word "may" in section 26 of the 
law of 1877 to "shall," which made levying a special tax 
mandatory rather than discretionary.83 In addition to this 
slight increase in tax support for the schools, the 
legislature of 1881 also provided for county superintendents 
and county teachers' institutes, authorized additional 
normal schools for each race, and established standards for 
the examination of public school teachers. 
Of course, tax rates varied throughout the counties of 
North Carolina, while power development and industrial 
growth made some counties wealthier than others. At the 
same time there was a demand for better schools: 
The financial strength of the counties measured in 
terms of property valuation varied. As a consequence 
the tax rate was the same in all parts of the state; 
but the length of term, notwithstanding the 
constitutional requirement for uniformity, was 
unequal.84 
In response to the inequity and insufficiency of taxes 
levied by the State in support of public schools to maintain 
one or more schools in each district for a four months' 
term, the General Assembly in 1885 authorized county 
commissioners in every county to levy a special tax 
annually. This special tax could exceed the 66-2/3 tax 
authorized in the Constitution in order that schools could 
operate for a period of four months or more. The General 
83Ibid. 
84Erwin, "A State Supported School System," p. 235. 
Assembly said that a minimum four months' school term must 
be maintained by special county tax approved by the 
commissioners even if the people did not approve it in 
referendum, that limitations on the tax rate did not apply 
to the establishment of schools in each district for a 
minimum four months' school term, and that the Constitution 
did not demand a referendum on a tax levy to support the 
minimum term.85 
The Commissioners of Sampson County levied a special 
county tax to provide the four months' minimum term. Once 
the commissioners proceeded, S. Barksdale and others 
enjoined the collection. The Sampson Superior Court agreed 
with Barksdale. On appeal, the Supreme Court in Barksdale 
v. Commissioners of Sampson County affirmed this decision.86 
The Supreme Court held that commissioners, in levying a tax 
sufficient to support a four months' school term, could not 
exceed the tax limitations set by the Constitution and that 
the action to the contrary by the General Assembly was 
unconstitutional and void. It further stated that the 
General Assembly could not authorize a county tax to 
maintain schools since a special tax was for special 
purposes, and that when the Constitution did not 
S^Coon, p. 12. 
6̂Coon, p. 13. 
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give to commissioners the means to provide a four months' 
term, then they or their employees could not be indicted.87 
According to Coon, 
Surely, that part of the opinion of the court 
which attempted to nullify the power of the General 
Assembly even to authorize a special county tax for the 
support of public schools beyond the tax limitation of 
Section 1 of .Article V of the Constitution reflects the 
utmost reactionary narrowness of constitutional 
construction ever promulgated by a North Carolina 
court. ... It must be asserted, therefore, that such 
a court decree as that promulgated in the Barksdale 
case certainly indicates that the majority of our court 
as late as 1885 was unable to take any large or 
broad-minded view of the meaning and intent of the 
public school provisions of the Constitution of 1868.88 
As a result of the Barksdale case, many counties were 
left with schools being open fewer than four months every 
year. Some towns such as Greensboro, Raleigh, Salisbury, 
Goldsboro, Wilmington, Fayetteville, Durham, and Charlotte 
established schools for 180 days by special voter approved 
taxation granted in advance by the legislature. The 
Barksdale decision of 1885 remained in effect until 1907, 
making local taxation for schools practically impossible.89 
As the Nineteenth Century ended, questions and concerns 
remained about the qualifications of teachers. In 1869 the 
office of county examiner was created, and in 1873 three 
examiners were provided to evaluate prospective teachers. 
87Coon, pp. 13-14. 
88Coon, pp. 14-15. 
89Knight, p. 198. 
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In 1881 county superintendents examined applicants and 
approved one year certificates for the county of issuance. 
Until 1881 certification was obtained and retained almost 
exclusively by successful completion of examinations. After 
1881 county teacher institutes were begun and remained the 
primary means for certification until 1922. They were run 
by county superintendents and teachers were required to 
attend.^ 
In 1897 a form of state uniformity was achieved with 
the creation of the State Board of Examiners. These 
examiners, appointed by the State Board of Education, 
prepared questions, graded the examinations, and granted 
First Grade life licenses which were valid for five years in 
any county of the state. Experience was one means of 
certificate renewal. Examiners made recommendations through 
the office of the county superintendent. Later in 1899 
county superintendents were given assistance for the 
operation of the county institutes. Their help came from 
the State Board of Examiners, from faculty at the normal 
schools, and from practical teachers who had been approved 
by the State Board of Examiners. 
^Ojames E. Hillman, "The History of Teacher Training," 
North Carolina Education, February 1936, p. 225. 
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1900-1915 
The years 1900-1915 saw a renewed campaign for 
education in North Carolina. Its leaders were Thomas J. 
Jarvis, a former governor; Charles B. Aycock, governor; 
Charles D. Mclver, educator; and Edwin A. Alderman, 
superintendent of schools in Goldsboro. Governor Aycock 
called a conference of state leaders to consider public 
education. Ministers were even encouraged to preach once a 
year about public education. Strong interest in schools was 
also supported by superior court judges who instructed grand 
juries to report on the conditions of the schools.91 During 
this time the legislature accomplished the following: 
passed a compulsory attendance law, provided for public high 
schools, established farm-life schools, increased the school 
term from four to six months, and provided a state 
equalization fund.92 
One of the first acts of the legislature when Aycock 
became governor was the appropriation of $100,000 for an 
equalizing fund. The legislature 
. . .introduced a new principle of school support by 
appropriating annually an additional $100,000 to be 
known as an Equalization Fund and to be so distributed 
as to extend the school term, as nearly as might be, to 
the four months specified in the Constitution.93 
91-Knight, p. 198. 
92Ibid. 
93Erwin, "A State Supported School System," p. 235. 
57 
In the same legislature cities and towns, as well as special 
school tax districts and counties as a whole, were 
authorized to vote taxes if the state provision would not 
support one or more schools in a district for at least the 
four months' term. By 1904 the $100,000 for counties was 
doubled by the legislature and the old Literary Fund was 
reorganized into a revolving fund to provide loans for 
building and improving schools.94 
By 1907 the legislature authorized the establishment of 
rural high schools and appropriated annual monies for their 
maintenance. This authorization began a state system of 
public secondary education. The Supreme Court in 1917 held 
that the high school was a part of the public school system 
and subject to constitutional requirements. 
In 1907 the commissioners of Franklin County levied a 
one cent special property tax and a three cents special poll 
tax to maintain a four months' term. The levy exceeded the 
66-2/3 cents state limit. A taxpayer in the county objected 
and sought an injunction to prohibit the levy. Collie v. 
Commissioners of Franklin County went to the North Carolina 
Supreme Court, which reversed the Barksdale decision of 
1885.95 The decision held that while the limitation on 
taxing power of the General Assembly remained, it did not 
94S. Huntington Hobbs, Jr., p. 251. 
9̂ Coon, p. 16. 
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always prevail and should not prohibit other expenses 
directly provided for in the Constitution. The General 
Assembly had properly left the amount to county officials, 
who had the responsibility for providing a four months' 
term. When it was achieved, then the tax limitations of the 
Constitution would be in effect. According to Coon, 
That reversal of the Barksdale case was truly a great 
victory for the schools, as well as for more 
enlightened constitutional construction. The dead hand 
of reaction and literalism was no longer to prevail.96 
Following 1918 amendments mandating a six months' 
school term, the legislature adopted a plan for the state to 
support schools for three months, while the county through 
the property tax would provide the additional three months' 
support. The county was also to provide for building and 
other incidental expenses for the complete term. In an 
effort to assure the mandatory six months' term, the 
legislature in 1921 created an Equalizing Fund Commission, 
later to become a State Board of Education, to appropriate 
monies after specified appropriations had been made in order 
that an adequate minimum six months' term could be assured 
in each county. Additional legislation would follow in 
later years supporting an equalizing fund to insure the 
mandatory school term.97 
96Coon, p. 17. 
97a. M. Proctor, "The Equalization of School Support," 
North Carolina Education, February 1936, p. 285. 
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The first two decades of the twentieth century also saw 
the passage of legislation to regulate the adoption of 
textbooks. Uniform textbooks were authorized for elementary 
and high schools. The adoption for elementary schools was 
the beginning of a uniform adoption system and supply of 
textbooks to the public schools of the state. In 1901 the 
General Assembly appropriated money to aid the purchase of 
books for free public school libraries. Although some of 
the larger counties had library books prior to this date, 
this action was the state recognition of the need for books 
in addition to textbooks.98 
Teacher certification and training also saw advances. 
Beginning in 1905, teachers had to be examined not only in 
the subjects of elementary school but also in the theory and 
practice of teaching in order to receive their certificates 
for grades one, two, or three. The five-year certificate 
was added, with the state superintendent providing a system 
of graduation, examination, and certification. Certificates 
were classified into primary, intermediate, and high school 
levels. The State Board of Examiners prepared questions and 
graded the examinations. The certificates were approved for 
acceptance by any county in the state. By 1907 
certification standards were extended to high school 
98Mary P. Douglas, "The Growth of Our School 
Libraries," North Carolina Education. February 1936, p. 233. 
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teachers. In 1915 the State Board of Examiners could accept 
at its discretion successful experience and academic and 
professional credits from approved colleges and universities 
as substitution for an examination. This general approach 
to state certification continues until today. 
The General Assembly in 1881 gave to Goldsboro and 
Durham the right to establish graded schools independent of 
their counties and to divide any voter-approved special 
school taxes on the basis of race. Special taxes on the 
property of whites were to go for the support of graded 
schools for whites and those on the property of blacks to 
schools for them. In 1883 the General Assembly authorized 
any school district to levy a special tax for schools, the 
proceeds of which were to be divided on the basis of race. 
Special acts were also passed legalizing the division of 
special taxes on the basis of race. Since the Constitution 
forbade discrimination in favor of the schools of either 
race, the North Carolina Supreme Court in Pruitt, Pasour and 
Others v. Commissioners of Gaston County and Riggsbee v. 
Town of Durham stopped this practice since it did not 
provide for the uniform levying of taxes and discriminated 
between the races.̂ 9 This decision was good news for black 
schools, which in comparison with schools for whites had 
more poorly prepared teachers, only the four months' 
9^Coon, p. 21. 
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term, and inadequate buildings and equipment: "Improvements 
in Negro public schools followed the same pattern as in 
white schools, though they were less expensive and poorer in 
every respect."100 
1913-1929 
North Carolina continued to make advances in public 
education during the years 1913-1929. The minimum school 
term increased by four to six months, and school attendance 
was compulsory for children ages eight through twelve. 
Improvements were made in school administration and finance. 
More attention went to the training and certification of 
teachers. More money was directed to the state equalizing 
fund, and there was an emphasis on building and equipping 
modern schoolhouses. 
In 1918-1919 vocational education became a part of the 
public school system as a result of the Smith-Hughes Act 
approved by Congress in February 1917.101 It provided a 
subsidy to the states for teaching agriculture, home 
economics, trade and industrial subjects and monies for 
cooperation in the training of teachers and for their 
supervision. Funds came to the state for the vocational 
program on a matching basis. 
l°°Lefler and Newsome, p. 558. 
101T. e. Browne, "Vocational Education in the State," 
North Carolina Education, February 1936, p. 222. 
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Special building funds were approved by the state 
authorizing counties to borrow from the state at low rates 
of interest to build schools. Special building funds had to 
be used for schoolhouse construction with the requirement of 
a definite and county-wide organization. Other requirements 
were a standard elementary and high school program resulting 
from consolidation and standards for schoolhouse 
construction. 
Effects of Depression 
The Depression of 1929 affected schools as it did every 
aspect of American life. Property values collapsed. 
Revenues turned down while school costs rose. All high 
schools would probably have closed had not the legislature 
in 1929 approved a tax reduction plan which enabled high 
schools to remain open for an additional two months beyond 
the six months required by the Constitution. In effect, the 
state accepted the responsibility for school operation 
beyond that one mandated by the Constitution.1^2 
The Depression also meant that school building bond 
issues ceased. The only funding for construction came from 
the Literary Fund. Limited funds existed for maintenance 
and upkeep. The General Assembly of 1931 faced a difficult 
situation. As the costs of education continued to rise, and 
many counties were unable to collect local taxes in order to 
102grwin, "A State Supported School System," p. 236. 
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pay their obligation. Some counties had gone to script; 
some teachers had not been paid in full for the previous 
year. 
Some assistance came from the Federal Relief Agency. 
Started in North Carolina in 1932, it expended funds for 
construction and. maintenance and the general improvement of 
school facilities. The Public Works Administration also 
made funds available for school plant construction. 
The State had been trying for some twenty-four years to 
equalize tax rates through the use of the equalization fund 
to support a six months' school term. However, a wide range 
of tax rates remained among counties due to shifting values 
and school costs. To address these problems, "The State as 
a whole, therefore, underwrote on the basis of State 
standards of cost, the operation of the constitutional term 
in every district of the State."103 But tfte state would not 
pay costs on county standards. 
Counties could still supplement each object and item of 
expenditures to bring their schools up to their own 
standards. Yet any extension beyond six months of the 
school term by counties could not be undertaken without a 
vote of the people. Since 1903 and the education revival 
-^Biennial Report of the Superintendent of Public 
Instruction of North Carolina For The Scholastic Years 
1930-1931 And 1931-1932, Part I Summary and Recommendations 
(Raleigh, N. C.: Issued by the State Superintendent of 
Public Instruction, n.d.), p. 6. 
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undertaken by Governor Aycock and others, many districts had 
voted special taxes. But the Great Depression wrought its 
misery, and in 1933 the legislature abolished all local 
taxes for the mandated school term.104 
This action brought about a true state supported system 
for an eight months' school term funded mostly from state 
funds and at state standards of costs. Funding came from 
legislative appropriations, fines, forfeitures, penalties, 
dog taxes, and the poll taxes collected in administrative 
units. Other provisions were enacted to reduce costs of the 
schools. Reduced salary schedules for superintendents, 
teachers, and principals were adopted. Rural supervisors 
were eliminated and fewer principals were allocated. The 
teacher/student ratio was increased. The State School 
Commission was to manage and supervise the transportation 
system. And all expenditures were to be monitored for 
economics. The number of school districts was reduced. 
Administrative units could still tax to supplement the 
budget or to extend the term to 180 days, but it could be 
done only after an approval vote by the people. Only twelve 
districts could get the voters to approve such an additional 
tax.105 
104Erwin, "The Growth of Public Education," pp. 277, 
286. 
105Erwin, "A State Supported School System," p. 264. 
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One of the factors impacting on school costs was 
transportation. Originally, no legislation had been enacted 
specifying those to be transported. Generally, students 
rode buses if they wanted to go to a better school. 
As the State assumed more responsibility for costs, it 
began to exercise more control over transportation. In 1933 
when the State assumed funding for a uniform eight months' 
term, it also established certain guidelines for 
transportation.The School Machinery Act of 1935 gave to 
the State School Commission the authority and the 
responsibility for operation of a transportation system for 
students. However, important responsibilities were 
delegated to local superintendents. 
The School Machinery Act approved the establishment of 
routes by local officials subject to state approval. 
Maintenance and repairs were to be a local obligation with 
state supervision and direction. The state provided in each 
county a garage for maintenance, supplies for the operation 
of a transportation system, and mechanics. While the state 
accepted the responsibility for replacing buses, the 
counties, through local taxation, could provide buses to 
relieve overcrowding. These actions in the early Thirties 
lO^Claude p. Gaddy, "School Transportation," North 
Carolina Education, February 1936, p. 232. 
laid the foundation for the system still in operation 
today.107 
Recovery from the Depression 
In 1941, the General Assembly made other improvements 
in the system of public education. The state increased its 
support funding for the schools, doubled its support for 
vocational education, and began the movement toward 
establishing the twelfth grade. An increase in teacher 
salaries and establishment of a retirement system for 
teachers and other state employees were other improvements 
begun in the Forties. 
A continuing source of concern was the supervision and 
administration of the public school system. Prior to 1943 
there were five separate boards involved with the 
supervision of the public schools. The primary ones were 
the State Board of Education, which concerned itself with 
the professional aspects of education, and the State School 
Commission established in 1933, which supervised the 
state-financed school program begun then.^8 
By amendments to the Constitution in the early Forties, 
a single State Board of Education was created. It had the 
authority to divide the state into school districts and to 
107Ibid., p. 262-263. 
^O^Paul W. Wager, North Carolina: The State and Its 
Government (New York: Oxford Book Company, 1947), p. 89. 
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consolidate them. Teachers were affected through its power 
to assess their qualifications, to determine the number 
needed, and to establish salaries for them. The State Board 
was also to select and adopt textbooks, to make rules and 
regulations relating to census and attendance, and to 
establish bus routes. In setting forth criteria for 
financial records and reports, it administered the state's 
permanent school funds and expenditures, not only for actual 
instruction and support activities but also for 
transportation and operational costs. The State Board also 
granted permission for local education agencies to take 
certain responsibilities, as well as administering federal 
monies received for vocational education.109 
The Superintendent of Public Instruction was designated 
the secretary to the State Board of Education and the 
administrative head and executive officer of the public 
schools with primary responsibility for directing state 
operations in instruction and the professional features of 
administration. One responsibility was to develop and to 
approve causes for elementary schools and programs and 
standards for high schools. Other responsibilities were 
approving building plans, acting as liaison between the 
state and local education agencies, reporting on the 
109s. Huntington Hobbs, Jr., North Carolina; An 
Economic and Social Profile (Chapel Hill, N. C.: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1958), pp. 219-220. 
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condition of the schools, enforcing the laws and regulations 
relating to the schools, and generally looking after the 
interests of the public schools. The Superintendent was to 
share his administrative duties with a controller, who would 
be appointed by the Board and who would be concerned with 
fiscal matters. In the words of historian S. Huntington 
Hobbs, 
In implementing the constitutional provisions of 
1945, which created a State Board of Education and 
state superintendent of public instruction, the General 
Assembly of 1945 provided, in effect, for two executive 
officers of the state board. The constitutional 
amendment, which recognized the necessity of 
centralizing responsibility and of placing authority 
for the several functions relating to schools in a 
single source, replaced the five agencies existing in 
1943 with the single newly created board. In contrast, 
in violation of the unitary intention of the amendment, 
.the implementing law as set up by the General Assembly 
in sections 8 and 9 calls for a procedure and course of 
action based on a division of authority in that it 
creates both the superintendent of public instruction, 
with jurisdiction in matters of educational policy, and 
the controller, with jurisdiction in financial affairs. 
This division of authority may prove a source of 
trouble in the event these two officials do not 
maintain common understanding and friendly cooperation 
in carrying out their several duties for public 
education. 
1950-1985 
The last thirty-five years in North Carolina has seen 
continued improvements in North Carolina's schools, 
beginning with the gubernatorial administration of Kerr 
Scott in 1949-1953, of Terry Sanford in 1961-1965, and of 
James B. Hunt in 1977-1985. These administrations saw 
110Ibid., pp. 220-221. 
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authorization of bond issues for the schools and creation of 
programs for gifted students such as the Governor's School, 
a summer program for gifted students, and the North Carolina 
School of Science and Mathematics, a residency program. 
State initiatives in research took place and the State 
adopted a state-wide kindergarten program and primary 
reading program. The State also authorized an Annual 
Testing Program to assess student abilities and a Competency 
Testing Program to determine the learning of basic skills 
for high school graduation. Moreover, the Basic Education 
Program will insure an adequate instructional program for 
every student in the State. HI 
During this period the State reacted to and undertook 
the integration of its public schools. Governor William B. 
Umstead and the General Assembly were generally cautious 
about implementing the United States Supreme Court decision 
of 17 May 1954, Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, which 
ended the dual school systems based on race.H2 on 3 June 
1954 the State Board of Education voted to continue 
segregation for the 1954-1955 school term. 
IHn. C., North Carolina State Board of Education, The 
Basic Education Program for North Carolina's Public Schools 
Revised January 1986. 
119  Lefler and Newsome, p. 650. 
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Governor Umstead in August of that same year appointed 
a committee headed by Thomas J. Pearsall to develop the 
State's response to the Brown decision. The General 
Assembly of 1955 adopted the Pearsall Plan, which made 
changes in basic school laws: (1) eliminated from laws any 
reference to race; (2) gave local boards the authority for 
enrollment and assignment; (3) gave ownership, operation, 
and control of school buses to local units; and (4) provided 
for yearly rather than continuing contracts for teachers and 
principals. As a consequence of these changes, blacks had 
to pursue admission to more than 160 school units rather 
than to one. 
In 1969 a federal district court ruled that the State 
must take some responsibility in desegration. In a special 
summer session of the General Assembly in 1956, a 
constitutional amendment, which was later ratified by the 
people, provided that if parents did not want their children 
to go to public schools with members of other races, then 
they could withdraw them and receive state private tuition 
grants. The Pearsall Plan, a safety valve, was a peaceful 
adjustment to integration and made North Carolina a model 
for the voluntary acceptance of integration. In the summer 
of 1957, school boards in Charlotte, Winston-Salem, and 
Greensboro voted to admit black students to formerly all 
white schools. 
In 1966 an NAACP lawyer noted that there were 
approximately six per cent of black students enrolled with 
white students. New federal guidelines, notably the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, were enacted to encourage Southern 
desegregation. Freedom of choice was acceptable if it 
resulted in desegregation; however, in 1968, freedom of 
choice was negated by the federal courts, which required 
affirmative action by Southern school districts to 
desegregate. Most North Carolina desegregation occurred 
between 1968 and 1972 under plans negotiated with the United 
States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare via 
thirty-nine court orders. I-*-3 On the other hand, there was 
only token integration in North Carolina for more than ten 
years after the United States Supreme Court decision 
outlawing segregation. Resistance to integration in the 
form of Ku Klux Klan rallies, threats, and openings of 
private schools were all too frequent. But by the 1970's 
North Carolina had the most completely integrated schools in 
the nation according to statistics from HEW. 
In its continuing emphasis on improving the quality of 
its teachers, the State Board of Education in October 1978 
H3Angela Davis, "N. C. Integration: 20 Years of 
Change," File on the Public Schools of North Carolina, 
Newspaper Clippings Without Masthead, n.d., Instructional 
Materials Library, Division of Instructional Services, State 
Department of Public Instruction, Raleigh, N. C. 
114Ibid. 
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adopted a Quality Assurance Program. Its goal was and 
continues to be a systematic and ongoing approach to quality 
assurance in both teacher education and certification. In a 
partnership among local school systems and institutions of 
higher learning, this program has provided an improved 
program of professional laboratory experiences. It also 
emphasizes that success in the teaching professional is 
demonstrated by the prospective teacher1s knowledge in 
English usage, literature, fine arts, mathematics, social 
studies, and science. This proficiency must be demonstrated 
prior to admission into a program of professional studies. 
QHP identifies the competencies required of teachers for 
certification and extends professional education of teachers 
into the first years of full time teaching. It also 
requires a review of teaching performance prior to issuance 
of continuing certificates. 
As a part of the effort to improve the lot of teachers, 
the State Board of Education in accordance with a 
legislative mandate developed and adopted on 5 September 
1984 a Career Development Plan for Teachers and 
Administrators. It is a bold plan for the training, 
evaluation, classification, differentiation, and salary 
compensation for those whose performance merits remunerative 
reward in the State's teaching profession. 
-'--'-̂ "Career Plan," Chalk Talk (Raleigh, N. C. : North 
Carolina Association of Educators, Inc., n.d.) 
In 1983 the General Assembly considered the reduction 
in disparities in education spending and services available 
to the school age children of the State. It directed the 
State Board of Education to define a basic educational 
program and its cost. With the adoption one year later of 
legislation directing the development of a standard course 
of study for every North Carolina student, the Basic 
Education Program was enacted. It calls for a basic program 
of instruction equalizing educational opportunity among 
school districts. The State will have the responsibility 
for funding the instructional program while counties must 
build, operate, and maintain school buildings and grounds. 
This program defines the curriculum, high school graduation 
and promotion standards, facilities standards, maximum class 
size, staffing, and minimum length of the instructional day. 
As a result of this program, every child in North Carolina, 
regardless of residence in the state, shall have the same 
opportunity of an adequate educational program defined by 
the State. Local administrative units may exceed (at local 
expense) the basic program in programming, facilities, and 
staffing. It is expected that this program will be fully 
implemented by 1993. 
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TABLE 1 
CHART OF IMPORTANT DATES 
HISTORY OF EDUCATION 
NORTH CAROLINA 
1705 Charles Griffin, the first professional teacher in 
North Carolina, was sent to Pasquotank County by the 
Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign 
Parts through the Established Church of England. 
1760 First academy established by Reverend James Tate at 
Wilmington. Crowfield Academy established in 
Mecklenburg County near the present site of Davidson 
College. 
1772 A school for little girls established by the 
Moravians at Salem. This ultimately developed into 
Salem Female Academy, later Salem College. 
1776 Adoption of a constitutional provision for 
legislative establishment of schools and for a 
university. 
1825 Establishment of the State Literary Fund by General 
Assembly to subsidize schools. 
1839 "An Act to divide the Counties into School Districts 
and for other purposes" — first Common School Law 
drawn by William W. Cherry. It established the 
principle of combined state and local funds for 
school support and provided for election of area 
superintendents. In the election of August 8, 
nearly every county voted favorably. 
1852 Election of Calvin H. Wiley, first General 
Superintendent of Common Schools. 
1860 Plan of graded school system outlined at the annual 
meeting of the State Educational Association. 
1864 Legislature passed graded school bill. 
1865 Legislature recognized right of the Negro to be 
educated. Establishment of: Shaw University, 
Raleigh, and Washburn Seminary, Beaufort, the first 
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Institutions for Negroes set up to offer courses 
above the elementary level. 
1868 State Constitution adopted, authorizing the office 
of State Superintendent of Public Instruction to 
replace the earlier abolished office of 
Superintendent of Common Schools, and creating a 
State Board of Education. 
1869 General Assembly added general school tax, a 
prescribed four-month school term, and education of 
Negroes. 
1870 First public white graded school aided by money from 
a city treasury established in Greensboro. 
1901 Governor Charles B. Aycock's influence increased the 
number of local tax districts, abolished 300 school 
districts by consolidation and reorganized the old 
Literary Fund, setting aside a revolving loan for 
schoolhouse buildings. 
1903 The Literary Fund set aside exclusively as a means 
of building and improving schoolhouses. 
1907 Legislature authorized the establishment of rural 
high schools and appropriated $45,000 annually for 
their maintenance. Normal schools for teacher 
training established. 
1913 Local bond issues for school construction 
authorized. Four months compulsory school 
attendance for ages 8-12. Compulsory Attendance Law 
passed. 
1914 The establishment of the first County Training 
Schools for Negroes with the aid of the John F. 
Slater Fund. Money for support of vocational 
education in public schools including agriculture, 
trade, home economics, and teacher education 
provided by Smith-Lever Act. 
1915 By this date there was a public high school in every 
county. Publication of the first list of high 
schools accredited by the State University. The 
beginning of the Rosenwald Building Program for 
Negro schools. 
1917 State certification of teachers begun on a definite 
standard of training. Responsibility of 
certification of all teachers given to Central State 
Board of Examiners. Smith-Hughes act providing 
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Federal aid for the teaching of agriculture and home 
economics in public schools accepted. High schools 
declared by the supreme court to be a part of the 
public school system. 
1918 The first accredited high schools for Negroes, all 
attached to institutions of higher learning -- four 
state supported and seven private. Aid on equipment 
in high schools from the General Education Board. 
1920 First listing of high schools accredited by the 
State Department of Public Instruction. 
1921 The General Assembly provided the first Special 
Building Fund of $5,000,000 to be loaned to the 
counties for building and equipping schoolhouses. 
The establishment of the Division of Negro Education 
in the State Department of Public Instruction. The 
staff included a High School Inspector of Negro 
schools. 
1928 Provisions made for county-wide organization of 
schools. The first public high schools for Negroes 
were accredited by the state — Durham, Reidsville, 
Wilmington and Method. 
1929 Beginning of Rosenwald aid on libraries and bus 
transportation in Negro schools. 
1931 Complete support for a term of six months of school 
assumed by the state. Minimum state support of 
school libraries. School Machinery Act passed. 
1933 Complete support for a term of eight months of 
school assumed by the state. 
1935-36 State textbook rental plan established. 
1937-38 Free textbooks provided for grades 1-8. 
1942 Constitutional amendment provided State Board of 
Education appointed by the Governor. Twelfth grade 
added. 
State-supported school term extended to nine months. 
School lunch program created. 
1943 
1946-47 Compulsory attendance age extended from 14 to 16 
1947 General Assembly authorized State Board of Education 
to use public funds for special education programs. 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1957 
1963 
1964 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1971 
1972 
1973 
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$50 million bond issue for school construction 
passed. 
U. S. Supreme Court ruled against separation of 
races in public schools in Brown v. Board of 
Education of Topeka. 
Pearsail Plan presented to General Assembly, 
resulting in transfer from State Board of Education 
to county and city boards, complete authority over 
enrollment and assignment of children in public 
schools, and buses. 
Community College Act passed. 
Governor's School, a summer program for gifted 
students, founded. $100 million bond issue for 
school construction passed. 
National Civil Rights Act passed; discrimination in 
public education prohibited. First state-funded 
experimental program, the Comprehensive School 
Improvement Program (CSIP), implemented. 
Advancement School for students with learning 
disabilities established. Learning Institute of 
North Carolina (LINC) created to provide research in 
education. 
General Assembly provided for free textbooks in all 
high schools. 
Report of Governor Dan Moore's Study Commission of 
the Public School System of North Carolina. 
State-wide experimental kindergarten approved by 
General Assembly. 
State Superintendent designated chief administrative 
officer of the State Board of Education, as well as 
secretary. General Assembly's State government 
reorganization names State Department of Public 
Education, with the State Board of Education as its 
head, to include the Department of Public 
Instruction, the Department of Community Colleges, 
and the Controller's Office. 
First regional education service centers 
established. 
$300 million bond issue for school construction 
passed. General Assembly provided funds for 
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ten-month term for teachers, twelve months for 
principals. 
1975 The Primary Reading Program initiated. State 
Superintendent designated chief administrative 
officer of the State Board of Education, as well as 
secretary. General Assembly's State government 
reorganization names State Department of Public 
Education, with the State Board of Education as its 
head, to include the Department of Public 
Instruction, the Department of Community Colleges, 
and the Controller's Office. $300 million bond 
issue for school construction passed. General 
Assembly provided funds for ten-month term for 
teachers. 
1976-77 Kindergarten made available to all children in the 
state. 
1977 Legislation passed authorizing both an Annual 
Testing Program and a Competency Testing Program. 
Testing began in 1978. 
1979 Non-public school responsibility removed from State 
Board of Education. 
1980 The North Carolina School of Science and Mathematics 
admitted its first students -- the first school of 
its kind in the nation. 
1981 A State Board of Community Colleges established. 
SOURCE: J. Henry Highsmith, "Secondary Education in 
North Carolina," North Carolina Education, February 1936, p. 
2 2 0 .  
SOURCE: "Through the Years: A History of Public 
Schools in North Carolina," State Deparment (N. C.) of 
Public Instruction, January 1983, pp. 5-9. 
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CHAPTER III 
NORTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT 
History 
The history of the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
begins with the first organized government in the state. In 
the grant of Carolina to the Lords Proprietors, justice was 
invested in eight sub-kings. Kemp Battle explains, "They 
were vested with all the royalties, properties, 
jurisdiction, and privileges of a county palatine,as large 
and ample as the county palatine of Durham."2 
The eight Lords Proprietors claimed those same powers 
which had been used by the Bishop of Durham. These powers 
included the right to create barons, to appoint judges, and 
to call Parliament. Among other powers were those to levy 
taxes, to coin money, to grant pardons, and to approve 
corporations. 
^A count palatine in England or Ireland had sovereign 
power in a royal province or dependency and royal privileges 
and rights within his domains. Philip Babcock Gove, 
editor-in-chief, Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged (Springfield, 
Mass.: G & C Merriam Company, 1971), p. 1623. 
2Kemp P. Battle, "An Address on the History of the 
Supreme Court," North Carolina Reports, no. 103 (February 
1889), pp. 445-446. 
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To carry out this government, the Lords Proprietors 
organized in 1669 under the Fundamental Constitutions of 
Carolina, or Grand Model. The Supreme Courts so created 
were to be presided over by one of the Lords Proprietors in 
person or by deputy. 
These were to be eight grand courts. The Proprietors 
would make up the highest court to be presided over by the 
oldest member, an approach styled after the Palatine. 
The other Proprietors would preside over their own courts as 
chief judges. 
In organizing themselves under the Grand Model in 1669, 
the Proprietors named Anthony Ashley Cooper, then Lord 
Ashley, later Earl of Shaftesbury, the first Chief Justice 
of North Carolina. In 1670 Shaftesbury transferred his 
appointment to his deputy, a Mr. John Willoughby, who became 
in practice the first chief justice.^ 
Willoughby and the deputies of the other Proprietors 
became the Council who also served as the upper house of the 
Assembly of Albemarle. Unfortunately, the Grand Model could 
not be fully implemented by the Proprietors. As a result, 
they instructed the Governor and Council to establish courts 
and appoint judges as nearly as possible to the provisions 
within it. 
•*Ibid., p. 447. 
^Ibid., p. 448. 
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The Governor and Council became a Court of Chancery 
exercising almost arbitrary powers as an appellate court 
to decide equity, common law, and fact. The Chief Justice, 
as a deputy of the Proprietors, was a member but not 
necessarily the Chancellor. The Chief Justice presided over 
the General Court, which was the supreme common law court.^ 
The earliest record of any General Court, in 1694, 
reported the hearing of cases on the laying out of roads, 
attachments, actions in debt, trespass, and criminal action. 
It also heard cases on escheats, assumpsit, and detinue.^ 
In 1728 the Proprietors transferred their jurisdiction to 
the Crown, which assumed it in 1731. 
Later the royal governor Johnston dissolved the 
Assembly and appointed a new meeting place in Wilmington,^ 
where the Assembly assigned New Bern as the seat of 
government and passed a court bill of 1746. The supreme and 
principal Court of Pleas for the Province, called by its old 
name, the General Court, was to meet twice a year in New 
Bern. The Crown and Governor respectively appointed the 
^Ibid., p. 449. 
^Escheats are the forfeitures of lands to the original 
grantor or lord when one left no heirs. Assumpsit permits 
recovery of damages for the non-performance of a simple 
ccontract. Detinue permits the recovery of personal 
property acquired lawfully, but keeps it without right. 
Henry Campbell Black, Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth ed. 
(St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1951), pp. 640, 157, 
537. 
^Battle, p. 458. 
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Chief Justice and the three Associates. Until this time, 
the Chief Justice usually sat with two to ten assistants who 
were justices of the peace. There being opposition to these 
governmental changes both in the colony and in England, some 
disorder resulted.® 
In 1767 a new five year court system was adopted, 
calling for five judicial districts at Edenton, New Bern, 
Wilmington, Halifax, and Hillsboro. Court was held twice a 
year by the Chief Justice and two Associates. However, the 
act initiating this system was not renewed, and the Province 
had no higher courts from 6 March 1773 to 24 December 1777.9 
The royal governor Martin attempted to institute 
criminal courts by special commission, but public opposition 
prevented them from being developed. Crime and turbulence 
were rampant as a result of the suspension of the courts. 
In preparation for the Revolutionary War, the State Congress 
meeting in Hillsboro in August 1775 adopted a provisional 
government and empowered the functions of a judiciary to the 
Committees of Safety.1® 
The Constitution of North Carolina adopted on 18 
December 1776 provided for the separation of legislative, 
executive, and judicial power. The framers of the 
®Ibid., p. 460. 
9Ibid., p. 463. 
lOlbid., p. 464. 
Constitution envisioned judges of the supreme or appellate 
court setting in the trial of causes but made no provision 
for superior court judges.H The General Assembly was to 
select the judges of the Supreme Courts of Law and Equity 
and Judges of Admiralty. Judges of the Supreme Court were 
to have adequate salaries and to hold office for "good 
behavior." The Constitution contemplated that the Supreme 
and Superior Court Judges should be the same. 
In the colonial government, the Chief Justice was a 
member of the Council; thus, he was a part of the executive 
branch of government. Since the Council served as the upper 
house of the Assembly, he also served as a member of the 
Legislature. Thus, while the North Carolina Constitution of 
1776 prohibited the mixing of the three branches of 
government, this same constitution made the executive and 
judicial branches almost entirely dependent on the General 
Assembly. According to Kemp Battle: 
They (judges) held office during good behavior, but 
they could be removed by repeal of the law authorizing 
the court. They were to have adequate salaries, but 
the Assembly had the sole decision as to what was 
adequate. The Assembly, without the intervention of a 
grand jury, could prosecute them by impeachment for 
alleged maladministration or corruption.12 
Ha trial of causes is civil or criminal litigation 
before a court of justice. Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged, 
p. 279. 
•^Battle, p. 466. 
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The General Assembly organized the judiciary according 
to provisions set forth in the North Carolina Constitution 
of 1776. In 1776 it divided the state into six districts 
and added others in later years. Judges rode circuits 
separately but sat together as an appellate or Supreme 
Court. In the court law adopted 15 November 1777, the term 
"Superior Court" was used when actually the term "Supreme 
Court" should have been used because of its supreme 
jurisdiction.^ 
In 1799 the legislature authorized the court to meet 
twice a year in Raleigh to hear charges against the 
Secretary of State and others concerning the fraudulent 
issue of land warrants and to hear appeals from cases in 
district courts. This authorization was to expire in 1802, 
but the responsibility to hear appeals was extended in 1801 
for three more years. The court was now called a "Court of 
Conference" and was made a court of record in 1804. In 1805 
the name was changed to "Supreme Court,"14 although judges 
were still trial judges. 
In 1810 judges were required to give their opinions in 
writing and to deliver them by voice in open court. They 
also elected one of their own, John Louis Taylor, as Chief 
Justice, bringing the new court to six judges. Two 
13Ibid., p. 467. 
14Ibid., p. 476. 
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continued to represent a quorum, and all judges rode the 
circuits. Party to a suit in Superior Court now had the 
right to appeal to the Supreme Court on questions of law. 
Finally in November 1818 the legislature effected the 
Supreme Court as promised by the North Carolina Constitution 
of 1776; that is, it was required to sit in Raleigh to hear 
appeals, instead of presiding as trial judges. The first 
session of the newly actualized North Carolina Supreme Court 
was on 5 January 1819. The legislation of 1818 provided for 
three judges elected by the General Assembly, who selected 
one of their own as Chief Justice. John Louis Taylor 
continued as Chief Justice. 
The North Carolina Constitution of 1868 provided for a 
Chief Justice and four associate justices. Until this time 
the members of the Court other than the Chief Justice were 
known as judges. Justices were to be elected by the people 
to eight-year terms. Vacancies would be filled by the 
governor until the next general election. Originally, the 
North Carolina Supreme Court had only three members from 
1818 to 1868 and again from 1875 to 1889. From 1868 to 1875 
and from 1889 to 1937 the Court consisted of five members.^ 
Since 1937 the Court has consisted of the Chief Justice and 
six Associate Justices. 
15john L. Cheney, Jr., ed., North Carolina Manual 
1983-1984 (Raleigh, N. C.: State of North Carolina 
Publications Division, n.d.), p. 766. 
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The Supreme Court of North Carolina has thus functioned 
as an appellate court since 1805. Since it is not a trial 
court, it does not hear witnesses, has no juries, and does 
not rule on questions of fact. It does hear oral arguments 
on questions of law coming from records and briefs of cases 
previously tried by Superior Courts, District Courts, and 
certain administrative agencies and commissions. Due to its 
customary judicial business and because of post-conviction 
appeals arising from United States Supreme Court decisions 
on constitutional issues, the North Carolina Supreme Court 
has been one of the most active in the nation. 
To relieve some of the workload on the court, the 1967 
General Assembly created a Court of Appeals after voters 
approved authorization of a constitutional amendment. The 
Court of Appeals and the North Carolina Supreme Court, the 
highest court in the State, represent the appellate process 
in the North Carolina judiciary system. 
Capital and life imprisonment cases are appealed 
directly to the Supreme Court while all other cases are 
initially appealed to the Court of Appeals. When a case has 
special constitutional significance, the Supreme Court may 
in some instances hear a case without its passing through 
the Court of Appeals first. Otherwise, any case may go to 
the Supreme Court after a determination has been made by the 
Court of Appeals; however, cases decided by the Court of 
Appeals involving constitutional issues, general rate-making 
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cases from the Utilities Commission, and cases decided by a 
split vote in the Court of Appeals must be given a second 
appellate hearing by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, it has 
the final say on important issues of law. 
Views on the North Carolina Supreme Court 
How has this court and the judiciary been described? 
Walter Clark, North Carolina Supreme Court Justice, 
1902 to 1924, and Chief Justice from 1903 to 1924, summed up 
the role of the courts in the following way: 
The work of all courts is in large measure temporary; 
but there is a still larger part which abides and 
shapes the future. Our civilization is like the coral 
islands, built by individual and forgotten workers, on 
whose labors each successive generation climbs to 
higher things. The work of the courts is a potent 
factor in our civilization. It bears the impress of 
the present but remains to instruct the future, as 
imprints of a passing shower of ages ago are preserved 
in strata of sandstone. 6̂ 
He believed that the people govern themselves through their 
representatives and not through their judges. Popular 
sovereignty required that the judiciary not increase its 
power over the legislative process. Clark believed that 
encroachment on this branch reduced the control the people 
had over their government. To this end Chief Justice Clark 
believed that judges should enforce the laws, but not make 
them. The legislature should make rules of law, the 
^Walter Clark, "The Supreme Court of North Carolina. 
Ill," The Green Bag IV (December 1892): 589-591. 
executive should carry them out, and the courts should 
interpret them. 
This approach has become a precedent for the North 
Carolina Supreme Court. Susie Sharp, Justice of the North 
Carolina Supreme Court from 1962 to 1975 and Chief Justice 
from 1975 to 1979 agreed: 
As she once put it, there are four steps in deciding a 
case: (1) state the facts; (2) state the issue raised 
by the facts; (3) state the law relevant to the issue; 
and (4) decide the issues in light of the law. 
In adhering to the view of Chief Justices Clark and Sharp, 
North Carolina Supreme Court justices should apply the law 
and not enact it. If they believe that legislation is 
needed, then they should state that opinion; but legislation 
should not be made through judicial decree. In spite of 
this philosophy, within limits justices do make law and 
policy by interpreting statutes and by applying the common 
law which represents past judicial decisions made in 
accordance with existing views on public policy. 
In reviewing the available, but limited literature on 
the North Carolina Supreme Court, two views seem to prevail: 
(1) it has established a good reputation but (2) it stalled 
for a time the development of education in the state. 
One of its clerks had this to say about the North 
Carolina Supreme Court: 
John V. Orth, "The Role of the Judiciary in Making 
Public Policy," N. C. Insight 4 (April 1981): 12. 
* 
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Probably no feature of our Government has caused so 
much discussion, received so much admiration, and been 
more frequently misunderstood, than the Supreme 
Court.18 
Chief Justice Clark pointed out that the North Carolina 
Supreme Court early on established its reputation by being 
the first state judiciary to declare an act of the 
legislature unconstitutional, null, and void: 
To this court belongs the distinction of being the 
first to assert the power and duty of the bench to 
declare an act of the legislature void for 
unconstitutionality. This it did in the case of Bayard 
v. Singleton, at May Term, 1786, shortly before similar 
action by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island. New York 
followed with a similar decision in 1791, South 
Carolina in 1792, and Maryland in 1802. This was novel 
and strong action then. There were no precedents for 
At the Centennial Celebration of the North Carolina Supreme 
Court in 1919, Edwin F. Aydlett, President of the Bar 
Association, and Chief Justice Walter Clark described the 
Court: 
During its existence this Court has stood for law, 
order and justice, and has ably and honestly met its 
obligations in expounding the law and safeguarding the 
rights of the State and its people. It is not a 
18Edward Murray, "Work of the North Carolina Supreme 
Court Pamphlets," 267, Duke University Law Library, Durham, 
N. C., 1. 
•^Walter Clark, "The Supreme Court of North Carolina. 
I," The Green Bag IV (October 1892): 459. 
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law-making body, but its high and solemn duty is to 
declare what the law is and to construct and apply it 
to concrete cases regardless of public favor or 
croaking criticism. It has even been true to its 
sacred trust, yet progressive and fearless.2° 
The people of North Carolina have every cause to be 
proud of the reputation and achievements of this 
honorable court. It is a great court -- great in its 
conception, in its personnel and in its jurisdiction. 
Its make-up has been of strong-minded and able men, 
learned in the law; patient, painstaking, and upright 
Judges; and at no time in its history has it failed to 
fully measure up to the purpose of its creation.21 
The pages of our Reports show that we have not 
halted with these reforms, but we have set out upon a 
course that is to emancipate the children by giving 
them education in the public schools and by limiting 
the years within which they can be harnessed down to 
labor, and we are giving to the creators of the wealth 
of the State some recognition by limiting the hours of 
labor.22 
To these views can be added the comments of historians 
who viewed the Court as reactionary and a stumbling block to 
educational progress in the State. Lane v. Stanly in 1870 
established a precedent against school taxes which would 
carry into the Twentieth Century, and, in the words of Hugh 
Lefler, "... the Supreme Court decision had thrown a 
r o a d b l o c k  i n  t h e  p a t h  o f  e d u c a t i o n a l  p r o g r e s s . I n  
2^Edwin F. Aydlett, "Address," Centennial Celebration 
of the Supreme Court of North Carolina 1819-1919 (Raleigh, 
N. C.: Mitchell Printing Company, 1919), p. 8. 
21lbid. , p. 9. 
^Walter Clark, "Address," Centennial Celebration of 
the Supreme Court of North Carolina 1819-1919 (Raleigh, 
N. C.: Mitchell Printing Company, 1919), p. 77. 
2^Hugh T. Lefler, History of North Carolina, Volume II 
(New York: Lewis Historical Publishing Company, Inc., 
1956), p. 643. 
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1885, the Court had the opportunity to reverse this trend in 
Barksdale v. Commissioners of Sampson County, but did not: 
In large measure, the responsibility for 
educational backwardness rested with the reactionary 
Democratic Supreme Court, which was willing to scrap 
the law and the Constitution in response to the general 
opposition to taxation and in defense of the interests 
and rights of property. The opinions of the court in 
Lane v." Stanly in 1870 and Barksdale v. Commissioners 
in 1885 made impossible the establishment of the 
constitutional four months' term; but these opinions 
provoked no protest or political effort to surmount the 
legal obstacle raised by the court. If various 
constitutional provisions were in conflict, the Supreme 
Court could have given supremacy to one as well as to 
another. It sacrificed the educational provisions for 
those on taxation.24 
Finally, in the Collie v. Commissioners of Franklin 
County decision of 1907, this trend was reversed. In fact, 
as one historian has commented, "This reversal of the 
Barksdale decision was a great victory for public 
schools."25 
It is noteworthy that in the period prior to the 
adoption of the Constitution of 1868, no appeals went from 
the North Carolina Supreme Court to the United States 
Supreme Court. In fact, the State Court has been praised 
for its reason and logic. And as a consequence, relatively 
24nugh T. Lefler and Albert Ray Newsome, The History of 
a Southern State, Third ed. (Chapel.Hill, N.C.: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1973), p. 537. 
2^Hugh t. Lefler, p. 722. 
92 
few cases from North Carolina have gone to the United States 
Supreme Court. Michael R. Smith has noted: 
The decisions advanced such clear reason and scholarly 
logic that they are frequently quoted today by courts 
of other states. Indeed their conclusiveness is 
probably the main reason for the relative lack of 
cases to reach the Supreme Court since.̂ 6 
26jyiichael R. Smith, Law and the North Carolina Teacher 
(Danville, 111.: The Interstate Printers & Publishers, 
Inc., 1975), p. 56. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPTS 
ON PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN DECISIONS 
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
NORTH CAROLINA 
Introduction 
In the United States the individual states have the 
responsibility for and control of the public schools. The 
Constitution of North Carolina encourages education and 
calls for a uniform system of schools. Consequently, the 
state obligation for and power over educational policy are 
generally accepted legal principles. In North Carolina, as 
in other states, the courts play an essential role in 
defining the legal principles which define the function and 
role of the public schools. A basic understanding of this 
role is aided by studying the decisions of the state's 
highest court, the Supreme Court of North Carolina. 
Analyzing applicable cases and determining the legal 
principles embodied in them will answer the questions posed 
by this study. Cases are grouped into specific periods of 
time according to the scope of the study and are grouped 
under the major categories of (1) governance, (2) employees, 
(3) pupils, (4) torts, (5) finance, and (6) property. Cases 
are reported according to the major legal principles which 
are reported in each case. A summary of the decisions of 
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the Court in each category of study elucidates some insight 
into the Court's record on cases arising from the inferior 
courts of the state. 
Governance 
During the period 1894-1979 the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina decided twenty-three governance cases. Of these, 
the Court affirmed thirteen, modified and affirmed one, 
reversed seven, and noted two for error. The twenty-three 
decisions point out the following legal principles: (1) the 
purpose of education, (2) constitutional construction and 
interpretation, (3) power of boards of education, (4) office 
holding, (5) and other powers of boards of education. 
Purpose of Education 
The Court has stated the purpose for which the public 
schools exist and the manner in which they should be 
operated. It is governance which embodies the purpose for 
which the public schools were created. In the 1923 Vann v. 
Board of Commissioners of Sampson County-*- case the Court 
pointed out that the public schools exist to educate young 
people mentally and morally under fair and effective laws, 
rules, and regulations. The public schools, thus, provide a 
basis for the development and success of society. 
-'-Vann v. Board of Commissioners of Sampson County, 185 
N. C. 168 (1923), p. 173. 
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Constitutional Construction and Interpretation 
The Court must consider its actions in light of the 
meaning of the Constitution and its interpretations. In 
Hooker v. Town of Greenville^ the Court in 1902 declared a 
law of the General Assembly unconstitutional because the 
legislature could not discriminate in favor of or against 
either the white or colored races in the distribution of 
money for the public schools. Furthermore, the Court held 
that acts of the General Assembly which are so obscurely 
constructed as to preclude enforcement and those which are 
clearly unconstitutional are void. In reviewing 
construction and constitutionality, the Court in the case of 
Hobbs v. Moore County3 in 1966 held that if one 
interpretation holds a law constitutional then that 
interpretation should be used. This decision of the Court 
found that interpretations which result in absurd 
consequences or impossibilities should be avoided, 
especially when a more reasonable approach would not have 
such effects. In addition, laws of the General Assembly are 
presumed to follow the literal meaning inherent in the 
language of the statutes. Local acts prevail over a general 
statute when there is conflict between statewide and local 
2Hooker v. Town of Greenville, 130 N. C. 472 (1902), p. 
478. 
3Hobbs v. Moore County, 267 N. C. 665 (1966), p. 671. 
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application. Legislative understanding and intent are 
important, although Hobbs v. Moore County stresses that 
. . . its meaning can be ascertained from its own terms 
read in the light of existing statutes which must be 
deemed to have been known to and considered by the 
General Assembly.4 
An interpretation of the Constitution by the Court 
resolved the question on the ministerial power of a 
governing body. It would not take a broad view. In 1979 
the Court in Hughey v. Cloninger̂  refused to allow a board 
of county commissioners to appropriate funds for a dyslexic 
school which was not operated by the board of education. 
Since it could not adequately provide educational 
opportunities for learning disabled children, the county 
commissioners used this funding to assist the children. In 
this instance, the Court reaffirmed its 1966 ruling in Hobbs 
v. Moore County Board of Education that if more than one 
statute governs a particular subject, then the one which 
specifically concerns it applies. The Court pointed out in 
Elliott v. Gardner^ in 1932 that the Court has no basis for 
amending the Constitution through judicial interpretation. 
If the provisions of Article IX are obsolete or 
ill-adopted to existing conditions, this Court is 
without power to devise a remedy. However, liberally 
we may be inclined to interpret the fundamental law, we 
4Ibid., p. 672. 
^Hughey v. Cloniger, 297 N. C. 86 (1979), p. 91. 
^Elliott v. Gardner, 203 N. C. 749 (1932), p. 756. 
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should offend every canon of construction and 
transgress the limitations of our jurisdiction to 
review decisions upon matters of law or legal inference 
if we undertook to extend the function of the Court to 
a judicial amendment of the Constitution.7 
Power of Boards of Education 
Local boards of education enjoy considerable 
discretionary power in addition to that which is 
specifically mandated. In 1894 in the case of the Board of 
Education of Duplin County v. State Board of Education8 the 
Court recognized that the State Board of Education has the 
power to make regulations for the public schools and the 
state education fund. The county board of education in 
Kreeger v. Drummond^ in 1952 had the lawful duty to make 
available an adequate school system for all the children of 
the county. But in considering the power of the local 
boards of education, the Court recognized that due 
consideration must be given to the specific provisions 
called for by the law. Such cases as Spruill v. Davenport-^Q 
in 1919 proved that the law is mandatory and not directory 
or optional. 
It is dangerous to attempt to be wiser than the law, 
and when its requirements are plain and positive, the 
7Ibid. 
^Board of Education of Duplin County v. State Board of 
Education, 114 N. C. 313 (1894), p. 320. 
^Kreeger v. Drummond, 235 N. C. 8 (1952), p. 11. 
•^Spruill v. Davenport, 178 N. C. 364 (1919), p. 368. 
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courts are not called upon to give reason why it was 
enacted.H 
County and city boards of education have the 
responsibility to control and to supervise matters 
pertaining to the public schools. In the case of Hughey v. 
Cloninger12 in 1979 the Court emphasized this principle. In 
the development of this view, the Court held in 1894 in the 
case of the Board of Education of Duplin County v. State 
Board of Education-^ that boards of education are lawful 
bodies and can sue and be sued. In addition to this 
corporate status, boards of education have the lawful right 
to exercise the powers conferred by the Constitution of 
North Carolina (according to the Court in the 1922 case of 
Lacy v. Fidelity Bank of Durham).14 one possible constraint 
on this power is the restriction on the unlimited 
expenditure of money. In 1915, in the case of Key v. Board 
of Education of Granville County,^ the Supreme Court held 
that the word approve used in connection with a decision of 
the board of education actually meant that the 
1;LIbid. 
12Hughey v. Cloninger, 297 N. C. 86 (1979), p. 94. 
•^Board of Education of Duplin County v. State Board of 
Education, 114 N. C. 313 (1894), p. 313. 
14Lacy v. Fidelity Bank of Durham, 183 N. C. 373 
(1922), p. 381. 
l^Key v. Board of Education of Granville County, 170 N. 
C. 123 (1915), p. 126. 
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board of education was using its sound judgment in the 
decision-making process. Decisions of the Court also 
address the discretionary power of boards of education. The 
Court in Gore v. Columbus County^ in 1950 held that the use 
of discretion by a board of education should be undertaken 
in good faith. Kreeqer v. Drummond^ in 1952 further 
emphasized that boards of education should act in good faith 
in making orders. This decision means that boards of 
education must recognize any existing facts and how their 
importance may impact on their determination: 
The General Assembly has no power to authorize 
local school authorities to exercise an arbitrary 
discretion, without regard to the existing facts and 
circumstances involved.18 
Boards of education as corporate bodies have an 
existence separate and apart from the members who comprise 
them. As the Court pointed out in 1952 in the case of 
Edwards v. Board of Education of Yancey County,^ boards of 
education can exercise their power only at regular or 
special meetings in which a quorum is present. To act 
legally, boards of education must have a majority vote of 
!®Gore v. Columbus County Board of Education, 232 N. C. 
636 (1950), p. 641. 
•^Kreeger v. Drummond, 235 N. C. 8 (1952), p. 13. 
18Gore v. Columbus County, 232 N. C. 636 (1950), p. 
640. 
•^Edwards v. Board of Education of Yancey County, 235 
N. C. 345 (1952), p. 348. 
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the boards' members. Although not prohibited by statute, 
the Court indicated in the case of Kistler v. Board of 
Education of Randolph County20 in 1951 that it is not wise 
or expedient for boards of education to meet in executive 
sessions and exclude the public. 
In its corporate status, boards of education may 
purchase real property and build schoolhouses. In such 
cases, as the Court in 1959 in McLaughlin v. Beasley2-^ 
pointed out, the individual members of the board possess no 
power separate from the legal corporate power of the board. 
Neither can this power be transferred on to the board of 
county commissioners: 
It is well established that the role of the board of 
county commissioners in the funding .of the school 
budget is not to interfere with the general control of 
the schools vested in the board of education.22 
Boards of education, acting in their corporate 
capacity, constantly make decisions which fall within their 
sound discretion. The Court ruled in 1915 in the case of 
Key v. Board of Education of Granville County23 that it will 
not interfere in that capacity. 
20Kistler v. Board of Education of Randolph County, 233 
N. C. 400 (1951), p. 407. 
21McLaughlin v. Beasley, 250 N. C. 221 (1959), p. 223. 
22Hughey v. Cloninger, 297 N. C. 86 (1979), p. 94. 
23Key v. Board of Education of Granville County, 170 N. 
C. 123 (1915), p. 125. 
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It is the recognized principle with us, upheld and 
approved in numerous decisions of this Court, that 
where discretionary powers are conferred on these 
ministerial boards, the court may not undertake to 
direct them as to how such powers shall be exercised in 
a given case. They may compel such a board to act in 
the premises, but cannot tell them how they must act.24 
Of course, this discretionary power can become action for 
adjudication if boards of education enter upon a system of 
extravagant expenditures. The Court in Lacy v. Fidelity 
Bank of Durham^ in 1922 held that such a condition might 
represent manifest abuse of power requiring judicial 
scrutiny and control. 
In the exercise of discretionary power, boards of 
education must often make decisions about consolidation, 
school site selection, and property decisions. In 1922 in 
Barnes v. Board of Commissioners of Davidson County2^ the 
Court pointed out that county boards of education may 
consolidate special tax districts according to relevant 
State statutes. Gates School District Committee v. Board of 
Education of Gates County^ in 1952 re-emphasized this Court 
principle. The same is true with regard to the adoption of 
a county-wide plan of organization. County 
24Ibid. 
^^Lacy v. Fidelity Bank of Durham, 183 N. C. 373 
(1922), p. 381. 
^Barnes v. Board of Commissioners of Davidson County, 
184 N. C. 325 (1922), p. 326. 
^Gates School District Committee v. Board of Education 
of Gates County, 236 N. C. 216 (1952), p. 218. 
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boards of education clearly have the authority to establish 
new school districts, to consolidate or enlarge existing 
districts, to levy local taxes, or to issue bonds. These 
are the legitimate powers of a board of education as 
expressed by the Court in Blue v. Board of Trustees of Vass 
Graded School District̂  (1924). However, as the Court 
indicated in Jones v. Board of Education of Robeson County^9 
in 1924, a consolidation order which does not comply with 
the law and election held pursuant to it is void. Boards of 
education may also consolidate schools in the same district. 
As pointed out previously, the courts will generally not 
interfere in such discretionary decision-making: 
Ordinarily the courts will not interfere with the 
control and supervision of the school authorities in 
the exercise of their discretion in creating or 
consolidating school districts or in the selection of a 
school site.30 
The same view was expressed by the Court in the case of 
Kistler v. Board of Education-^^ in 1951. In this decision 
the Court indicated that the courts will not restrain the 
sound discretion of a board of education in 
2^Blue v. Board of Trustees of Vass Graded School 
District, 187 N. C. 431 (1924), p. 434. 
Jones v. Board of Education of Robeson County, 187 N. 
C. 557 (1924), p. 560. 
30Qore v. Columbus County, 232 N. C. 636 (1950), p. 
640. 
31-Kistler v. Board of Education of Randolph County, 233 
N. C. 400 (1951), p. 404. 
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schoolhouse sites. The exception occurs only in violation 
of law or manifest abuse of discretion. In its 
determination in the case of Kreeger v. Drummond3̂  the Court 
held that a board of education exercises its discretion when 
it decides to discontinue or transfer a school site. 
Furthermore, the courts will not interfere in creating or 
consolidating school districts unless boards of education 
violate the law or manifestly abuse their discretionary 
duty. The Court in Edwards v. Board of Education of Yancey 
County33 in 1952 referred to the plenary power which boards 
of education enjoy in contracting for a consolidated high 
school building. In 1959 the Court in the case of 
McLaughlin v. Beasley34 called the selection of a school 
site by a board of education the use of its discretionary 
power. 
Office Holding 
The Court has also clarified the conditions for office 
holding and its liability. It defined office holding in 
1898 in the case of State v. Thompson35; 
An office is defined by good authorities as involving a 
delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign 
3̂ Kreeger v. Drummond, 235 N. C. 8 (1952), pp. 10, 12. 
33Edwards v. Board of Education of Yancey County, 235 
N. C. 345 (1952), p. 349. 
34McLaughlin v. Beasley, 250 N. C. 221 (1959), p. 223. 
3̂ state v. Thompson, 122 N. C. 493 (1898), pp. 495-496. 
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functions of government, to be exercised by him for the 
benefit of the public, by which it is distinguished 
from employment or contract. 
This case held that election to two offices makes the first 
vacant if the second is accepted. The officeholder himself 
must decide which position to accept, but the decision is 
made according to preference and qualification for one of 
the two. Such a decision is determined by the plain and 
positive language of the Constitution of North Carolina.3 7 
For example, on accepting the position of mayor, a school 
board member violated the prohibition in double office-
holding. In the 1952 State ex rel. Atkins v. Fortner^S 
case, the Court held that if the member did not voluntarily 
surrender membership in the board of education, the office 
was automatically and instantly vacated upon assuming the 
second office. 
In 1919 the Court held in the case of Spruill v. 
Davenport39 that a public officer is not liable for damages 
resulting from an act carried out in the line of duty. On 
the other hand, it reinforced previous decisions which held 
that if the act for which the officer is not normally 
personally liable was wrongful or malicious, then 
36Ibid. 
37ibid., pp. 497-498. 
3®State ex. rel. Atkins v. Fortner, 236 N. C. 264 
(1952), p. 270. 
3̂ Spruill v. Davenport, 178 N. C. 364 (1919), p. 365. 
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litigation could be instituted against the public officer to 
recover damages for the wrong which was committed. 
In the case of Russ v. Board of Education of Brunswick 
County^Q (1950) the Court addressed the removal of 
commiteemen. School committeemen appointed by a county 
board of education do not hold office at the pleasure of the 
board but for a definite time; they cannot be removed at the 
will or caprice of the board. If the board uses the 
statutory proceedings for removal, the committeemen should 
have a notice of proceedings and charges against them and 
have an opportunity to be heard and to give defense 
testimony. The county board may not remove a committee 
member until it makes a determination following a full and 
fair hearing on the merits of the evidence concerning the 
cause for removal. 
Other Powers of Boards of Education 
In defining the powers of boards of education, the 
Court has identified authority in addition to its mandated 
and discretionary power. A board of education which 
succeeds another has the authority of its predecessor. In 
fact, the successor board has the authority to spend monies 
for the purpose for which the tax providing the fund was 
levied, according to Board of Education of McDowell County 
^ORUSS V. Board of Education of Brunswick County, 232 
N. C. 128 (1950), pp. 129-130. 
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v. Burgin41 in 1934. Also a successor board of education 
can receive the clear proceeds from court levied fines. In 
the Board of Education of Guilford County v. City of High 
Point4̂  case, the Court in 1938 held that the total sum of 
fines and costs in municipal court less only the sheriff's 
fee for collection must go to the governing body of the 
schools. The clerk of the municipal court may not retain a 
percentage for compensation in violation of the provisions 
of Article IX, Section 5 of the Constitution of North 
Carolina. 
Summary 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirms that the 
public schools exist to educate our young people mentally 
and morally under just and effective laws, rules, and 
regulations. In determining questions related to these, the 
Court gives consideration to the constitutionality of 
legislative enactments. Statute construction which is 
obscure, which clearly raises questions of 
constitutionality, and which leads to absurd consequences 
should definitely be declared null and void. In addition, 
the courts consider the express language of state laws, 
statewide and local application of these laws, and 
4•'•Board of Education of McDowell County v. Burgin, 206 
N. C. 421 (1934), p. 424. 
42j3oard of Education of Guilford County v. City of High 
Point, 213 N. C. 636 (1938), p. 636. 
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legislative intent. Generally, the Court will not take a 
broad interpretive view regarding questions of 
constitutionality. It is the conviction of the Court that 
its role is not to amend the Constitution of North Carolina 
through its interpretation of meaning and construction. The 
Court harmonizes statutes on the same subject, generally 
focusing on the view which has more specific application. 
In looking at the authority vested in boards of 
education, the Court first considers what the law requires. 
It recognizes the corporate status of boards of education 
with the exercise of the powers conferred upon them. In 
exercising such powers, boards of education must use good 
faith in their sound judgment and discretionary power. 
Boards of education make important decisions only with a 
quorum present. Although not prohibited, boards, in the 
opinion of the Court, should operate in public view and 
scrutiny. The authority of boards of education cannot be 
passed on to boards of county commissioners. Although the 
Court will not usually exercise judicial restraint on boards 
of education, it may if there is manifest abuse of the 
discretionary power. Boards of education often use this 
discretionary power in deciding questions about school 
consolidation, school site selection, and property 
decisions, for example. 
In resolving questions about governance, the Court 
defines office-holding in North Carolina and liability 
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associated with such office holding. In addition, it speaks 
to the issue of resultant power of successor boards and 
recipient of clear proceeds from fines and forfeitures by 
the appropriate governing body. 
Employees 
During the period 1939-1984 the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina ruled on ten cases concerning employees. Of these 
ten cases, the Court affirmed five lower court decisions; 
affirmed and remanded one; affirmed in part, reversed in 
part, and remanded one; and reversed three. The ten cases 
emphasize the following legal principles: (1) legislative 
intent, (2) corporate status, (3) immunity from suits, 
(4) powers of boards of education, (5) certification, 
(6) judicial restraint, (7) qualified privilege of 
communication, (8) contracts, (9) employment termination, 
(10) employee rights, and (11) judicial standard. 
Legislative Intent 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina stated in the case 
of Faulkner v. New Bern-Craven County Board of Education^ 
in 1984 that any ambiguity in the interpretive meaning of a 
statute must be viewed in the context of the state 
constitution and the intent of the legislature. A fair and 
reasonable interpretation should be used to harmonize 
^Faulkner v. New Bern-Craven County Board of 
Education, 311 N. C. 42 (1984), p. 58. 
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differences in those statutes which relate to the same 
subject. The Court also held in Taylor v. Crisp44 in 1975 
that the manifest purpose of the legislature should not be 
thwarted by any interpretation which leads to absurd 
consequences. The legislature has intended that North 
Carolina have good teachers who are held to a higher 
standard of personal conduct: 
Our inquiry focuses on the intent of the 
legislature with specific application to teachers who 
are entrusted with the care of small children and 
adolescents. We do not hesitate to conclude that these 
men and women are intended by parents, citizenry, and 
lawmakers alike to serve as good examples for their 
young charges. Their character and conduct may be 
expected to be above those of the average individual 
not working in so sensitive a relationship as that of 
teacher to pupil. It is not inappropriate or 
unreasonable to hold our teachers to a higher standard 
of personal conduct, given the youthful ideals they are 
supposed to foster and elevate.4 5 
Corporate Status 
Local boards of education in North Carolina have 
corporate status through statutes enacted by the General 
Assembly. The legislature delineates the powers of a county 
board of education, which is an agency of the state and 
therefore has corporate status. In essence, county boards 
of education may operate and administer the public school 
system, purchase and hold real and personal property, build 
and repair schools, sell and transfer school properties, and 
44Taylor v. Crisp, 286 N. C. 488 (1975), p. 496. 
^^Faulkner v. New Bern-Craven County Board of 
Education, 311 N. C. 42 (1984), p. 59. 
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prosecute and defend suits for and against the corporation 
(Kirbv v. Stokes County Board of Education — 1949)M. 
Thus it seems clear that the General Assembly 
intended to continue the existence of the county board 
of education as a corporate entity with power to 
prosecute and defend suits.47 
Immunity from Suits 
It is an accepted doctrine of the Court, stated in 
Kirby v. Stokes County Board of Education48 in 1949, that 
the State is sovereign and may not be sued in its own courts 
or elsewhere without its consent. This immunity extends to 
boards of education since they are agencies of the State. 
Such immunity is absolute and unqualified unless the State 
or its agencies consent to be sued or waive this immunity. 
For instance, if a local board of education purchases 
liability insurance, it waives its extension of sovereign 
immunity and may be sued, according to the Court's 1979 
ruling in Presnell v. Pell.49 
Powers of Boards of Education 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has continued to 
stress the legal principle of non-interference in the 
discretionary power of local boards of education as applied 
4®Kirby v. Stokes County Board of Education, 230 N. C. 
619 (1949), p. 623. 
47Ibid., p. 624. 
48Ibid., p. 623. 
49Presnell v. Pell, 298 N. C. 715 (1979), p. 721. 
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to provisions set forth in the statutes. In 1971 in Still 
v. Lance50 the Court refused to review the wisdom used by 
boards of education in making employment determinations. In 
respect to this discretionary authority, the Court in the 
case of Harris v. Board of Education of Vance County^ in 
1939 expressed the opinion that in the exercise of authority 
and power boards of education must act in good faith. Thus, 
in employment decisions approval may be given or withheld 
according to the boards' judgment.^2 However, those who 
feel they have alleged wrongs may seek injunctive relief 
upon proper pleadings, finding by the courts, and a hearing. 
This approach is generally the extent to which the courts 
will go in controlling the discretionary power of boards of 
education in personnel decisions: 
He may upon proper pleadings, and upon a finding 
by the court, upon a hearing, that the action of the 
county authorities was in fact arbitrary and capricious 
and actuated by selfish and personal motives, apply for 
and obtain a mandatory injunction compelling the 
defendants to proceed to act upon the election and to 
grant or withhold their approval in good faith, 
uninfluenced by selfish or personal motives. This is 
as far as the courts may go in controlling the action 
of administative units or governmental agencies. When 
a public official fails to act in accord with the 
wishes of the majority of those whom he serves, the 
relief is usually through the ballot box. 3̂ 
50Still v. Lance, 279 N. C. 254 (1971), p. 263. 
^Harris v. Board of Education of Vance County, 216 N. 
C. 147 (1939), p. 150. 
S^ibid., p. 151. 
53Ibid. 
This principle of discretionary power embodies the 
employment decisions which boards of education make. As 
agencies of the state, boards of education have the sole 
authority to employ teachers. G.S. 115-359 (in 1950) noted 
that by express declaration or necessary implication a 
school committee could dismiss or reject employment of a 
principal or teacher before the end of a school year. 
However, approval or disapproval for this action must come 
from the county board of education. Otherwise, it has no 
validity according to the 1952 ruling of the Court in 
Iredell County Board of Education v. Dickson^ which held: 
The action of the district school committee was 
without validity in law, however, because it was not 
approved by the county board of education in meeting 
assembled at any time before the close of the school 
term.^5 
In deciding whether or not to give a teacher career status 
by voting to re-employ or dismiss a teacher, boards of 
education use their discretionary power as the Court held in 
the case of Taylor v. Crisp^ in 1975. 
In exercising its authority and power, boards of 
education must meet as corporate bodies with a quorum 
present. The Court held in the case of Iredell County 
^^Iredell County Board of Education v. Dickson, 235 N. 
C. 359 (1952), p. 362. 
55Ibid., p. 363. 
56Taylor v. Crisp, 286 N. C. 488 (1975), p. 494. 
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Board of Education v. Dickson^ in 1952 that a board is 
composed of different members having power only when meeting 
together as a corporate body in regular or special meetings. 
Board members cannot act individually, informally, or 
separately. Similarly, action resulting from informal and 
individual consultation between the superintendent and a 
board chairperson is not valid since such consultation does 
not derive from the power of the board meeting in its 
corporate status.^8 
Legislative power in North Carolina was conferred upon 
the General Assembly by the Constitution of North Carolina, 
Article II, Section 1. It cannot be transferred to any 
other officer or agency without the establishment of 
standards or its guidance. In its decision of 1971 the 
Court in the case of Guthrie v. Taylorstated this 
fundamental legal principle quite clearly: 
This power it may not transfer to another officer or 
agency without the establishment of such standards for 
his or its guidance so as to retain in its own hands 
the supreme legislative power.®0 
The Constitution of North Carolina delegates the power to 
make rules and regulations to administrative boards or 
5-7 
'Iredell County Board of Education v. Dickson, 235 
N. C. 359 (1952), p. 363. 
58Ibid. 
^Guthrie v. Taylor, 279 N. C. 703 (1971), p. 712. 
60Ibid. 
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agencies. Such delegated power is absolute except to the 
extent limited by the Constitution of North Carolina, the 
United States Constitution, the legislature, or the agency 
which derives its power from the Constitution. Generally 
speaking, no questions about such delegation arise under the 
United States Constitution since the distribution of power 
among state organs, divisions, or agencies is a decision for 
the State itself. 
Certification 
As the Supreme Court of North Carolina will not 
substitute its judgment for that of the local boards of 
education, it applies the same standard to the decisions of 
the State Board of Education. In the case of Guthrie v. 
Taylor62 the Court in 1971 applied this standard to the 
development of certification requirements for the teachers 
of the state: 
There being a reasonable basis for the opinion 
reached and expressed by the State Board of Education, 
in the exercise of the legislative power conferred upon 
it by the Constitution of North Carolina, this Court is 
not authorized to substitute its judgment for that of 
the State Board of Education and to declare the 
regulation, adopted by the Board, invalid on the ground 
that, in our opinion, some other method for earning the 
required credits for renewal would be equally as 
satisfactory in result.63 
61Ibid., pp. 712-713. 
62Ibid., pp. 715-716. 
63Ibid. 
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The General Assembly may delegate to administrative 
officers and agencies the authority to develop rules and 
regulations for the individuals who compose a trade or a 
profession. However, the General Assembly must likewise 
establish the standard which the officers and agencies will 
use to exercise discretionary judgment. Otherwise, the 
governing statute is unlawful.constitution of North 
Carolina confers enumerated powers upon the State Board of 
Education. When the General Assembly is silent on a 
particular issue, then by its enumerated powers the State 
Board of Education has the constitutional authority to 
promulgate and administer regulations for the certification 
of teachers. Under such conditions this authority is 
limited only by the Constitution of North Carolina.̂5 
Certification standards are also applicable unless they are 
unreasonably discriminatory and thus violate the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution or a similar clause in Article I, 
Section 19, of the North Carolina Constitution. If the 
standards are so arbitrary and unreasonable as to deprive 
one of liberty or property, then they may violate the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
^Ibid. , p. 712. 
65Ibid., p. 710. 
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States Constitution or a similar prohibition in the Land 
Clause of Article I, Section 19, of the North Carolina 
Constitution.66 
The Court in Guthrie v. Taylor^7 in 1971 provided 
further guidelines which make possible certification 
requirements for the teachers of North Carolina. To 
classify individuals on a reasonable basis and to provide 
different treatment does not validate the Equal Protection 
Clause of the United States Constitution or Article I, 
Section 19, of the Constitution of North Carolina. 
Obviously then, certification standards can be established 
for those who teach in the public schools of the state. 
Such requirements are a reasonable basis for the improvement 
of classroom performance. Guthrie v. Taylor provides: 
It cannot be deemed arbitrary for the State to 
insist that the teachers in its public schools keep 
their own knowledge abreast of such changes. Nor is it 
arbitrary to require that this be done by one or more 
procedures, which may reasonably be deemed likely to 
produce the desired result, to the exclusion of other 
procedures which might also be deemed reasonably likely 
to do so. Such choice between possibly effective 
procedures is for the rule making authority, not for 
this Court.68 
Judicial Restraint 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina's recognition of 
the discretionary judgment of boards of education or state 
66ibid., p. 713. 
67ibid., pp. 713-714. 
68Ibid., p. 714. 
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agencies is not absolute. The Court recognizes that some 
review of this discretionary power is possible. But this 
review process should occur only after the agency of the 
State establishes the record, gets the facts, and makes a 
decision. The Court in Presnell v. Pell^ in 1979 
recognized that this limited review assures judicial 
restraint: 
The avoidance of untimely intervention in the 
administrative process is a long recognized policy of 
judicial restraint. This policy acquires the status of 
a jurisdictional prerequisite when the legislature has 
explicitly provided the means by which a party may seek 
effective judicial review of particular administrative 
action.70 
In fact, G.S. 115-34 (in 1976) required any challenge 
to the action of a county or city board of education to come 
before that body before being submitted for judicial review. 
Any appeal from an administrative decision goes directly to 
the Superior Court of North Carolina. Effective 
administrative remedy provided by the legislature must be 
used before effective judicial remedy can be undertaken. 
Qualified Privilege of Communication 
Communication between school employees is qualified or 
under conditional privilege only if it is made in good 
69Presnell v. Pell, 298 N. C. 715 (1979), p. 722. 
70Ibid. 
71Ibid. 
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faith. In addition, the Court held in Presnell v. Pell^ in 
1979 that for subject and scope of communication to be 
conditional or qualified, it must come from one having the 
right to uphold it or the legal right or duty in reference 
to it and must be made to someone who has a corresponding 
interest, right, or duty. Conditional or qualified 
privilege becomes actionable in court if express or actual 
malice occurs. 
Contracts 
Whereas boards of education have the responsibility for 
operating the public schools, they may make contracts within 
the limits prescribed by corporate status as a part of the 
machinery to carry out this function. Teachers and 
principals enter into contracts with boards of education and 
must seek any remedy for breach of that contract from the 
boards of education which enter into the contracts. In the 
Kirby v. Stokes County Board of Education73 case (1949), the 
Court summarized the key principles of disputed contract 
resolution. Since the Courts must consider what the 
contract actually requires. The presumption of law holds 
that authorities must demonstrate regularity in the 
72Ibid., p. 720. 
7̂ Kirby v. Stokes County Board of Education, 230 N. C. 
619 (1949), p. 628. 
performance of duties, a complainant must show that the 
contrary has occurred. Mutuality of agreement means that 
there is neither doubt nor difference in understanding of 
the contract by the contracting parties. Differences 
indicate no agreement. A contract, certain and definite, 
defines the nature and extent of service to be performed, 
the place of service, and the person for whom the service 
will be rendered. Compensation is also delineated. If 
these conditions are not met then no enforcement of the 
contract can ensue. A contract means both what is 
specifically expressed and what is implied.^4 In the 1952 
Iredell County Board of Education v. Dickson75 case, the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the implication of 
state law was the re-election of teachers and principals in 
the same manner as the original selection. Elevating a 
probationary teacher to career status (tenure) is a 
discretionary decision of a board of education. If not 
selected to tenure, then a probationary teacher is without a 
contract. In order to provide teachers of ability and to 
offer protection from dismissal for reasons other than just 
cause the State adopted G.S. 115-142. In 1975 in the case 
^^Iredell County Board of Education v. Dickson, 235 N. 
C. 359 (1952), p. 361. 
75Ibid., p. 362. 
120 
of Taylor v. Crisp7^ the Court summarized the reasons for 
the enactment of this statute: 
The manifest purpose of G.S. 115-142 was to 
provide teachers of proven ability for the children of 
this State by protecting such teachers from dismissal 
for political, personal, arbitrary or discriminatory 
purposes. 77 
Employment Termination 
The listing of specific reasons for which a teacher may 
be dismissed, demoted, or employed on a part time basis 
gives job security to teachers. Failure to fulfill 
expectations of the contract may constitute cause for 
dismissal. For example, in North Carolina neglect of duty 
is cause for dismissal. However, it is defined neither by 
statutes nor by the Supreme Court of North Carolina. Yet in 
1981 according to the Court in Overton v. Goldsboro City 
Board of Education7*^, a review of cases from other states 
brings about a common sense definition. In taking this 
common sense approach, the Court has further applied the 
standard of reasonableness.^ 
Regardless of the circumstances to which "neglect 
of duty" is sought to be applied, we think that 
76Taylor v. Crisp, 286 N. C. 488 (1975), p. 496. 
77Ibid. 
7 8 Overton v. Goldsboro City Board of Education, 304 
N. C. 312 (1981), p. 318. 
^Ibid. , p. 319. 
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dismissal under the statute on this ground alone cannot 
be sustained unless it is proven that a reasonable man 
under those same circumstances would have recognized 
the duty and would have considered himself obligated to 
conform.8̂  
As in all cases which come before the courts, determination 
should be based on already established legal principles, 
even though some of the questions which must be resolved can 
be answered only case by case.8̂  
Employee Rights 
The Court held in Presnell v. Pell82 in 1979 that there 
is no constitutional right to an administrative hearing 
prior to dismissal. Of course, in spite of this, due 
process must be somehow guaranteed to public school 
employees. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution is applicable to the issue of discharge only if 
the procedures relating to it violate property or liberty 
interests. While a property right or vested interest can 
come from or be created by statute, ordinance, or express or 
implied contract, its scope is determined by state law.83 
The Court addressed this issue in 1979 in considering the 
dismissal of a school cafeteria manager who was discharged 
without a pre-termination hearing. 
80Ibid. 
81Ibid., p. 322. 
82Presnell v. Pell, 298 N. C. 715 (1979), p. 719. 
83Ibid., p. 723. 
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We conclude that the mere dismissal of plaintiff 
without a pre-termination hearing did not abridge a 
proprietary interest of constitutional magnitude.84 
In addition, the Court in Presnell v. Pell8̂  addressed 
the liberty issue. A liberty interest exists if the right 
to the common occupations of life is affected by 
unreasonable restrictions enacted by the State or its 
agencies. In such a situation an employee may submit a 
claim. Weight is given to the claim if future employment 
may be negatively affected not only by dismissal but also by 
dismissal based on unsupported charges which were not 
refuted. However, the Court held that due process 
requirements could be met at a hearing held before or at a 
reasonable time after discharge. 
Judicial Standard 
The general judicial review standard stated in G.S. 
150A-51 (formerly G.S. 143-315) called for the reversal of 
decisions by boards of education which are prejudicial to 
petitioners. The Court in the case of Thompson v. Wake 
County Board of Education8** in 1977 held that such a 
condition can arise from administrative findings, 
inferences, conclusions, or decisions based on neither 
84Ibid., p. 724. 
85Ibid. 
8̂ Thompson v. Wake County Board of Education, 292 N. C. 
406 (1977), p. 410. 
123 
competent material nor substantial evidence as a part of the 
entire record. The standard of review according to this 
case is a "whole record" test. Although a court may reach a 
different conclusion on the first hearing of contradictory 
evidence, it cannot replace the board's judgment. However, 
in considering all the evidence, the court may consider 
whatever in the "whole record" takes away from the evidence 
presented by a board of education. Thus, a court must 
consider both that evidence which supports the board of 
education's decision and any contradictory evidence or 
inferences arising from the evidence. The Court further 
required that trial judges, in considering the "whole 
record" test, must look at not only the complete testimony 
but also the determination of a Professional Review 
Committee empowered to make findings. Its recommendation is 
considered to be competent evidence. Findings by an 
impartial panel may lessen the substantiality of evidence in 
a board of education's decision. This is especially true if 
the panel draws conclusions different from those conclusions 
determined by the local board of education. A court must 
then decide if the competent evidence is substantial. 
Substantiality occurs if a reasonable mind can accept the 
facts and inferences adequate for the conclusions drawn.^7 
87Ibid., p. 414. 
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In the case of Thompson v. Wake County Board of Education, 
the following conclusion was drawn: 
If a career teacher's ability to maintain good 
order and discipline at school is to be judged solely 
by one incident, the evidence of that incident should 
be clear. We hold the evidence that Mr. Thompson 
neglected his duty to maintain order and discipline was 
insubstantial in view of the entire record.88 
In a dismissal hearing a court must apply the "whole 
record" test and then determine if the substantiality of the 
evidence supports dismissal. In 1984 in the Faulkner v. New 
Bern-Craven County Board of Education8̂  case, the Court 
summed up the "whole record" test by requiring the 
consideration of all testimony, by considering the report of 
the Professional Review Panel as competent evidence, and by 
determining the substantiality of the evidence. Thus, the 
entire record, fact and conclusions, substantiality of 
evidence, and preponderance of evidence are all factors in 
any determination. 
Hearsay evidence is also allowable since the rules of 
evidence do not apply to board hearings in dismissal 
proceedings. In effect, 
. . . rules of evidence shall not apply to such 
hearings and the board may give probative effect to 
evidence that is of a kind commonly relied upon by 
88Ibid., p. 415. 
8̂ Faulkner v. New Bern-Craven County Board of 
Education, 311 N. C. 42 (1984), pp. 50-51. 
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reasonably precedent persons in the conduct of serious 
affairs.90 
Summary 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina holds that any 
ambiguity in the meaning of statutes must be understood in 
light of the State Constitution and legislative intent, 
harmonized to reduce this ambiguity, interpreted reasonably, 
and intended to give North Carolina good teachers. To carry 
out the operation and administration of the public schools, 
boards of education have corporate status. However, as 
agencies of the state boards of education enjoy the 
sovereignty of the state and may not be sued without consent 
unless they waive immunity or purchase liability insurance. 
Repeatedly the Court has refused to control the 
discretionary power of boards of education in such issues as 
employment decisions. In exercising their power, boards of 
education must meet as a corporate body rather than as 
individuals, with a quorum present. The powers which boards 
of education enjoy flow from constitutional definition to 
legislative delegation to agencies of the State. In 
carrying out these powers, the State Board of Education as 
an agency of the State may require certification 
requirements for teachers. The Supreme Court of North 
Carolina, in exercising judicial restraint concerning the 
discretionary power of boards of education or State 
90Ibid., p. 57. 
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agencies, will review decisions only in prescribed 
circumstances and only after the board of education or state 
agency establishes a record, gets the facts, and makes its 
own determination. Employees of boards of education in 
exercising their duties and responsibilities enjoy qualified 
or conditional privilege only if it is made in good faith. 
In carrying out powers, boards of education as corporate 
bodies may enter into contracts with their teachers and 
principals. Employment termination may occur if 
expectations upon which the contract is based are not 
fulfilled. In such matters, cases coming before the Court 
are decided on established legal principles which include 
the constitutional rights enjoyed by employees. In 
determining cases involving employees the Court uses the 
judicial standard of the "whole record." 
Pupils 
During the period 1924-1985 the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina ruled on fourteen cases concerning pupils. Of 
these the Court affirmed six lower court decisions, ordered 
a new trial in one, found error in one, dismissed the appeal 
in one, found error in and remanded one, reversed and 
ordered a new trial in one, reversed and remanded one, 
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded one, and 
reversed one. The fourteen cases address the following 
legal principles: (1) power of boards of education, 
(2) general and uniform system of public schools, 
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(3) compulsory attendance requirements, (4) discipline, 
(5) assignment, (6) discrimination, (7) school fees, 
(8) home instruction, (9) vaccination, (10) secret 
societies, and (11) contract transportation. 
Power of Boards of Education 
The Constitution of North Carolina makes provision for 
a general and uniform system of public education. However, 
the actual establishment and operation of the public schools 
is within the control of the legislature subject only to 
constitutional provisions. The General Assembly has 
delegated to boards of education the authority to make those 
rules and regulations which are necessary for the successful 
management of the public schools. 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has consistently 
supported the power of boards of education in carrying out 
management of the schools for the welfare of pupils. In 
1944 the Court in Coqgins v. Board of Education of City of 
Durham^ held that the Court will abide by the decisions of 
boards of education unless the boards act corruptly, in bad 
faith, or in the manifest abuse of their power. 
General and Uniform System of Public Schools 
The Constitution of North Carolina mandates certain 
provisions to carry out this general and uniform system of 
91-Coggins v. Board of Education of City of Durham, 223 
N. C. 763 (1944), p. 769. 
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public schools. In the case of Frazier v. Board of 
Commissioners of Guilford County9^, the Court in 1927 
summarized some of those provisions enacted by the General 
Assembly. These listings include funding through taxation 
and otherwise, the absence of tuition for those between the 
ages of six and twenty-one, and the division of the state 
into districts. These provisions also allowed for the 
establishment of a longer term than the minimum set by the 
Constitution in accordance with the General Assembly's 
judgment and response to the wishes of the people: 
It cannot be too often emphasized that the controlling 
purpose of the people of North Carolina, as declared in 
their Constitution, is that a State system of public 
schools shall be established and maintained -- a system 
of schools supported by the State, and providing for 
the education of the children of the State — and that 
ample power has been conferred upon the General 
Assembly to make this purpose effective.93 
Compulsory Attendance Requirements 
The State has the inherent right to prescribe 
compulsory attendance for its children. . However, as the 
Court pointed out in State v. Lewis94 in 1927, this 
requirement cannot require all school age children to attend 
the public schools. To do so would serve as an infringement 
on the rights of private schools. 
^Frazier v. Board of Commissioners of Guilford County, 
194 N. C. 49 (1927), p. 61. 
93Ibid., pp. 61-62. 
94State v. Lewis, 194 N. C. 620 (1927), p. 621. 
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It is expected that those in control of school-age 
children shall send their children to school. Failure to 
comply with this requirement may result in criminal charges. 
In such a condition, the Court in 1924 in State v. Johnson^ 
held that a parent could not be held accountable solely by 
the proof of failure to send the children to a public 
school. There could be no valid conviction unless the 
inference of the evidence showed that the parent failed to 
send school-age children to any properly conducted and 
recognized school for the time required during the 
scholastic year: 
It will be observed that the statute does not make 
the failure to cause the attendance of a child, between 
the ages mentioned, in the public school a crime, but 
the offense is defined as the failure on the part- of 
the parent, guardian, or other person having control of 
such child, to cause said child to attend school 
continuously for a period equal to the time the public 
school of the district shall be in session.96 
In another case, a parent removed her daughter from the 
public schools and enrolled the girl in a non-public school. 
In State v. Vietto^ the Court in 1965 held that there was 
no violation of the Compulsory Attendance Law since the 
State's proof that the non-public school was not approved by 
the State was entirely speculative. The Court stated that 
substantial evidence of the offense must be demonstrated. 
^State v. Johnson, 188 N. C. 591 (1924), p. 594. 
^State v. Lewis, 194 N. C. 620 (1927), p. 621. 
97State v. Vietto, 297 N. C. 8 (1979), p. 12. 
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In addition, it must consider both competent and incompetent 
evidence which has been placed in the record. Even if the 
evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State, 
speculative testimony alone requires a directed verdict of 
not guilty. 
Discipline 
Even though children have a right to attend the public 
schools, this right is not absolute. The Court held in 1944 
in Coggins v. Board of Education of City of Durham^ that 
effective schools must establish reasonable rules and 
regulations to operate the schools in an orderly manner: 
The right to attend school and claim the benefits 
afforded by the public school system is the right to 
attend subject to all lawful rules and regulations 
prescribed for the government thereof.99 
In this decision the Court affirmed that the authority to 
make rules and regulations should be used to maintain 
successful management, good order, and discipline: 
It is generally held that local school authorities 
have the inherent power to make rules and regulations 
for the discipline, government, and management of the 
schools and pupils within their district.100 
A county board of education has the authority to 
provide control and supervision over all matters pertaining 
to the public schools within the board's administrative 
98coggins v. Board of Education of City of Durham, 223 
N. C. 763 (1944) , p. 767. 
100Ibid. 
unit. These powers and duties are conferred upon boards of 
education. Such power includes whatever is necessary and 
expedient to provide for good management of and discipline 
within the schools-'-®-'-: 
In doing so, however, it will be kept in mind that the 
local board is the final authority so long as it acts 
in good faith and refrains from adopting regulations 
which are clearly arbitrary or unreasonable. 
In the opinion of the Court, to substitute its opinion and 
judgment for that of a board of education would seriously 
impair the government of the schools. Such an approach 
would place boards of education in a precarious position 
according to the Court. 
Coqqins v. Board of Education of City of Durham asserts: 
The Court, therefore, will not consider whether such 
rules and regulations are wise or expedient. Nor will 
it interfere with the exercise of the sound discretion 
of school trustees in matters confided by law to their 
discretion.103 
Assignment 
Boards of education have the responsibility for 
assigning students to specific schools within their 
jurisdiction. The Court ruled quickly on cases coming 
before it regarding enrollment in and assignment to schools 
since in the 1960's they were of public importance and 
101Ibid., p. 768. 
102Ibid., p. 769. 
103Ibid. 
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needed clarification. The Court in 1956 in the case of 
Joyner v. McDowell County Board of Education-̂  4 established 
some basic guidelines for challenging assignments. It held 
that parents should apply by name to appropriate school 
officials for enrollment of the parents' children only. 
Parents could not apply for others unless the parents were 
the guardians or were serving in loco parentis. Due to the 
differences in the ages of children, the grades they had 
completed, as well as teacher-student ratios, some 
applications might be accepted while others might not --
hence, the rationale for considering applications 
individually rather than en masse. 
The Court also stated that boards of education should 
establish the rules and regulations governing the filing of 
applications for reassignment prior to the opening of 
school. This case also pointed out that parents having 
applications rejected could appeal to the boards for a 
hearing, and then to Superior Court for a jury trial, where 
the cases should be prosecuted individually and not 
collectively.In Applications for Reassignment of 
104Joyner v. McDowell County Board of Education, 244 N. 
C. 164 (1956), pp. 168-169. 
105Ibid. 
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Pupils-*-^ (1958), the Court continued the precedent 
established in Joy'ner about the right to submit an 
application for reassignment. Such a right is the privilege 
of the parent, guardian, or person serving in loco parentis 
for the child seeking reassignment: 
The history of the statute, we think shows that 
the "person aggrieved" permitted to appeal from a 
decision of a school board assigning a child is the 
child assigned or some one acting in behalf of that 
child.107 
This case also held that parents unhappy with the operation 
of a school due to assignment of another pupil must seek the 
reassignment of the parents' own children. Only the parties 
to a hearing have a right to receive the decision of the 
board of education. The remedy is not to appeal the 
assignment of the other pupil^^: 
To say that the parent of every child has a right to 
challenge the assignment of another child because the 
assignment is not in the best interest of his child or 
to challenge the right for any of the other reasons 
provided by statute would, for all practical purposes, 
make the administration of the public school system an 
utter impossibility.109 
I n  r e  H a v e s t h e  Cour t  i n  1 9 6 4  a d d r e s s e d  t h e  i s s u e  o f  
assignment. It emphasized that parents dissatisfied with 
Application for Reassignment of Pupils, 247 N. C. 
413 (1958) , p. 420. 
107Ibid. 
108Ibid. 
109Ibid., p. 421. 
HOln re Hayes, 261 N. C. 616 (1964), p. 621. 
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the assignment of children should apply in writing to 
boards of education for a hearing. The Court emphasized 
that assignment decisions should take into consideration 
the welfare of children: 
It is worthy of note that the statute places all 
emphasis on the welfare of the child and the effect 
upon the school to which reassignment is requested. 11 
1 i o In re Varner the Court in 1966 re-emphasized the 
legal principles already established: county and city 
boards have the authority to assign and reassign students, 
the courts can hear appeals from the orders of boards of 
education, and the welfare of the children must govern 
decisions on assignment requests. It limited the right to 
reassignment when it would interfere with the proper order 
of the schools; when it could endanger the instruction, 
health, or safety of other students; or when assignment was 
to or from another jurisdiction without the consent of both 
boards of education. Furthermore, the board could not 
abdicate or delegate its responsibility to act in the best 
interest of children. 
Discrimination 
In Anson County, a bond order and election for two of 
nine project facilities were described as suitable for 
colored children. The question raised centered on alleged 
111Ibid., p. 622. 
^-^In re Varner, 266 N. C. 409 (1966), p. 415. 
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discrimination against the white race. The Court said in 
Constantian v. Anson County^in 1956 that no 
discrimination against white children existed in violation 
of the Constitution of North Carolina, Article IX, Section 
2. The nine projects mentioned made one complete program 
which at the judgment and discretion of school officials 
would provide plant facilities for all the children of Anson 
County. The Court held that "... the bond order on its 
face does not show discrimination against children of the 
white race. The Constitution of North Carolina, 1868, 
with amendments in 1875, provided for a general and uniform 
system of public schools, tuition free for children between 
the ages of six and twenty-one. The amendments provided for 
separate schools for the white and colored race provided 
there was no discrimination in favor of, or to the prejudice 
of either. In this case the Court found that the 
authorization of bonds was for the overall capital outlay 
needs for all Anson County children. The program which 
differed from plant facilities was not an issue according to 
the findings of the Court. Once the administrative unit 
received funds from the board of county commissioners, the 
commissioners no longer had any responsibility for funds 
administration. This case established the principle that 
H-*Constantian v. Anson County, 244 N. C. 221 (1956), 
p. 223. 
114Ibid., p. 224. 
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physical plant facilities and equipment exist for teaching 
and are irrespective of consideration of race. Being 
suitable for colored children meant additional plant 
facilities would be available where colored children were 
taught.Were the bonds and election invalidated in 1954 
by Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka? The 
interpretation of the Court held that the Constitution of 
the United States did "not require either a compulsory or 
voluntary state system of public schools. Such a decision 
was exclusively a matter of state policy. Brown did not 
require that children of different races be taught in the 
same schools. It provided that children could not be 
excluded from attending the school of their choice solely on 
the basis of their race. If the State or an agency of the 
State provided for such exclusion, then the exclusion would 
represent a violation of Constitutional rights under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Enforcement of the 1875 amendment to the Constitution of 
North Carolina would then be violative of the Equal 
Protection Clause.However, such was not the issue in 
the question before the Court; in the words of the 1956 
Court: 
115Ibid., p. 225. 
116Ibid., p. 227. 
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No one can now foretell in what localities or in 
what buildings or to what extent children of the white 
race and children of the colored race will be taught in 
the same public schools in North Carolina. H7 
Even in disagreeing with the decision in Brown, the 
Court did recognize that the Constitution of the United 
States takes precedence over the Constitution of North 
Carolina- 8̂: 
Our deep conviction is that the interpretation now 
placed on the Fourteenth Amendment, in relation to the 
right of the state to determine whether children of 
different races are to be taught in the same or 
separate public schools, cannot be reconciled with the 
intent of the franters and ratifiers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the actions of the Congress of the United 
States and of state legislatures, or the long and 
consistent judicial interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. However that may be, the Constitution of 
the United States takes precedence over the 
Constitution of North Carolina.H9 
School Fees 
As already noted, the Constitution of North Carolina 
provides for a general and uniform system of free public 
schools. Does this mean that the public schools may not 
charge students incidental and instructional fees? In 1980 
in Sneed v. Greensboro City Board of Education-̂  0 the Court 
said "no." 
117Ibid. 
118Ibid., p. 229. 
119Ibid., p. 228-229. 
l^Ogneed v. Greensboro City Board of Education, 299 N. 
C. 609 (1980), p. 610. 
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We find no constitutional bar to the collecting by our 
public schools of modest, reasonable fees for the 
purpose of enhancing the quality of their educational 
effort.121 
The 1970 amendment to the Constitution of North 
Carolina, Article IX, Section 2 (2) uses the language of 
free public schools. Plaintiffs in this case argued that 
the public schools could not charge incidental or 
instructional fees since the language prohibiting these was 
clear and unambiguous. The Court said it must interpret the 
language according to the intent of the framers who wrote it 
and the citizens who ratified it. Such interpretation would 
take into account the history of the provision, its 
antecedents, the situation prior to its adoption, and the 
purposes to be accomplished in its enactment. The Court 
found that the word "free" had been used in the Constitution 
of North Carolina, 1868, and in other sections of Article IX 
calling for free public schools. Thus, its use in the 1970 
changes was not a compelling or substantive change-^-22: 
Second, a review of the general history of the 
development of our public schools establishes that the 
state's provision of "free" schools has never been 
understood to require the absence of modest, 
supplementary support given by those able to pay it.123 
121Ibid. 
2̂2Ibid., p. 613. 
2̂̂ Ibid., p. 614. 
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In explaining its conclusion, the Court reviewed the 
history of charges and the common schools of North Carolina. 
It found that Archibald Murphey's plan of 1817 called for 
charging tuition to children who were able to pay. The 
charitable feature of the common schools was abandoned in 
1839, but the schools were "free" only in the sense that 
tuition and capital costs were paid by state and local 
funds. North Carolina, except for the period following the 
Civil War, maintained its "free" schools. It was not until 
1969 that the General Assembly provided basic textbooks to 
all students at no rental charge. The Court also said that 
the 1963 General Assembly recognized fees when it said that 
none could be collected from students or school personnel 
unless the policy calling for such fees was approved by 
local boards of education in their official minutes-*-24: 
Prior to the 1970 constitution revision, then, 
there was little to indicate that either the members of 
our General Assembly or the officials responsible for 
administering our "free" public schools have ever 
understood the word "free" to encompass more than the 
notion of free tuition. 
The Court also found no intent on the part of the 
framers of the 1970 revision to make the radical change 
necessary to make the public schools totally "free." 
Similarly, the voters showed no evidence of believing they 
124Ibid., p. 614-615. 
125Ibid., p. 615. 
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were ratifying an era of totally "free" public schools.126 
The Court recognized that as long as public funds covered 
physical plant, personnel salaries, and maintenance of a 
general and uniform system of public schools, the public 
schools of the state were "free" of tuition. There was no 
violation of constitutional provision of free public schools 
when students and parents who could afford to do so paid for 
use of personal supplies and materials or boards of 
education charged modest, reasonable fees for supplementary 
materials used by students.127 
The Court, however, did hold unconstitutional a waiver 
policy for those who due to economic hardship could not pay 
the incidental or instructional fees. It did not pass 
review since the policy provided no means for notifying 
parents or students of any changes in policy or the 
procedures for obtaining a waiver.128 since enrollment 
could be denied in the second semester for failure to obtain 
a waiver and failure to pay such fees, equal access to 
participation in the school system was denied, thus 
violating the State Constitution and procedural due process. 
The Court said such deficiencies could be corrected by 
informing students and parents about the meaning of the 
126ibid., p. 616. 
127ibid., p. 617. 
128jbid., p. 618. 
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waiver policy and the implementation of a confidential 
application process to meet procedural due process.129 
Home Instruction 
In 1985 in the case of Delconte v. Statel3̂ , the Court 
held that home instruction is a non-public school within the 
context of state statutes and is not prohibited by school 
attendance statutes.130 This determination was made since 
the General Assembly has provided that the attendance at a 
private church or religious charter school or a qualified 
non-public school satisfies the state's compulsory 
attendance requirements. Specifically, home instruction 
meets the standards since it receives no funding from the 
state and, thus, qualifies within the meaning of the 
statutes as a non-public school. Particularly significant, 
the Court ruled that there is nothing so intrinsic in the 
nature of the word school which precludes home instruction 
although, clearly, such an interpretation was not the intent 
of the legislature nor is it supported by most 
authorities.1^1 Delconte v. State points out that: 
The state strenuously argues, as the Court of 
Appeals thought, that a majority of jurisdictions hold 
that home instruction cannot be a "private school" 
under compulsory school attendance laws because of what 
129ibid., p. 619. 
l^Delconte v. State, 313 N. C. 384 (1985), p. 389. 
l3iIbid., p. 392. 
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the word "school" intrinsically means. Our analysis of 
the cases on the question convinces us that a majority 
of jurisdictions have not so held.13̂  
In making this ruling the Court noted that the 
legislature has never actually defined what a school is. 
Rather, it has passed laws that have established objective 
criteria which schools must meet to comply with the 
compulsory attendance laws. Specifically, a historical 
review of the compulsory attendance law does not give any 
legislative intent to apply it to a particular instructional 
setting. In fact, as the Court observed, the State has 
recently relaxed rather than tightened its standards for 
non-public schools. In addition, the Court said that to 
preclude home instruction based on attendance standards 
would mean possible conflict with the Constitution of North 
Carolina since it requires the General Assembly to allow 
education in settings other than the public schools133: 
It is clear that the North Carolina Constitution 
empowers the General Assembly to require that our 
children be educated. Whether the constitution permits 
the General Assembly to prohibit their education at 
home is not so clear.134 
Thus, this issue remains unresolved. 
132jbid. 
133Ibid., p. 400. 
134Ibid., p. 400-401. 
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Vaccination 
The Court ruled in State v. Midayl35 in 1963 on 
vaccination requirements and exemptions. It held that a 
religious organization does not have to forbid vaccination 
for its teachings to come within the meaning of the statutes 
applicable to those children whose parent, parents, or 
guardians are bona fide members. A jury must decide whether 
the teachings of the religious organization justify the 
position against vaccination or immunization. Moreover, 
conviction under the compulsory attendance laws is not 
appropriate if parents try to keep children in school 
without waiving religious rights.1^6 
Secret Societies 
Some boards of education have had to address the issue 
of membership by students in Greek letter fraternities or 
sororities. The Court in 1944 stated in the cases of 
Coqqins v. Board of Education of City of Durham-̂  7 that 
secret societies are against the best interests of the 
schools. When voluntary cooperation sought from parents 
failed, the Durham board adopted rules prohibiting such 
membership. The Court agreed that adopting such rules were 
within the authority of the law and that they were neither 
l-^State v. Miday, 263 N. C. 747 (1965), p. 751. 
•'••^Ibid. , p. 753 . 
l-^Coggins v. Board of Education of City of Durham, 223 
N. C. 763 (1944), p. 768. 
144 
unreasonable nor unlawful discrimination or deprivation of 
rights within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.138 
Parents who disagreed with such an approach were urged to 
voice opinions at the ballot box. 
Contract Transportation 
In State ex rel. North Carolina Utilities Commission v. 
McKinnon-139, the Court found in 1961 that the statutes 
governing the operation of school buses said nothing about 
the transportation of athletic teams or school bands. 
Therefore, the Court held that boards of education have the 
inherent right to contract for such transportation. 
Summary 
The General Assembly empowers local boards of education 
to enact rules and regulations which are necessary to manage 
the public schools. The Court supports the enactment of 
those rules and regulations which provide for the welfare of 
students unless local boards of education have acted 
corruptly, in bad faith, or in the abuse of their power. 
This power of boards of education is a part of the general 
and uniform system of public education which the 
Constitution of North Carolina mandates. One inherent right 
of the State and its agencies is the enactment and 
138Ibid., pp. 769-770. 
Instate ex rel. North Carolina Utilities Commission v. 
McKinnon, 254 N. C. 1 (1961), p. 11. 
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enforcement of compulsory attendance requirements, which 
anticipate that parents enroll school-age children in 
school. However, regulations do not require enrollment in 
the public schools. Failure to enroll a student could even 
lead to criminal conviction under certain circumstances. In 
making such a determination, the Court holds that 
substantial evidence of any non-compliance, along with any 
competent or incompetent evidence, must be considered. 
Purely, speculative evidence requires a directed verdict of 
not guilty. 
Students have the right to attend the state's public 
schools, although this right is not absolute. It must be 
exercised within the framework of the rules and regulations 
adopted by local boards of education to operate and manage 
the public schools in an orderly manner. The Court will not 
interfere in this power of local boards of education unless 
those rules and regulations are clearly arbitrary, 
prejudicial, or unreasonable. 
Another power exerted by boards of education is the 
enrollment of and assignment of students to the public 
schools. Only parents, guardians, or those serving in loco 
parentis can pursue challenges to enrollment and assignment 
regulations. The Court recognizes that there are many 
reasonable factors which might affect such enrollment and 
assignment; however, local boards of education should 
establish proper rules and regulations as well as a 
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challenge process prior to the opening of school. 
Dissatisfied parents, guardians, or those serving in loco 
parentis may not challenge the assignment of other students, 
only their own. Those unhappy with the decisions of local 
boards of education should be allowed to a hearing before 
the boards. The Court has reiterated that in these 
decisions the welfare of the child should be of paramount 
consideration. 
In a bond issue in which funds were approved for 
facilities suitable for colored children, the plaintiffs 
argued that such approval constituted discrimination against 
the white race. In rejecting such an allegation, the Court 
took issue with the correctness of the 1954 decision in 
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, even though it did 
reaffirm that the Constitution of the United States takes 
precedence over the Constitution of North Carolina. 
The Court has also been called upon to rule upon the 
incidental and instructional fees which local boards of 
education may adopt. At the heart of the issue was the 
meaning of "free" in relation to a general and uniform 
system of public schools. In considering the history 
surrounding the development of the public schools in North 
Carolina and legislative intent, the Court held that such 
fees were allowable, but a waiver policy known to students 
and parents was mandatory. Its implementation required a 
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confidential application process to meet constitutionally 
guaranteed due process. 
Home instruction is not prohibited by the state•s 
school attendance laws. It may. also meet certain standards 
as a non-public school. In fact, the Court specifically 
ruled that there is nothing so intrinsic in the nature of 
the word school to preclude home instruction. In fact, the 
legislature has never defined specifically the meaning of 
school and its prohibition would raise serious 
constitutional questions. 
In other decisions relating to students, the Court has 
ruled that a jury must determine whether the teachings of a 
religious organization justify a position against 
vaccination or immunization. It supports the prohibition on 
student membership in secret societies adopted by a board of 
education. Such prohibition was clearly within the realm of 
the board of education meeting its responsibility to act in 
the best interest of students. The Court also supports the 
right of local boards of education to undertake contract 
transportation. 
Torts 
During the period 1951-1963 the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina heard six cases on torts. Of these the Court 
affirmed five lower court decisions and reversed and 
remanded one. The six cases address the following legal 
principles: (1) power of boards of education, (2) liability 
148 
of boards of education, (3) liability of officials and 
employees, (4) waiver of immunity, (5) school bus liability, 
and (6) contributory negligence. 
Power of Boards of Education 
Statutes and the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
establish and clarify the powers and duties of the State 
Board of Education and the local boards of education. In 
the 1959 Turner v. Gastonia City Board of Education-^O case, 
the Court recognized that the General Assembly created the 
State Board of Education with specifically assigned duties. 
As an agency of the State it has statewide application. 
This case also recognized that the two classes of local 
administrative units, county and city, have duties which are 
local in nature. County and city administrative units have 
the general powers to control and supervise within their 
respective areas: 
The State contributes to the school fund, but the local 
boards select and hire the teachers, other employees 
and operating personnel. The local boards run the 
schools.I41 
Liability of Boards of Education 
State statutes make both county and city administrative 
units corporate bodies which can sue and be sued. As the 
Court in the case Fields v. Durham City Board of 
140Turner v. Gastonia City Board of Education, 250 N. 
C. 456 (1959), pp. 462-463. 
•^llbid. , p. 463. 
149 
Education142 pointed out, the giving of corporate status did 
not also mean that the General Assembly waived immunity from 
torts for these boards of education. This case further 
emphasized that the prior decisions of the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina supported such immunity unless it was waived 
by statute or established under the Tort Claims Act: 
It is clear that the Legislature has not waived 
immunity from tort liability as to county and city 
boards of education, except as to such liability as may 
be established under our Tort Claims Act, but has left 
the waiver of immunity from liability for torts to the 
respective boards and then only to the extent such 
board has obtained liability insurance to cover 
negligence or torts.143 
In the 1952 Smith v. Hefner144 case, the Court further 
commented on the liability immunity of boards of education. 
It confirmed the principle that the state cannot be sued in 
its own courts as sound public policy. The only condition 
under which suit may occur is if the State by statute has 
consented to such a suit or has waived immunity from suit. 
Likewise, the same principle applies to boards of education 
which act as agencies of the State. 
Liability of Officials and Employees 
In general, boards of education and the administrative 
units which they govern are not responsible for the torts 
142Fields v. Durham City Board of Education, 251 N. C. 
699 (1960), p. 700. 
143Ibid., p. 701. 
144Smith v. Hefner, 235 N. C. 1 (1952), p. 6. 
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committed by school officials or employees. In addition to 
this accepted view, the Court in the case of Smith v. 
Hefner-*-45 1952 held to the principle that public 
officials carrying out their duties involving discretion and 
judgment cannot be held personally liable for mere 
negligence. Accordingly, an official cannot be held liable 
unless the alleged and proven act or failure to act was 
corrupt or malicious. On the other hand, even when an 
employer has governmental immunity, an employee of that 
governmental unit may be held individually liable for 
negligence in carrying out prescribed duties.1^6 jn the 
case of Eller v. Board of Education v. Buncombe County-*-^ in 
1955, the Court reaffirmed prior decisions that boards of 
education enjoy immunity from liability of its members or 
agents except that which might be established under the Tort 
Claims Act. Of course, an employee is distinguished from a 
public official such as a member of a local board of 
education. In the 1959 Turner v. Gastonia City Board of 
Education 4̂ 8 case, the Court stated this legal principle 
when it held that the board of education was 
l^Ibid. f p. 7. 
146Ibid. 
l^Eller v> Board of Education of Buncombe County, 242 
N. C. 584 (1955), pp. 585-586. 
148Turner v. Gastonia City Board of Education, 250 N. 
C. 456 (1959), p. 462. 
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not liable for the tort of the board's employee since a 
board of education retains governmental immunity unless 
there is provision for waiver of immunity. Any immunity is 
not retroactive preceding any provision which makes waiver 
possible. 
Waiver of Immunity 
Immunity can be waived only to the extent that a board 
of education is indemnified by insurance for negligence or 
tort. In 1955 the General Assembly provided that any county 
or city administrative unit could waive its governmental 
immunity from liability for damages, death, or injury to 
person or property by obtaining liability insurance. It 
could then waive the liability by negligence of tort of any 
agent or employee of the local board of education, provided 
the agents or employers were acting within their authority 
or employment. 4̂9 The Court in the case of Clary v. 
Alexander County Board of Education^-50 in 1975 held 
specifically that the purchasing of liability insurance 
waives governmental immunity to the extent that a local 
board of education is indemnified by insurance for such 
negligence or tort. In this way, the purchase of insurance 
removes any argument of governmental immunity by a board of 
education: 
149Ibid., p. 461. 
15C>Clary v. Alexander County Board of Education, 286 N. 
C. 525 (1975), p. 530. 
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Although there is no allegation or admission as to 
the amount of liability insurance defendant had 
procured and therefore nothing to show the extent of 
defendant's waiver of governmental immunity, waiver of 
governmental immunity to any extent was sufficient to 
preclude the granting of motions for directed verdicts 
on the ground of governmental immunity. 51 
In addition, the Court in Huff v. Northampton County Board 
of Education-*-52 in 1963 emphasized also that no liability in 
tort exists unless the board of education waived immunity in 
accordance with the Tort Claims Act. 
School Bus Liability 
Injuries resulting from accidents occurring in the 
operation of school buses have often been the cause for 
suits to recover damages. In such cases the Supreme Court 
of North Carolina has adhered to its stand on liability 
immunity and waiver of liability. The North Carolina 
Session Laws of 1955 relieved the State Board of Education 
for responsibility of the operation of school buses and 
empowered county and city boards of education to transport 
students enrolled in county or city administrative units. 
In the 1963 Huff v. Northampton County Board of Education-*-^ 
case, the Court held that any award against a county board 
of education under the Tort Claims Act must come from the 
negligent act or omission of a bus driver employed by the 
151Ibid., p. 531. 
152Huff v. Northampton County Board of Education, 259 
N. C. 75 (1963), p. 79. 
153Ibid., p. 77. 
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board of education and not from a negligent act or omission 
of the board: 
However, as heretofore pointed out, the Tort 
Claims Act does not authorize a recovery against a 
county board of education for the negligent act or 
omissions of its agents, servants and employees except 
for a claim based upon a negligent act or omission of a 
driver of a school bus employed by the board from which 
recovery is sought.154 
Contributory Negligence 
The Tort Claims Act provides no recovery unless the 
plaintiff claimant can show no contributory negligence. The 
Court in Huff v. Northampton County Board of Education^-^ in 
1963 affirmed this legal principle in finding that a student 
was not free from contributory negligence: 
We think the plaintiff's evidence tends to show that 
she moved from the rear of the bus immediately before 
the fight occurred and while the bus was in motion and 
voluntarily entered into the fight that resulted in her 
injuries. 
In the 197 5 Clary v. Alexander County Board of Education-^7 
case, the Court enlarged on this legal principle of 
contributory negligence. It held that in considering issues 
of negligence and contributory negligence, all evidence must 
be viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs. The 
Court also found that contributory negligence is an 
154Ibid., p. 79. 
155Ibid., p. 78. 
156Ibid. 
157  Clary v. Alexander County Board of Education, 28 6 
N. C. 525 (1975), p. 532. 
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affirmative defense. As a consequence the burden of proof 
of contributory negligence rests on the defendant. 
Summary 
The State Board of Education and boards of education 
enjoy governmental immunity from suit unless immunity is 
waived. This immunity is a well-established legal 
principle. Both classes of local administrative units, 
county and city, have the authority to control and supervise 
within their respective jurisdictions. As corporate bodies 
they may sue and be sued; however, as already stated these 
administrative units have immunity from suit unless it has 
been waived by state statute or established under the Tort 
Claims Act. The purchase of liability insurance for 
damages, death, or injury to person or property by a board 
of education generally waives governmental immunity from 
suit. It is also a generally accepted legal principle in 
North Carolina that public officials carrying out their 
duties involving discretion and judgment cannot be held 
personally liable for negligence unless the act or failure 
to act was corrupt or malicious. However, the employees of 
units which enjoy governmental immunity may be held 
individually liable in carrying out prescribed duties. 
Awards resulting from bus accidents, for example, must come 
from the negligent act or omission of its agents. In such 
cases the Tort Claims Act provides no recovery unless the 
plaintiff claimant can show no contributory negligence. 
Finance 
During the years 1871-1970 the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina decided forty-three finance cases. Of these 
forty-three cases, the Court affirmed twenty-five lower 
court decisions, modified and affirmed four, affirmed with 
no error one, found no error in two, reversed six, reversed 
and remanded one, found error in two, and found error and 
remanded two. The forty-three decisions address the 
following legal principles in public school education: 
(1) necessary purpose of public schools; (2) tax-levying and 
bond elections; (3) consolidation and taxation; (4) bond 
issues, general and uniform system of public education; 
(5) role of county board of commissioners; (6) role of the 
board of education; (7) school fund distribution and 
supplementary tax levies; (8) debt assumption, budget 
surplus; (9) fines, forfeitures, and other specified sources 
of funds; (10) racial segregation, and (11) transportation. 
Necessary Purpose of Public Schools 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina wrestled with the 
question of whether or not education was a necessary expense 
in the late nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth 
centuries. In 1871 the Court faced this question in Lane 
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v. Stanly. -*-58 it was the judgment of the Court that then 
Article VII, Section 4, of the Constitution of North 
Carolina gave to townships the corporate powers necessary 
for the purposes of local government. The Court held that 
the legislature defined "local" when it empowered townships 
to lay out and alter highways; to establish ferries, 
bridges, and cartways; to appoint overseers of roads and to 
allow toll bridges and gates across highways. In addition, 
local government could provide for a township house. 
However, no mention of schools or the poor was made. The 
1871 Supreme Court alleged: 
We have already seen that public schools are not 
one of the enumerated subjects over which township 
trustees have control. But it is insisted that, as 
education is necessary to good government, they have 
implied power over it. This would be entitled to much 
consideration if public schools were not otherwise 
provided for. They are otherwise provided for.159 
The court found that the School Law Acts of 1868-1869 
provided for school committees in each township to provide 
for four months schools. These committees, being given 
corporate status, had responsibility for the management and 
supervision of the schools according to then Article VII, 
Section 2, of the Constitution of North Carolina. The 
County Commissioners had the authority to levy school taxes, 
keep monies in the treasuries, and disburse monies upon the 
l^Lane v> Stanly, 65 N. C. 153 (1871), p. 154. 
159Ibid. 
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order of the school committee. But the Court emphatically 
said that neither school committees nor township trustees 
had taxing power for school purposes.1^0 In this decision 
the General Assembly according to then Article IX, 
Constitution of North Carolina, was to provide by taxation 
and otherwise for a general and uniform system of public 
schools. The Court explained why taxation by school 
committees and township trustees was prohibited. A general 
and uniform system "... is not to be subject to the 
caprice of localities, but every locality, yea, every child, 
is to have the same advantage and be subject to the same 
rules and regulations."161 ^he court then asked? "But 
would this be if every township were allowed to have its own 
regulations and to consult its own caprices?"162 Tke court 
stated that as a consequence, some townships would then have 
no schools, some inferior ones, and others extravagant ones. 
The result would be no uniformity in the purpose of 
government to provide all citizens with a good education. 
Nevertheless, Lane says: 
The conclusion is that townships have not the 
power of taxation for school purposes, either through 
their trustees or committees. Nor has a county the 
l60Ibid., p. 155. 
l6llbid., p. 156. 
i62Ibid. 
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power to lay township taxes, as distinguished from the 
general county tax for school purposes.163 
The Court had not altered its opinion in 1892 when in 
the Board of Education of Bladen County v. Board of 
Commissioners of Bladen Countyl64 the Court reaffirmed its 
previous decisions that the county commissioners could not 
levy a tax beyond limitations imposed by then Article V, 
Section 1, of the Constitution of North Carolina. 
Specifically, the Laws of 1885 authorizing commissioners to 
levy annually a special tax to cover the deficiency in the 
state levy was unconstitutional since it was not a special 
tax provided for in then Article V, Section 6, of the 
Constitution of North Carolina.165 The Court specifically 
said that it was important to stand on its previous 
decisions unless there was error. 
However, in 1907 the Court reversed its opinion on the 
necessity of a local tax for special school purposes. In 
the case of Collie v. Commissioners of Franklin Countyl66t 
the Court expressed the opinion that interpretations change 
163Ibid., p. 157. 
164BQarcj 0f Education of Bladen County v. Board of 
Commissioners of Bladen County, 111 N. C. 578 (1892), p. 
579. 
165Ibid. 
166Collie v. Commissioners of Franklin County, 145 
N. C. 170 (1907), pp. 171-173. 
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as indicated by the actions of the General Assembly. The 
Court held that such changes of interpretation were 
important: 
As those cases involve a construction of certain 
sections of the Constitution relating to a question of 
taxation and involve no right affecting the life, 
liberty or property of the citizen, we can see no 
reason why they should continue to guide us if time and 
reflection have convinced us that they are not correct 
interpretations of the letter and spirit of our organic 
law.1157 
The Court noted that sessions of the General Assembly 
had tried to make it possible for county commissioners to 
levy an annual special tax to make up the deficiency when 
the state tax did not provide for a four months' term in 
each school district. In the 1907 Collie v. Commissioners 
of Franklin County-*-^ case, the Court found that Article V 
of the Constitution of North Carolina placed limitations on 
the taxing power of the General Assembly and that 
maintenance of a four months' school term was a necessary 
expense utilizing a .special tax for such purposes. However, 
in the opinion of the Court, the limitation did not always 
prevail and did not prevent the effect of another article of 
equal importance: 
. . . We must not interpret the Constitution 
literally, but rather construe it as a whole, for it 
was adopted as a whole; and we should, if possible 
give effect to each part of it. The whole is to be 
167Ibid., p. 171. 
168Ibid., p. 173. 
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examined with a view to ascertaining the true intention 
of each part, and to giving effect to the whole 
instrument and to the intention of the people who 
adopted it.-^® 
By this reasoning, in order to provide for those 
necessary expenses which are specifically authorized in the 
Constitution, the limitation does not apply: 
The purpose of our people to establish by taxation a 
general and uniform system of public schools, wherein 
tuition shall be free of charge to all children of the 
State, and that such schools shall be open every year 
for at least four months, is so plainly manifest in 
Article IX of the Constitution that we cannot think it 
possible they ever intended to thwart their clearly 
expressed purpose by so limiting taxation as to make it 
impossible to give effect to their directions. 
The logic of the Court assumed that many schools could 
not be kept open for the mandated four months' term without 
the special levy. This interpretation made possible the 
enactment of the provisions of the Constitution of North 
Carolina, recognizing that Article V was not intended to 
prevent the county commissioners from carrying out their 
duty to provide at least a four months' school term. The 
General Assembly left the amount to be levied unspecified 
but required the county commissioners to observe the 
equation between property and poll tax fixed in the 
Constitution of the State. 
169Ibid. 
170Ibid., p. 174. 
The Court later addressed other issues related to 
taxation and necessary expenses. In the 1914 Board of 
Education v Wake County^-'- case, the Court found that school 
taxes are not included in county funds for the purpose of 
ordinary county expenses. As a consequence, school monies 
could not be charged with a proportionate expense of 
preparing and computing the tax lists of the county: "The 
Tax for schools is a State tax, and it was not intended that 
they should contribute to the ordinary expenses of the 
county."172 jn addition, the Court held in Fuller v. 
Lockhartl73 that fixed charges including insurance, within 
provision of the Constitution of North Carolina, met a 
public and necessary expense. In the 1942 case of Bridges 
v. City of Charlotte^^^, the Court added that contributions 
to the State Retirement System met the required necessary 
interpretation since they reflected the reasonable demands 
of social progress. 
Tax Levying and Bond Elections 
Many of the cases in finance concerned elections on tax 
levying authority and bond issues. The Court held in 
l^l-Board of Education v. Wake County, 167 N. C. 114 
(1914), p. 116. 
l^^Ibid. 
l 3̂Fuller v. Lockhart, 209 N. C. 61 (1935), p. 69. 
l^Bridges v. City of Charlotte, 221 N. C. 472 (1942), 
p. 481. 
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Younts v. Commissioners of Union County-^S 1909 that a 
vote on a special school tax was not invalidated by the fact 
that a registrar had been absent from the district for two 
of the twenty days required by law for registration to vote. 
It further specified that an election is not invalidated 
when the Board of County Commissioners fix and publish the 
date of the election and a majority of the voters approve of 
the levy by voting in the place where all elections were 
usually held. It was obvious to the Court that all voters 
knew of the place to vote and had been given fair and full 
opportunity to vote. In the 1924 Plott v. Board of 
Commissioners of Haywood County-̂^ case, the Court 
reinforced this decision by holding that irregularities of 
registrations did not invalidate an election since the 
outcome of the election would have been the same anyway. 
The Court held in 1912 in Gill v. Board of Commissioners of 
Wake County-̂  ̂ that before permitting the people to vote on 
levying a tax and before forming a special school district, 
county commissioners must receive a petition signed by 
one-fourth of the freeholders in the territory. In the 
1913 Gregg v. Board of Commissioners of Randolph 
l^Younts v. Commissioners of Union County, 151 N. C. 
582 (1909), p. 586. 
176piott v. Board of Commissioners of Haywood County, 
187 N. C. 125 (1924), p. 131. 
l^Gill v. Board of Commissioners of Wake County, 160 
N. C. 176 (1912), p. 176. 
163 
County^-^ / the Court held that in an election on the 
issuance of bonds no citizen affected by the election was 
deprived of the right to vote. This presumption was based 
on the legality and regularity of acts of public officers. 
Also, issuance of bonds after a lapse of time following an 
election did not void the right of issuance since there was 
no evidence of abuse of power.179 in another case 
concerning the validity of a petition for a special election 
authorizing a school tax levy, the Court in 1916 in Chitty 
ion 
v. Parker held that the one-fourth endorsement of the 
petition by freeholders was a protection to landowners 
against taxation voted by a majority of nontaxpayers. Later 
the Court in Weesner v. Davidson Countyl̂ l in 1921 said that 
the legislature clearly intended that elections for special 
school tax districts should be held no less than two years 
after a previous election. Legislative intent could be 
determined by the caption of the law only if the meaning of 
the text was unclear. However, it could not control the 
meaning of the text if it was clear. In the 1922 Miller 
l7®Gregg v. Board of Commissioners of Randolph County, 
162 N. C. 479 (1913), p. 484. 
l^Ibid. 
"^^Chitty v. Parker, 172 N. C. 126 (1916), p. 129. 
1 fil 
Weesner v. Davidson County, 182 N. C. 604 (1921), 
p. 606. 
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v. Duke School District No. 1^-82 case, the Court reinforced 
previous decisions that school districts, empowered by the 
legislature to hold election on specified bond issues, could 
levy a special tax to provide for the bonds. The 
proceedings on elections continued when in 1924 the Court 
(Sparkman v. Board of Commissioners of Gates County-*-83) 
ruled that the voters of a new school district had the right 
to vote and,, thereby, determine a tax levy. Sufficient and 
substantial compliance with the law validated elections 
"| O A 
according to the Court in 1924 in Carr v. Little and in 
1925 in Board of Education of Yancey County v. Board of 
Commissioners of Yancey County-^5^ in the latter case the 
Court also held that calling for an election was not a 
discretionary duty, but a ministerial or mandatory one when 
undertaken in accordance with state statutes. In 1934 the 
Court in Forrester v. Town of North Wilkesboro-*-8̂  SUmmed 
182Miner v. Duke School District No. 1, 184 N. C. 197 
(1922), p. 201. 
18 3 Sparkman v. Board of Commissioners of Gates County, 
187 N. C. 241 (1924), p. 247. 
1 8 4 
Carr v. Little, 188 N. C. 100 (1924), p. 112. 
185 Board of Education of Yancey County v. Board of 
Commissioners of Yancey County, 189 N. C. 650 (1925), 
p. 652. 
•^^Forrester v. Town of North Wilkesboro, 206 N. C. 347 
(1934), p. 352. 
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up its view that elections are not voided when substantial 
compliance with the law has been met: 
We see no prejudicial error on the record, but we may 
say that all elections should be carefully conducted 
under the law, of course a substantial compliance is 
all that is required, but public officers cannot be too 
careful in these matters. 
Consolidation and Taxation 
In the twentieth century the Court has determined a 
large number of cases related to consolidation and its 
congruent taxation. In the 1922 Paschal v. Johnson-*-88 case 
the Court did not object to a proposed bond issue since 
county boards of education were authorized by the General 
Assembly under special conditions to consolidate local tax 
districts and special charter districts. Additionally, the 
Court held that special school tax districts served as 
quasi-public corporations exercising a governmental function 
in the administration of the school laws. As a consequence, 
they were bound by constitutional provisions against 
contracting for other than necessary purposes except by a 
vote of the people. Thus, voters must impose upon 
themselves any tax or tax increase. The resulting 
obligation accrued to any consolidation district. 
187Ibid. 
188Paschal v. Johnson, 183 N. C. 129 (1922), p. 132. 
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The Court extended upon this principle in 1922 in Perry 
v1_Coxl89 When it ruled that the combination of a local 
school tax district with an area not already voting a 
special tax for the purposes of the schools required a 
separate vote upon the question of taxation in order to 
conform with then Article VII, Section 7, Constitution of 
North Carolina. In this case the Court again emphasized 
that the courts had a responsibility to harmonize the 
provisions of different statutes and to give each its 
appropriate significance. In another consolidation case, 
the 1922 Court in Board of Education of Buncombe County v. 
Bray Brothers Company^judged that the county board of 
education at its discretion could ask for an election on 
consolidation or the formation of a new district. In 
addition, the board could submit the question of a special 
tax or the issuance of bonds at the same time as the 
election on consolidation as long as the provisions of the 
law were observed. In 1952, the Court still answered 
questions related to consolidation and the rights of voters. 
In Gates School District Committee v. Board of Education of 
Gates County^^^, the Court held that the consolidation of 
189perry v. Cox, 183 N. C. 387 (1922), p. 392. 
19°Board of Education of Buncombe County v. Bray 
Brothers Co., 184 N. C. 484 (1922), pp. 486-487. 
191-Gates School District Committee v. Board of 
Education of Gates County, 235 N. C. 212 (1952), p. 216. 
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a non-special school tax district with a special tax 
district could occur with the approval of voters in the 
non-special tax district. In such a situation the 
consolidation had to be for administrative or attendance 
purposes and not for a supplemental tax. 
Bond Issues, General and Uniform System of Public Education 
The determination of bond issues faced the Court during 
the Depression Era. In the 1932 Reeves v. Board of 
Education of Buncombe County-*-^ case, the Court ruled that 
counties could assume special district bond payments as a 
county-wide obligation instead of levying a tax upon the 
district wherein the bonds were approved. The specific and 
special legislative authority for the issuance of bonds and 
establishment of maturity dates was affirmed by the Court in 
1934 in the case of Taylor v. Board of Education of Davidson 
County.1^3 jn 1942 the Court in Bridges v. City of 
Charlotte4 upheld the County Finance Act, which permitted 
counties to issue bonds and notes for schoolhouses and the 
purchase of the land necessary for schools. In addition, 
1^2Reeves v. Board of Education of Buncombe County, 204 
N. C. 74 (1933), p. 76. 
193Tayior v. Board of Education of Davidson County, 206 
N. C. 263 (1934), p. 265. 
194Bridges v- City of Charlotte, 221 N. C. 472 (1942), 
p. 479. 
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they could levy taxes to pay the principal and interest on 
the bonds. In such situations counties were acting not as 
municipal corporations serving local governmental purposes, 
but as administrative agencies of the state providing for a 
state system of public schools as planned by the General 
Assembly. Counties were prohibited from paying bonds 
issued under a special act from county funds until that 
responsibility was assumed by the counties under statute 
provisions, according to the Court in the 1958 case of 
I QC 
Strickland v. Franklin County. 
The Court also established some flexibility in the use 
of funds derived from bond sales. In the 1966 Dilday v. 
196 Beaufort County Board of Education case, the Court held 
that the funds from bonds could be used for purposes 
comparable to the original purpose for which the bonds were 
approved if changing conditions necessitated a different use 
to serve educational needs. The Court specified, though, 
that such a reallocation could not be excessive, had to be 
necessary for maintenance of the constitutionally mandated 
school term, and had to result from a request from the local 
board of education. Of course, the approval of county 
commissioners was obligatory for such reallocation. 
"'•^Strickland v. Franklin County, 248 N. C. 668 (1958) , 
p. 673. 
196 Dilday v. Beaufort County Board of Education, 267 
N. C. 438 .(1966), pp. 449-450. 
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Similarly, in the 1949 Atkins v. McAden 7̂ case, the Court 
stated that the board of county commissioners could 
reallocate proceeds of bonds to different projects only if 
the change was necessary to carry out the original purpose 
of the bond issue. 
Local boards of county commissioners and education 
share with the state certain responsibilities for the 
maintenance of the general and uniform system of public 
education in North Carolina, but from time to time the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina has been called upon to 
clarify the roles of these instrumentalities of government. 
Role of County Board of Commissioners 
In the 1934 Evans v. Mecklenburg County-*-98 case, the 
Court pointed out that the General Assembly directed 
counties as the administrative units of the state to provide 
by taxation or otherwise for the constitutionally mandated 
school term. This provision could be accomplished without 
submitting the question of bonds to the voters. This case 
also identified some of the areas considered necessary for 
the maintenance of the school term, including school sites, 
buildings, auditorium, shops for a technical school, sewage 
197Atkins v. McAden, 229 N. C. 752 (1949), p. 755. 
198Evans v. Mecklenburg County, 205 N. C. 560 (1934), 
p. 564. 
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disposal plants, and toilet facilities.Following this 
decision in 1933, the Court in 1934 in City of Hickory v. 
Catawba Countŷ QQ held that providing for the maintenance of 
public schools in the county rested primarily upon the Board 
of County Commissioners. Such a role was constitutionally 
mandated, but the manner in which such support was 
accomplished relied on statutory provisions. At the same 
time in 1934, the Court also emphasized the role of county 
commissioners in maintaining the state system of public 
schools in the case of Taylor v. Board of Education of 
Davidson County.201 The decision recognized the often-held 
Court opinion that a board of county commissioners serves as 
an administrative agency of the State and can, therefore, 
issue notes and county bonds to acquire sites, build 
necessary schoolhouses, and operate the public schools 
without seeking the approval of the voters. In such 
circumstances the action of a board of county commissioners 
must comply with the Constitution of North Carolina. 
Another case similarly dealt with the role and 
responsibility of county commissioners. In the 1936 
199Ibid., p. 565. 
200city of Hickory v. Catawba County, 206 N. C. 165 
(1934), p. 172. 
20lTaylor v. Board of Education of Davidson County, 206 
N. C. 263 (1934), pp. 264-265. 
case of Marshburn v. Brown202, the Court held that county 
commissioners have the duty to maintain in each school" 
district one or more schools (for a then mandated term of 
six months) and to provide adequate buildings and equipment. 
Furthermore, this decision recognized that if the county 
commissioners fail to do so and the school district must 
thereby issue bonds to accomplish this requirement, then the 
board of county commissioners at the request of the county 
board of education, may assume the indebtedness of the 
district. In this way, the commissioners carry out the 
mandate imposed by the Constitution of North Carolina. 
Role of the Board of Education 
In questions of finance, the Supreme Court has 
identified the role of local boards of education. In 1930, 
the Court held in Wilkinson v. Board of Education of 
Johnston County20-* that the county board of education must 
determine what changes should occur in its budget provisions 
if the board of county commissioners does not fund the full 
request. In this case, as well as in Reeves v. Board of 
Education of Buncombe County2in 1932, the Court pointed 
out that the courts never interfered with the sound 
202Marshburn v. Brown, 210 N. C. 331 (1936), p. 338. 
2°3wiikinson v. Board of Education of Johnston County, 
199 N. C. 669 (1930), p. 672. 
20̂ Reeves v. Board of Education of Buncombe County, 204 
N. C. 74 (1933), p. 79. 
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exercise of board discretion unless manifest abuse of 
this power is evident. Fuller v. Lockhart^OS j_n 1935 
observed that the local board of education exercised such 
sound discretion when the board entered into a contract with 
a mutual fire insurance company to insure its school 
buildings. The board did not lend its credit in so doing. 
The Court remarked: "Ordinarily, the Board of Education has 
discretion in matters of this kind, and usually its action 
is not reviewable."206 
The Court has also addressed the county board of 
education's discretionary power in consolidation, location, 
and site selection. In Feezor v. Siceloff^Q^ the Court in 
1950 held that in using school bonds, the county board of 
education in considering such consolidation, location, and 
site selection could make changes as long as the purpose for 
which the bonds were issued remained the same. In another 
case, the Court recognized that city and county boards of 
education constitute separate and distinct governmental 
agencies with the responsibility for the control and 
management of school funds. As a consequence, the Court in 
Branch v. Board of Education of Robeson County^OS j_n 
205pu]_]_er v> Lockhart, 209 N. C. 61 (1935), p. 67. 
t p. 69. 
207peezor v> siceloff, 232 N. C. 563 (1950), p. 566. 
20832-anch v. Board of Education of Robeson County, 233 
N. C. 623 (1951), p. 625. 
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1951 stated that boards might sue for the protection or 
recovery of school funds. Interestingly, this case also 
pointed out that if public officers were derelict in the 
performance of official duties, then a taxpayer could take 
action on behalf of the public agency or political 
subdivision when proper authorities neglected or refused to 
act^OS?. of course to prevent arbitrary taxpayer litigation, 
the court explained:' 
The law takes cognizance, however, of the disruptive 
tendency of officious intermeddling by taxpayers in 
matters committed to the decision of public officers. 
Consequently, it decrees that a taxpayer cannot bring 
an action on behalf of a public agency or political 
subdivision where the proper authorities have not 
wrongfully neglected or refused to act, after a proper 
demand to do so, unless the circumstances are such as 
to indicate affirmatively that such a demand would be 
unavailing.210 
In later judgments, the Court further delineated the role of 
the board of education. In the 1953 Parker v. Anson 
County2H case/ the Court recognized that a board of 
education has the authority to operate the schools, to 
determine building needs, plant facilities, and equipment 
and by resolution to present the board of county 
commissioners with this information. Specifically, the 
209Ibid. 
210Ibid. 
2Hparker v. Anson County, 237 N. C. 78 (1953), p. 86. 
board of education, and not the board of county 
commissioners, has the authority to determine whether the 
county should have one central high school or two high 
schools. Once the board of county commissioners has 
determined what funds are necessary, its jurisdiction ends. 
The authority to execute a plan remains the responsibility 
of the board of education. Any control over expenditures 
which the board of county commissioners has cannot be 
construed to interfere with the exclusive control of the 
schools vested in a county board of education.212 1966 
Dilday v. Beaufort County Board of Education213 judgment 
expressed a similar conclusion. 
In 1952 the Court in Lamb v. Board of Education of 
Randolph County214 spoke to the need for the board of county 
commissioners and the board of education to cooperate. It 
held that the board of county commissioners and the board of 
education should together resolve whether to use funds for a 
particular named purpose or for some other related purpose. 
Furthermore, the courts should not review such actions. 
When funding differences between the board of county 
commissioners and board of education are unresolvable, 
212ibid., p. 87. 
213Dilday v. Beaufort County Board of Education, 267 N. 
C. 438 (1966), p. 448. 
21^Lamb v. Board of Education of Randolph County, 235 
N. C. 377 (1952), p. 380. 
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then the Clerk of Superior Court might be called upon to 
determine the appropriate funding level. In such cases 
appealed to Superior Court, the court was limited to a 
consideration of assigned errors and statute noncompliance. 
In 1954 in the Board of Education of Onslow County v. Board 
of County Commissioners of Onslow County^-^, the Court held 
that the record should stand since findings did not show 
arbitrary abuse of statutory duty. 
In the 1942 Bridges v. City of Charlotte^-^ case, the 
court summed up the relationship between the State, boards 
of county commissioners, and boards of education in this 
fashion. 
The public school system, including all its units, is 
under the exclusive control of the State, organized and 
established as its instrumentality in discharging an 
obligation which has always been considered direct, 
primary and inevitable. When functioning within this 
sphere, the units of the public school system do not 
exercise derived powers such as are given to a 
municipality for local government, so general as to 
require appropriate limitations on their exercise; they 
express the immediate power of the State, as its 
agencies for the performance of a special mandatory 
duty resting upon it under the Constitution, and under 
its direct delegation.217 
School Fund Distribution and Supplementary Tax Levies 
Other areas in finance which have come before the Court 
^l^Board of Education of Onslow County v. Board of 
County Commissioners of Onslow County, 240 N. C. 118 (1954), 
p. 121. 
21®Bridges v. City of Charlotte, 221 N. C. 472 (1942), 
p. 478. 
217Ibid. 
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have considered the distribution of the county school fund 
and supplementary tax levies. 
The Court spoke to the manner in which the county 
school fund should be distributed. In the 1915 Board of 
School Commissioners of City of Charlotte v. Board of 
Education of Mecklenburg County2-^, the Court said that the 
fair method for distributing county school funds to each 
district was on a per capita basis. 
The Court has also addressed the issue of supplementary 
tax levying to operate schools at a higher standard than 
that provided for by the State. In one case a special 
election was called to approve an ad valorem tax to 
supplement from year to year the fund for school purposes. 
The funds were not limited to increasing the standard state 
school term. The Court held in 1934 in the case of Freeman 
v. City of Charlotted̂  that the funds could be used to 
supplement any object or item of school expenditure at 
discretion of the school commissioners. In another case 
arising in Charlotte, the Court held in 1942 in Bridges v. 
City of Charlottê O that contributions to the State 
218goarci 0f school Commissioners of City of Charlotte 
v. Board of Education of Mecklenburg County, 169 N. C. 196 
(1915), p. 198. 
219preeman v> city of Charlotte, 206 N. C. 913 (1934), 
p. 913. 
220BricLgeS v. City of Charlotte, 221 N. C. 472 (1942), 
p. 484. 
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Retirement Fund were mandatory, did not require submission 
to popular vote, and were not affected by the maximum tax 
rate adopted by Charlotte in voting a supplementary tax levy 
for salaries. In the 1952 Gates School District Committee 
v. Board of Education of Gates County221 case, the Court 
spoke to the question of voter approval of supplementary tax 
levies: 
A tax of this character cannot be levied in this 
State unless it has been approved by a majority of the 
voters who voted in favor of such tax in an election 
duly held as provided by law in the area in which the 
tax is to be levied. Consequently, when an area is 
consolidated with an administrative unit that has voted 
a supplemental tax and no election has been held in the 
area added to or consolidated with such administrative 
unit, then no supplemental tax can be legally levied in 
any of the consolidated area.222 
The board of county commissioners also has been given 
the authority to add or supplement items of expenditures in 
the current expense fund. Such expenditures might be for 
additional personnel and/or supplements to salaries of 
personnel. A tax levy sufficient to provide for these may 
be established either with or without the approval of 
voters. The General Assembly has conferred such authority 
on the board of county commissioners, who cannot act unless 
the county board of education has proven a need for such 
22lQates School District Committee v. Board of 
Education of Gates County, 235 N. C. 212 (1952), pp. 
217-218. 
222j]3icj> 
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supplements. The Court addressed this issue in 1968 in its 
decisions in the case of Harris v. Board of Commissioners of 
Washington County.223 
Debt Assumption, Budget Surplus 
Debt assumption and budget surpluses have also been 
addressed by the Court. In the 1924 Lovelace v. Pratt224 
case, the Court upheld the legislature's authority to assume 
and direct counties to pay the indebtedness for schoolhouses 
used to maintain the state- mandated term. During the Great 
Depression, the Court ruled that a board of county 
commissioners could assume the payment of bonds previously 
issued by school districts for buildings, equipping 
schoolhouses, and other expenses necessary for the 
maintenance of schools for the constitutionally mandated 
term. In 1934 in the case of City of Hickory v. Catawba 
County225, the Court further stated that the school district 
was not required to pay out of its taxable property a debt 
that was imposed on the county by the Constitution. In 1937 
in the case of Mebane Graded School District v. Alamance 
County22̂ , the Court held that the County of Alamance had 
223Harris v. Board of Commissioners of Washington 
County, 274 N. C. 343 (1968), p. 355. 
224Lovelace v. Pratt, 187 N. C. 686 (1924), p. 690. 
225City of Hickory v. Catawba County, 206 N. C. 165 
(1934), p. 172. 
22̂ Mebane Graded School District v. Alamance County, 
211 N. C. 213 (1937), pp. 226-227. 
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the obligation to assume the school indebtedness for the 
Mebane School District as the County had done for every 
other school district in the County. The Court ruled in the 
case of Johnson v. Marrow^*^ in 1947 that securities 
constituted an unencumbered school sinking fund surplus, 
such surpluses to be kept by the county treasurer. This 
case also found that the General Assembly might designate 
or change the custodian of sinking fund securities or direct 
expenditure of the surplus school funds provided it was for 
a school purpose. However, if such a surplus was needed for 
outstanding and unpaid bonds for which the sinking fund had 
been created, then the General Assembly could not authorize 
a diversion. The county retained the right to use any 
surplus to meet the budget requirements for erection, repair, 
and equipment of school buildings. The surplus could also 
be taken into consideration in the preparation of future 
budgets and tax levies. In addition, in this instance the 
Court held that the law does not contemplate a surplus. It 
also restated the view that a board of county commissioners 
and not a board of education was charged with determining 
expenditures for the erection, repair, and equipping of 
school buildings. 
In 1917 the Court made a significant ruling on high 
schools. The Board of Education of Granville County had 
^^Johnson v. Marrow, 228 N. C. 58 (1947), p. 61. 
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requested 10 cents on 100 dollars' valuation from the board 
of county commissioners to maintain the public schools. The 
commissioners set a rate of 5 cents. The Board of Education 
instituted proceedings to have a necessary amount fixed. 
The Superior Court judge ruled that the request for a high 
school was appropriately eliminated since the high school 
for which funds were requested was not a part of the public 
school system. The North Carolina Supreme Court in 1917 
upheld this view in Board of Education v. Board of 
Commissioners of Granville Countv228; 
In reference to the high school in the town of 
Oxford, on the record as now presented, this item or 
claim was properly disallowed. That, being in 
strictness a town or city high school, governed by 
local authority and accessible only to the school 
population of the specified district, is not a part of 
our public school system, within the meaning of our 
Constitution, and is not entitled to have a special 
allowance made for it in the yearly estimate of the 
county board of education.^29 
It should be noted that this decision rested on the fact 
that no contract for the school had been entered into by the 
county board of education and approved by the State. 
However, county high schools were considered a part of the 
public school system and could receive special allowances. 
High schools in towns or cities with at least 1,200 
22830ar(j 0f Education v. Board of Commissioners of 
Granville County, 174 N. C. 469 (1917), p. 471. 
229Ibid., pp. 473-474. 
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inhabitants could similarly receive money, but in this case 
the high school was under no such authorizing contract. 
Fines, Forfeitures, Other Specified Sources of Funds 
The Court has addressed use of funds from fines, 
forfeitures, and other specified sources by the schools. In 
1954 the Court held in Board of Education of Onslow County 
v. Board of County Commissionerŝ  ̂that the funds accruing 
from fines, forfeitures, and other specified sources were 
usually used for maintenance of facilities and fixed 
charges. However, the Court said that they could be used to 
supplement any object or item in the current expense budget 
for which state funds were available. 
Racial Segregation 
In 1966 the Court spoke forcefully on the issue of 
racial segregation. The Board of Education and the Board of 
County Commissioners in Beaufort County attempted to provide 
their constituents with racially segregated schools since 
that was the intent when voters approved certain bonds. In 
the 1966 Dilday v. Beaufort County Board of Education^31 
case, however, the Court stated that the provision in the 
North Carolina Constitution calling for separate public 
23C>Board of Education of Onslow County v. Board of 
County Commissioners of Onslow County, 240 N. C. 118 (1954), 
pp. 126-127. 
23lDiiday v. Beaufort County Board of Education, 267 N. 
C. 438 (1966), p. 451. 
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schools for the children of the white and colored race had 
been invalidated by the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education of 
Topeka. It also pointed out that the Constitution of the 
United States took precedence over the Constitution of North 
Carolina. In this decision the Court warned that in order 
for Beaufort County to get any federal aid for education, it 
would need to comply with federal law and the specifications 
of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Parents who 
believed that their children were being deprived of equal 
protection under the law could upon written complaint get 
the Attorney General of the United States to initiate relief 
in the appropriate United States district court. Chief 
Justice Sharp summed up what was in the best interest of 
children: 
Under the decisions of the Supreme Court of the 
United States and the Acts of Congress, the Board of 
Education of Beaufort County can no longer legally 
impose segregation of the races in any school. 
Therefore, the real question to be resolved by the 
County Board of Education, the Board of County 
Commissioners, and the State Board of Education is 
whether it is in the best interest of the children who 
live in District III to have a single integrated high 
school or three integrated high schools. The question 
whether the schools of Beaufort County will be 
integrated in the future is no longer open. ... It 
behooves defendants to see to it that the citizens 
understand the exigencies which confront not only 
defendant Boards but every member of the body politic. 
Democracy is based upon the premise that the citizenry, 
if educated and enlightened, will do what is required 
of it to preserve government by law. The preservation 
of our form of government, therefore, depends upon an 
adequate system of public education.232 
232Ibid., p. 452. 
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Transportation 
In 1971 in Styers v. Phillips233 the court was called 
upon to answer the question of whether the State Board of 
Education could allocate to counties and cities funds from 
the General Assembly to transport urban pupils to and from 
schools located within corporate limits of cities and towns. 
It found that the State, counties, or cities had no duty to 
allocate funds for such purpose. The Court found that ". . 
..it is quite clear that whether any school board shall 
operate a bus transportation system is a matter in its sole 
discretion. . . ."234 State Board must adopt safety 
regulations, give advice to the establishment of school bus 
routes, and provide counsel on the acquisition and 
maintenance of buses, and answer other pertinent questions. 
Furthermore, the State Board is in charge of allocating all 
funds appropriated by the General Assembly for 
transportation. However, the General Assembly decision to 
transport some urban pupils but not others was overturned 
since the policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
United States Constitution. The State did not appeal this 
decision.235 styers v. Phillips stated: 
233Styers v. Phillips, 277 N. C. 460 (1971), p. 464. 
234Ibid., p. 465. 
235ibid. f p# 467. 
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The Federal District Court enjoined the State from 
providing funds for the transportation of any pupils 
within a municipality unless it provided transportation 
on an equal basis for all pupils residing within the 
city and living more than one and one-half miles from 
the school to which they were assigned.23̂  
Summary 
In 1871 the Supreme Court of North Carolina ruled 
peremptorily that neither school committees nor townships 
had taxing power for school purposes. Thus, the provision 
for a general and uniform system of public education derived 
from the action of the General Assembly in statewide 
application. This view held until 1907, when the Court, 
recognizing that interpretations change as conditions 
change, stated that county commissioners could levy a 
special tax to make up the deficiency when the state tax did 
not make possible the required four months' term in each 
school district. After crossing this threshold in taxation, 
the Court addressed other issues related to it. It has 
ruled that school taxes are not included in county expenses, 
that fixed charges including insurance are necessary 
expenses, and that contributions to the State Retirement 
System are also necessary expenses within the broadened 
interpretation of the Constitution of North Carolina. 
Tax levying and bond elections concerned the Court over 
a period of time. It has been called upon to answer sundry 
questions concerning the validity of tax levies and bond 
23®Ibid., pp. 467-468. 
185 
issues. Most of these decisions answered technical 
questions regarding substantial compliance with the law. 
Similarly, the Court has been called upon to answer 
questions on consolidation and taxation. As in the tax 
levying and bond election issues, the Court responded on the 
basis of constitutional and statute provisions. It did 
address the legal principles of harmonizing different 
statutes and discretionary power of boards of education. 
During the Depression, the Court was often called upon 
to rule on the legality of bond issues and their uses. As 
with other questions on finance, the Court responded with 
the application of state statutes. In so doing, it 
considered constitutional provisions, state statutes, the 
role of the State, boards of county commissioners, and 
boards of education. It again recognized the discretionary 
power of boards of education. 
In considering school fund distribution and 
supplementary tax levies, the Court stated that a fair 
method of distributing the county fund was on a per capita 
basis. It also held that funds could be used to supplement 
any object or item of school expenditure. 
Debt assumption and budget surpluses were also 
addressed by the Court, particularly during the Depression 
years. It responded to these questions with application of 
the law allowing debt assumption. The Court also suggested 
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that surpluses should not be contemplated, but when they did 
occur, they should be applied to the sinking fund or future 
budgets. 
In other actions the Court once held that a town or 
city high school could not receive financing from the board 
of county commissioners since it was not a part of the 
public school system. It also held that funds from fines, 
forfeitures, and. other specified sources could be used to 
supplement the current expense budget as well as for 
facilities and fixed charges. 
Of particular interest was the firm stand the Court 
took on racial segregation concerning use of approved bonds. 
The Court said that citizens should accept the law of the 
land and get on with what is required to preserve government 
by law. Transportation questions about providing school 
buses for some urban students and not others meeting the 
same qualifications were settled by federal court action and 
General Assembly action. 
Property 
During the years 1908-1975 the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina decided fifteen property cases. Of these the Court 
affirmed eleven lower court decisions, modified and affirmed 
two, found no error in one, and dismissed the appeal on one. 
The sixteen decisions speak to the following legal 
principles: (1) discretionary power of boards of education, 
(2) assignment of power to others, (3) lease of and 
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condemnation of property, (4) other legal issues: the 
constitutionality of statutes, and board of education 
hearings and interpretations of statutes. 
Discretionary Power of Boards of Education 
In considering property litigation, the Supreme Court 
of North Carolina has persistently held that decisions on 
property are within the sound discretion of boards of 
education. The courts will not interfere unless a violation 
of state law occurs or the manifest abuse of power is 
evident. In the 1908 Pickler v. Board of Education of Davie 
Count^237 case/ the Court addressed the question of 
discretionary power in considering the division of townships 
into school districts and the erection and maintenance of 
school buildings. The Court held that such decisions are 
left to the judgment of the boards of education unless there 
is an allegation of misconduct or violation of state 
statutes. 
There being no allegation of misconduct, their action 
cannot be supervised nor restrained by the courts 
unless in violation of some provision of the 
O 6 Q A 
statutes: 
The court has consistently held that the courts will 
not meddle in site selection by school committees. The 
Court in 1908 in Venable v. School Committee of Pilot 
237pickier v. Board of Education of Davie County, 149 
N. C. 221 (1908), p. 222. 
238Ibid. 
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Mountain239 upheld the consistency of these opinions in a 
case in which school systems favoring and opposing removal 
of a school and its location elsewhere were represented. 
The Court recognized that state statutes permit school 
committees to act within their own discretion without 
judicial restraint unless there is evidence of violation of 
the law, improper motives, or individual midconduct: 
The Court below having found that there was no fraud or 
collusion, that the change of site was in accordance 
with the wishes of a majority of the patrons of the 
school and to the best interests of the school, this 
Court cannot reverse that judgment or interfere with 
the removal, unless we could find that, upon the 
evidence or on the facts found, there was fraud or 
collusion. 
The 1922 case of Davenport v. Board of Education of 
^McDowell County241 concerned the location of schoolhouses 
within the school district. In this instance, the Court 
ruled that the location of schoolhouses and the conduct of 
school business are matters best left to school authorities: 
The power and authority of the local school boards 
are adapted to the full and proper performances of the 
duties imposed upon them, . . . and we should be 
careful not unduly to restrict these powers, the full 
239Venable v. School Committee of Pilot Mountain, 149 
N. C. 120 (1908), p. 121. 
240Ibid., pp. 121-122. 
24lDavenport v. Board of Education of McDowell County, 
183 N. C. 570 (1922) , p. 576 
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exercise of which is so essential to the efficient 
conduct and management of our public schools.242 
Davenport v. Board of Education of McDowell County^3 
further specified that the Court has no power to reverse the 
decision of boards of education in property decisions unless 
there is a violation of law. In such decisions the boards 
of education exercise their rightful authority under the 
law. 
In the 1924 Mclnnish v. Board of Education of Hoke 
County244 case the Court held that a county board of 
education should exercise proper discretion in its power and 
authority. The selection of school sites and the 
construction of schoolhouses falls within the assigned 
duties of boards of education in directing and supervising a 
school system for children. The Court eschews any 
involvement in these matters unless there is evidence of 
gross abuse by a board of education.245 
In a case involving primarily the lighting of school 
property, the Court elaborated on the activities which fall 
within the discretionary power of boards of education. The 
242ibid. 
243ibid. 
244McInnj_s]1 v> Board of Education of Hoke County, 187 
N. C. 494 (1924), p. 495. 
245Ibid. 
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Court ruled in 1925 in Conrad v. Board of Education of 
Granville County246 that a county board of education had the 
duty to properly light schoolhouses, to equip them with 
suitable desks for students, to provide tables and chairs 
for teachers, and generally to maintain the school term 
required by the Constitution of North Carolina. This case 
also held that school buildings could be used for the 
benefit of the people in the community: 
The manner in which, and the means by which a public 
school building shall be lighted, to the end that the 
people of the community in which it is located may use 
and enjoy it, are properly to be determined by the 
board of education, in the exercise of their 
discretion, and of course, in good faith.247 
The Court will not consider or pass upon the wisdom of a 
contract which boards of education have entered into for the 
lighting or maintenance of the school term. 
In the 1928 Clark v. McQueen^ 8 case, the Court ruled 
on the power of a county board of education to discontinue a 
high school, to establish a new high school in the district 
or to transfer a high school to an adjoining school district 
in another county: 
In the absence of statutory limitations upon the power 
to perform this duty, discretion is vested in said 
boards to locate, discontinue, transfer and establish 
246conrad v. Board of Education of Granville County, 
190 N. C. 389 (1925), p. 396. 
248Clark v. McQueen, 195 N. C. 714 (1928), p. 716. 
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high schools in the districts of their several 
counties. In the absence of abuse, this discretion 
cannot be set aside or controlled by the courts. 49 
In 1937 the Court emphasized in Moore v. Board of Education 
pen 
of Iredell County the discretionary power of local boards 
of education to select the sites for school buildings in 
school districts. This privilege to choose school sites was 
also confirmed in 1950 by the Court in Wayne County Board of 
T C I  
Education v. Lewis. Once again the Court held that such 
a decision resided alone in the sound discretion of local 
officials unless violations of the law or intentional 
abuse by local authorities could be proven. This 
discretionary authority flows from state statutes to school 
officials. To be sure, according to the Court in the Brown 
252 v. Candler case in 1953 local boards must consider many 
factors in using its discretionary power: 
Indeed, it illustrates the necessity for the 
legislative vesting in the school authorities the 
discretionary power to determine which one of the 
various available sites to be used. 
249Ibid. 
^^^Moore v. Board of Education of Iredell County, 212 
N. C. 499 (1937), p. 501. 
2"^Wayne County Board of Education v. Lewis, 231 N. C. 
661 (1950), p. 663. 
^^Brown v. Candler, 236 N. C. 576 (1953), p. 583. 
253Ibid. 
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In 1972 in Lutz v. Gaston County Board of Education2̂  the 
Court applied the "discretionary judgment" precedent to 
school consolidation. The Court's role is to consider if a 
county board or State Board of Education complied with the 
law and did not unreasonably or arbitrarily exercise 
manifest abuse of discretion. In the 1975 Painter v. Wake 
County Board of Education2̂ 5 case, the Court expressed the 
same principle: 
In construing these statutes, our Court has 
consistently held that the Board of Education 
determines whether new school buildings are needed and, 
if so, where they shall be located. Such decisions are 
vested in the sound discretion of the Board. The 
Board's discretion with reference thereto cannot be 
restrained by the courts absent a manifest abuse of 
discretion or a disregard of law.256 
Assignment of Power to Others 
This discretionary authority cannot be assigned by the 
board to others. In 1937 the Court in Bowles v. 
Fayetteville Graded Schools^"? held that the board of 
education could not give to its property committee the 
"power to act," for this "power to act" resided solely in 
^^Lutz v. Gaston County Board of Education, 282 N. C. 
208 (1972), p. 213. 
^^Painter v> wake County Board of Education, 288 N. C. 
165 (1975), p. 176. 
256Ibid. 
257bow]_ss v> Fayetteville Graded Schools, 211 N. C. 36 
(1937), p. 39. 
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the discretionary authority of the board of education. The 
motion to give to the property committee this authority 
. . . should not be construed to constitute the valid 
delegation of power to the chairman of the property 
committee to execute a contract for the sale of the 
property in a manner contrary to the method set out in 
the statute. The Fayetteville Graded Schools cannot in 
law be bound thereby.258 
Lease of and Condemnation of Property 
In another case involving the acquisition and lease of 
property, the Court held that it would not prohibit the 
constitutional conveyance of property. Boney v. Board of 
Trustees of Kinston Graded Schools^^ j_n 1948 concerned the 
buying of private property by school officers and then its 
conveyance to the City of Kinston. The Court held that the 
conveyance in a written contract of property to the City of 
Kinston for an athletic field and playground was a proper 
school use of property: "Without a doubt, this is a proper 
public school use, for physical training is a legitimate 
function of education."260 In such situations, however, 
the courts are available to prevent any unconstitutional 
diversion of board of education property. 
t pp. 39-40. 
259soney v. Board of Trustee of Kinston Graded Schools, 
229 N. C. 136 (1948) , p. 140. 
260Ibid. 
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In another case involving the lease of school property, 
in 1958 the Court in State v. Cooke^Sl held that the 
Greensboro City Board of Education had the legislative 
authority to lease property with presumption of its intended 
and contemplated use. The Greensboro City Board of 
Education possessing more land than it needed for school 
purposes, decided to lease the property to a private 
corporation to be used for public or semipublic purpose as a 
golf course. The board of education in its conveyance 
intended and contemplated that the property should be used 
without unlawful discrimination because of race, color, 
religion, or other illegal classification. As a subsequent 
rejoinder, the Court in State v. Cooke262 prohibited the 
denial of use to citizens simply because they were Negroes. 
The Court has ruled on the taking of land for public 
school use. In the 1956 Burlington City Board of Education 
v. Allen^ 3̂ case, the Court held that it is a legislative 
prerogative limited only by organic law to determine the 
just compensation to be used in acquiring appropriated 
property and by the procedures for such acquisition: 
In discharging this function in respect to schools, the 
General Assembly has delegated to the respective local 
^^State v. Cooke, 248 N. C. 485 (1958), p. 491. 
262Ibid. 
263Burlington City Board of Education v. Allen, 243 N. 
C. 520 (1956), p. 522. 
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school administrative units the authority to take land 
for school sites and other school facilities and has 
prescribed the procedure therefor.264 
Boards of education, as administrative agencies of the 
State, may select school sites. When boards condemn 
property not obtained by gift or purchase, the boards of 
education act in an administrative capacity. Since taking 
property for public school use is a discretionary decision 
of boards of education, the courts will not intercede only 
if there is willful abuse of this discretion or an 
inherently illegal action.^65 
Other Legal Principles: Constitutionality of Statutes, 
Hearings and Interpretation of Statutes 
In considering the lawful purchase, relocation, or 
transfer of property by school administrative units, the 
Supreme Court has also emphasized some other legal 
principles. 
A case concerning the exchange of one parcel of 
property for another for school purposes by boards of 
education came before the Court in 1975. In Painter v. Wake 
County Board of Education^**, the Court ruled that the 
courts must presume the constitutionality of a state 
264lbid. 
265Ibid., p. 523. 
266painter v. Wake County Board of Education, 288 N. C. 
165 (1975), p. 177. 
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statute. The Court will not declare a statute 
unconstitutional unless it is clearly so, but all reasonable 
doubt must be resolved in favor of the statute's validity. 
The Court assumes that the acts of the General Assembly are 
constitutionally within its legislative power unless 
analysis appears clearly to the contrary. Similarly, the 
Court presumes that boards of education act in good faith 
and in accord with the spirit and purpose of statute. In 
the 194 8 Boney v. Board of Trustees of Kinston Graded 
Schools 0̂' case, the Court held that if reasonable doubt on 
the constitutionality of a legislative enactment remains, 
then any questions must be resolved in favor of the lawful 
exercise of power by representatives of the people. 
Lutz v. Gaston County Board of Education2*^ held that 
procedures for board hearings on property questions must be 
reasonable and in full compliance with state laws. The 
Court also called for giving plain and definite meaning to 
broad and ambiguous statutes. 
Summary 
Decisions on property questions are within the sound 
discretion of boards of education. The Court will not 
overrule the judgment of a local board unless there is an 
267 Boney v. Board of Trustees of Kinston Graded 
Schools, 229 N. C. 136 (1948), p. 141. 
2f̂ Lutz v. Gaston County Board of Education, 282 N. C. 
208 (1972), p. 219. 
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allegation of misconduct or violation of state statutes. 
This discretionary power which boards of education enjoy 
cannot be assigned by them to others. In questions 
concerning decisions on property issues, the courts presume 
the constitutionality of acts of the General Assembly and 
state statute. The Supreme Court of North Carolina will not 
declare a state statute unconstitutional unless it is 
clearly so. Hearings on property questions must be 
reasonable, and must comply with state law. Plain and 
definite meaning must be given to statutes if their language 
is obtuse or ambiguous. 
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CHAPTER V 
REVIEW OF COURT DECISIONS 
Introduction 
This chapter presents a review of authoritative or 
illustrative decisions in the six categories outlined in 
Chapter One. An overview is presented for each category and 
specific facts and judicial decisions are given. A 
conclusionary discussion of each case is given as it 
pertains to the category to which it is applied. Categories 
and cases are listed below: 
1. Governance 
State v. Thompson (1898) 
Gore v. Columbus County (1950) 
2. Employees 
Still v. Lance (1971) 
Faulkner v. New Bern-Craven County Board of 
Education (1984) 
3. Pupils 
Coqqins v. Board of Education of the City of 
Durham (1944) 
Delconte v. State (1985) 
4. Torts 
Fields v. Durham City Board of Education (1960) 
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5. Finance 
Lane v. Stanly (1871) 
Collie v. Commissioners of Franklin County (1907) 
6. Property 
Pickler v. Board of Education of Davie County 
(1908) 
Lutz v. Gaston County Board of Education (1972) 
Governance 
Overview 
Office holding and the discretionary power of boards of 
education are among the subjects addressed in the study of 
governance. The Supreme Court of North Carolina has ruled 
on dual office-holding in the state and the use of 
discretionary authority by boards of education in selecting 
school sites in consolidating schools of a district, and 
with the approval of the State Boards of Education in 
consolidating school districts. The positive language of 
the Constitution of North Carolina forbids dual office-
holding even though there may be no incompatibility between 
the two offices. The discretionary power of boards of 
education must be made in good faith depending upon existing 
facts and circumstances. 
State v. Thompson 
122 N.C. 493, 29 S.E. 720 (1898) 
Facts 
The defendant was elected a county commissioner in 
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Bladen County and served in that capacity. Later, the 
defendant was elected to the Board of Education for Bladen 
County and began to exercise the duties of that office as 
well. The Attorney General brought action to turn the 
defendant out of the office of county commissioner. The 
Superior Court found that the defendant did not 
automatically forfeit the office of county commissioner by 
accepting and qualifying as a member of the Board of 
Education of Bladen County. 
Decision 
This case came before the Court to determine if two 
offices can legally be held at the same time. The argument 
that membership on a board of education did not constitute 
office-holding in North Carolina was never seriously put 
forth. The Court held that a reading of the law made it 
plain that membership in a county board of education was 
clearly an office.^ Although common law placed no limit on 
a citizen's right to hold several offices, the Constitution 
of North Carolina prohibited such dual office- holding. The 
question then which had to be answered concerned the forfeit 
and vacating of the first office on the acceptance of the 
second. The Court ruled that such was not the case when 
holding a federal office conflicted with the acceptance of a 
state office since the state court had no authority over 
Estate v. Thompson, 122 N. C. 493 (1898), p. 496. 
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federal offices: "The general rule however, is otherwise in 
the States. It is the acceptance of the second that vacates 
the first.The Court further held that acceptance of a 
second prohibited office must make the first vacant. 
Although the citizen has the right to determine which office 
to retain, the choice is made when the citizen accepts and 
qualifies for the second office. The public has a right to 
know which decision has been made.3 In conclusion, the 
Court stated that the first office was forfeited and left 
vacant on acceptance of the second office in accordance with 
the plain and positive language of the Constitution of North 
Carolina even though there was no incompatibility between 
offices as required in making such a determination in common 
law. 4 
Discussion 
The Court enforced the constitutional prohibition on 
dual office-holding. It considered the language of the 
Constitution of North Carolina and ruled against the 
defendant. 
^Ibid., p. 497. 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid., p. 498. 
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Gore v. Columbus County 
232 N.C. 636, 61 S.E. 2d 890 (1950) 
Facts 
The Board of Commissioners of Columbus County 
authorized a bond election for the erection, remodeling and 
enlarging of school buildings, and acquisition of necessary 
land and equipment. The bonds were approved and the bond 
order referred to school buildings for white children in 
specified districts. Prior to the bond election the 
superintendent of schools in Columbus County publicized a 
statement specifying the improvements to be made in certain 
schools. "Proceeds from the bond issue were thereafter 
allocated for the purpose of making the above 
improvements5 Afterwards, a new superintendent was 
selected, who promptly requested a survey of the schools to 
serve as a guide in their development. When the subsequent 
survey presented a plan contrary to the information shared 
with voters prior to the bond election, an act of the 
General Assembly authorized the Board of Commissioners of 
Columbus County to reallocate a portion of the funds from 
the bond issue at its discretion to carry out the new plan. 
Accordingly, the County Board of Education of Columbus 
County passed a resolution approved by the Board of 
Commissioners to carry out this purpose. Citizens 
^Gore v. Columbus County, 232 N. C. 636 (1950), p. 637. 
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obtained a temporary injunction forbidding the obligation of 
funds contrary to the original published allocation. But 
the Court ultimately dissolved the temporary restraining 
order. 
Decision 
The Court held that the county board of education had 
the authority by statute to consolidate school districts 
when such action would better serve educational interests. 
In such matters the Court affirmed that courts will not 
interfere with exercise of discretion by school authorities 
in creating or consolidating school districts, or in the 
selection of school sites.® The Court was then faced with 
the question of whether there was in fact a lawful 
reallocation of funds. It concluded that such a 
reallocation based on the relevant facts and circumstances 
was allowable; moreover it stressed the important tenet that 
the "General Assembly has no power to authorize local school 
authorities to exercise an arbitrary discretion, without 
regard to the existing facts and circumstances involved.1,7 
Existing facts and circumstances, not pre-existing 
conditions, had to be considered in the exercise of 
discretion in good faith. 
^Ibid., p. 640. 
7Ibid. 
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Discussion 
The Court recognized the legal principle of 
non-interference in discretionary power of boards of 
education when made in good faith. As a consequence, the 
Court would not restrain decisions on consolidation, site 
selection, and funds reallocation necessitated by changing 
circumstances. 
Employees 
Overview 
Employment decisions by boards of education are the 
subject for determination by the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina in the study of employees. In considering teacher 
dismissal cases, the Court has ruled that boards of 
education must adhere to contract requirements, statutory 
provisions, and the "whole record" test. Employment 
contracts determine the duration or termination of 
employment, and statutory provisions govern the basis for 
termination. Likewise, the standard of judicial review 
requires boards of education to use the "whole record" test 
in teacher dismissal. 
Still v. Lance 
279 N.C. 254, 182 S.E. 2d 403 (1971) 
Facts 
A public school teacher for four years in the Buncombe 
County Public School System sued for damages and injunctive 
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relief when the County Board of Education, acting upon the 
recommendation of the principal and District School 
Committee, terminated the teacher's contract. On or before 
the last day of the last academic year of employment the 
County Board of Education determined that the teacher's 
contract would not be renewed. In accordance with the law, 
the superintendent informed the teacher by registered mail, 
the County Board of Education provided no hearing for the 
teacher concerning the termination of the contract. 
The written contract between the teacher and the County 
Board of Education was in the prescribed form and did not 
specify a termination date. It conformed to school law and 
stated that the teacher would carry out duties required by 
the laws of North Carolina and the rules and regulations of 
the County Board of Education. The Board of Education 
agreed to pay the teacher for services rendered. The 
contract also specified that the superintendent would assign 
the teacher to duties. 
Yet, the teacher did not receive from the Board of 
Education, either orally or in writing, any explanation for 
termination of contract. As a result, the teacher requested 
in writing from the Chairman of the District Committee the 
reasons for termination as well as a hearing by the County 
Board of Education regarding the termination of the 
contract. 
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Decision 
The contract conformed to school law and contained no 
provisions on the duration of employment or means of 
termination. In lieu of other provisions, the contract was 
terminable at the will of either party notwithstanding the 
quality of performance by the other party. However, if 
business usage or other circumstances showed that the 
employment was to continue through a fixed term, then the 
contract could not be ended earlier than the conclusion of 
the fixed term except for cause or by mutual consent.** 
The nature of school operations is such that, in the 
absence of evidence of a contrary intent, a contract 
for the employment of a school teacher is presumed to 
be intended by the parties to continue to the end of 
the school year and not to be terminable by either 
party prior to that time and without cause and without 
the consent of the other party.9 
The Court held that the contract in accordance with the 
relevant state statute, did not limit to a specific cause or 
circumstance the employer's right to terminate the 
employment of a teacher at the conclusion of the year. The 
Board was not required to file charges against the teacher, 
to notify the teacher of reasons for termination of 
employment, or to allow a hearing on the matter. Such 
omissions were obviously not an oversight in the statute. 
Thus, the interpretation of the relevant statute supported 
8Still v. Lance, 279 N. C. 254 (1971), p. 259. 
9Ibid. 
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the County Board of Education's authority to terminate the 
teacher's employment as it had done.10 Other considerations 
of state statute permitting an appeal to a county or city 
board of education of decisions in relation to school 
personnel did not apply since the decision was made by the 
board of education. Also, the action did not affect the 
teacher's character or right to teach and, thus, the same 
statute did not allow for an appeal from the board of 
education to the Superior Court.H 
In addition, the Court found that neither the 
Constitution of the United States nor the Constitution of 
North Carolina forbade the limitation of teacher contracts 
to a term of one school year. When the teacher entered into 
the contract, she did not have the absolute right to 
continued employment until dismissal for cause. Employment 
continued until it was terminated according to state 
statute. Hence, the County Board of Education did not 
violate its contract with the teacher. 
The Court further discovered no violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States. One procedure for dismissal of a teacher during 
10Ibid., pp. 260-261. 
H-Ibid., p. 261. 
l^ibid., p. 262. 
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the school year for cause and another for termination at the 
end of the school year are allowable.still v. Lance 
explained: 
The vast difference in the consequences of these two 
actions, insofar as the future effect upon the 
teacher's professional standing and ability to obtain 
employment is concerned, is ample basis for 
classification within the limits of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and of Article I, s 17, of the Constitution 
of North Carolina. 
In summary, the Court held: 
There is nothing in the record before us to 
suggest that the action of the County Board of 
Education was designed to restrict the plaintiff in the 
exercise of any of her constitutional rights, or as a 
retaliatory measure by reason of her previous exercise 
of any such right, or for any reason save the bona fide 
exercise by the board of the discretion vested in it by 
the statute for the purpose of operating within the 
county an effective, properly staffed system of public 
schools. Consequently, the plaintiff has shown no 
constitutional right to a notice setting forth the 
board's reasons for terminating her employment at the 
end of the school year or to a hearing upon this 
matter.^ 
Discussion 
The Court refused to review the discretionary wisdom of 
a board of education in an employment decision. Authority 
for school board actions is set forth in the statutes passed 
by the General Assembly. Consideration of this matter 
occurred only after the local board of education had 
established a record, obtained the facts, and made a 
13Ibid., p. 263. 
14Ibid. 
15Ibid., pp. 264-265. 
209 
decision. Contract provisions and intent were reviewed, and 
the legal principles embodying constitutional rights of 
employees were considered. 
Faulkner v. New Bern-Craven County Board of Education 
311 N.C. 42, 316 S.E. 2d 281 (1984) 
Facts 
A tenured teacher with the New Bern-Craven County Board 
of Education was suspended. The grounds for dismissal 
listed by the superintendent included habitual or excessive 
use of alcohol, failure to fulfill the duties and 
responsibilities imposed upon teachers by the General 
Statutes of North Carolina, neglect of duty, immorality, and 
insubordination. The teacher requested a hearing before a 
Professional Review Panel, which found the charges as 
presented had neither truth nor substance. The charges were 
based on evidence of consuming alcohol on school grounds or 
in the classroom and being absent from the classroom for 
extended periods of time without just cause or excuse. 
Nevertheless, the superintendent recommended dismissal to 
the Board of Education, which granted a hearing in executive 
session. After hearing testimony by witnesses for each side 
and having considered the report of the Professional Review 
Committee, the Board made the following findings of fact: 
1. The teacher had been continuously employed by the 
school district since 1969 until his suspension in 
September, 1981; 
210 
2. The evaluations for the three preceding years had 
been marked satisfactory or better; 
3. The teacher had been employed as a career teacher 
for the 1981-1982 school year at H. J. McDonald Middle 
School in the areas of seventh grade language arts; 
4. During the school year, the principal detected the 
odor of alcohol on the breath of the teacher, informally 
reprimanded and warned the teacher against any further 
conduct of this nature, but did not place a formal complaint 
in the teacher's personnel file; 
5. The principal requested a guidance counselor to 
talk with the teacher about this problem and she did so; 
6. On other occasions during the early part of the 
1981-1982 school year, another teacher detected alcohol on 
the breath of the teacher; 
7. A parent going to the teacher to obtain assignments 
for her child detected the odor of alcohol on the teacher's 
breath; 
8. Other complaints were received in writing and 
verbally by the principal and superintendent concerning the 
odor of alcohol on the breath of the teacher during the 
early part of 1981-1982; 
9. The principal directed the teacher to meet with the 
principal concerning the complaints; 
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10. The teacher ignored or failed to respond to the 
principal's directive until summoned by the principal for 
the teacher's response to the complaints; 
11. During the 1980-1981 school year the principal had 
reprimanded the teacher for extended absences from the 
classroom during the time the teacher was to instruct and 
supervise students; in return, the teacher admitted this 
inadequacy and promised to correct it; 
12. During the early part of the 1981-1982 school year 
the teacher was again reprimanded for absences from the 
classroom, whereupon the teacher admitted to the absences 
which were without just cause or excuse. 
The Board concluded on the findings that the grounds 
for dismissal were both true and substantial and therefore 
voted to dismiss the teacher. The Court of Appeals found 
that findings 1, 2, and 3 were not in dispute; that findings 
4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 were supported by the entire record; that 
finding 9 was partially supported by the record except that 
the communication from the principal was not a directive 
requiring a consultation but a notice of the complaints and 
an invitation to the teacher to discuss the situation, that 
the entire record did not support finding 10, that finding 
11 did not include a reprimand of the teacher for conduct 
and that the whole record would show that the matter was 
treated as a principal-teacher conference aimed at 
correcting the problem, and in view of the whole record test 
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finding 12 was supported by the evidence. The Court of 
Appeals ordered reinstatement of the teacher. 
Decision 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina granted 
discretionary review of this case and considered the first 
ground on which the Board voted to dismiss the teacher: 
habitual and/or excessive use of alcohol. The Court of 
Appeals set aside the decision of the Board of Education 
because the ground of habitual and/or excessive use of 
alcohol was not supported by the evidence and drinking 
during duty hours had not been established as a ground for 
dismissal by the General Assembly. The Court reversed this 
decision of the Court of Appeals, since "... the findings 
of fact and conclusion of the defendant board of education 
are supported by substantial evidence and based upon a 
preponderance of the evidence.The Court held that the 
evidence presented against the career teacher constituted 
habitual or excessive use of alcohol and therefore provided 
lawful grounds for dismissal.^ In so doing, the Court was 
guided by legal principles: interpretation of statutes 
according to legislative intent and harmonizing statutes 
•^Faulkner v. New Bern-Craven County Board of 
Education, 311 N. C. 42 (1984), p. 56. 
l^Ibid.,  p. 57. 
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which relate to the same subject to attain fair and 
reasonable interpretation. 
Discussion 
The Court in this instance ruled that any ambiguity in 
the meaning of statutes relating to the same subject must be 
harmonized and interpreted according to legislative intent. 
The judicial standard of the "whole record" was applied. 
Pupils 
Overview 
Regulations for the discipline, government, and 
management of the schools and pupils as well as compliance 
with school attendance requirements are among the subjects 
to consider in the study of laws relating to pupils. The 
Supreme Court of North Carolina has addressed the issues of 
regulations which prohibit secret societies at school and 
violations of the state compulsory attendance laws. Boards 
of education have the discretionary authority to make these 
regulations unless the boards act in bad faith or in abuse 
of power. State statutes do provide alternate ways in which 
school-age children may comply with the compulsory 
attendance law; for example, home instruction meets the 
criteria for recognition by the state as a non-public 
school. The legislature has yet to define the word school 
in order to give it any intrinsic meaning. 
18Ibid. p. 58. 
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Coqqins v. Board of Education of the City of Durham 
223 N.C. 763, 28 S.E. 2d 527 (1944) 
Facts 
The original plaintiff was a student in the senior high 
school administered by the defendant board of education, who 
had adopted a resolution disapproving the membership of 
students in secret societies and fraternities. A copy of 
the resolution was mailed to parents. Among other things, 
the resolution indicated that previous attempts at enlisting 
parent and student co-operation in opposing such secret 
societies had failed. After further investigation, the 
board decided to end school pupil membership in secret 
societies. As a result, students were asked to sign a 
pledge that they would not join or attend the meetings of 
such organizations and would not support financially or 
participate in any of their activities. Parents were 
informed that students who did not sign the pledge would be 
denied participation in school activities. An illustrative, 
but not exhaustive list was provided. The student plaintiff 
admitted membership in a fraternity, had not signed the 
pledge, and feared that such failure would deny the 
opportunity to play on the football team and to participate 
in other extracurricular activities. When the lower court 
ruled in favor of the board of education, the plaintiff 
appealed. 
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Decision 
The Court ruled that students have a right, though not 
an absolute right, to attend school. Rules and regulations 
may be adopted to insure the orderly management of the 
schools, and attendance at school is subject to these rules 
and regulations.^ The public schools come under the 
control of the General Assembly, which gives to local boards 
of education the right to make the rules and regulations 
necessary for an orderly environment. 
In Coggins v. Board of Education of City of Durham, the 
Court ruled: 
This includes the power to make, promulgate, and 
enforce such rules and regulations as they, in their 
discretion, deem reasonably necessary for the good 
management of the schools and the discipline of its 
pupils. 
The Court said that the rule did not deny the plaintiff 
instruction in the required curriculum or participation in 
extracurricular activities. The plaintiff student had to 
make a choice between compliance with the policy and 
non-compliance and resulting consequences. 
On the other hand, the Court held that those 
disaffected by rules could seek a remedy at the ballot box. 
To be sure, the courts had the right to review the 
l^Coggins v. Board of Education of City of Durham, 223 
N. C. 763 (1944), p. 767. 
20Ibid., p. 768. 
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unreasonableness of such rules but generally did not as long 
as they were made in good faith and were not clearly 
arbitrary or unreasonable. The Court further stated that to 
substitute the opinion of a court or a jury for that of a 
local board of education would make the board's position 
precarious in dealing with such questions.21 in summary, 
the Court held that the defendant board could regulate 
secret societies, that it had acted within its lawful 
authority, that their regulation was not unreasonable and 
did not constitute unlawful discrimination against the 
plaintiff, and that no right guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Federal Constitution had been infringed 
upon.22 
Discussion 
In this case the Court unequivocally ruled that local 
boards of education have the right to make rules for the 
orderly management of the public schools. The Court will 
not interfere in the discretionary power of boards of 
education unless the boards act corruptly, in bad faith, or 
in abuse of power. 
21Ibid., p. 769. 
22ibid., pp. 769-770. 
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Delconte v. State 
313 N.C. 384, 329 S.E. 2d 636 (1985) 
Facts 
The parents moved to North Carolina from New York. 
Fundamentalist Christians who conducted religious services 
at home, the parents believed that the Bible obliged them to 
teach their children at home. With the approval of the 
local board of education in New York, the parents had taught 
their own children at home. Thus, in North Carolina, the 
parents sought from the State Coordinator of the Office of 
Non-public Education recognition of this home school as a 
non-public school. The request was denied; Delconte was 
prosecuted for violating the compulsory school attendance 
laws. However, the State voluntarily dismissed the criminal 
charges, and the parents continued to educate their own 
children at home. Standardized test scores and schoolwork 
showed that the two children rated average or better 
academically. Delconte expressed religious and 
"sociopsychological" objections to the public schools. 
Delconte believed the children should be taught at home 
since the parents objected to some teachings in the public 
schools — specifically, the teaching of evolution which 
they felt was contrary to the Bible. "Sociopsychological" 
objections stemmed from a belief that sending children away 
from home at an early age signified parental rejection and 
made them susceptible to the undesirable influence' of 
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teachers and other students by this logic, therefore, the 
children should not be exposed to the community-at-large. 
The trial court recognized the parents' home school as 
a qualified non-public school. Otherwise, the compulsory 
school laws would violate religious freedom guaranteed in 
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, section 13 of the Constitution of North Carolina. 
The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the home 
instruction did not constitute a qualified non-public 
school, that compulsory attendance laws prohibited home 
instruction, and that constitutional rights were not 
violated by such an interpretation. 
Decision 
The Court held that enrollment in private church 
schools or qualified non-public schools did indeed meet the 
State's compulsory attendance requirements. The parents' 
home instruction met the standards required of non-public 
schools and the specified characteristic of receiving no 
funding from the State. The Court also stated that there is 
nothing intrinsic in the meaning of the word school which 
precludes home instruction.23 "we do not agree that the 
legislature intended simply by use of the word 'school,' 
because of some intrinsic meaning invariably attached to the 
^^Delconte v. State,. 313 N. C. 384 (1985), p. 391. 
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word, to preclude home instruction."24 Furthermore, the 
Court held that most of the authorities cited by the State 
and the Court of Appeals were faulty in not supporting such 
a conclusion. 
In addition, the Court observed that the General 
Assembly has never specified what a school is: 
The upshot of this historical review is that we 
find nothing in the evolution of our compulsory 
attendance laws to support a conclusion that the word 
"school," when used by the legislature in statutes 
bearing on compulsory attendance, evidences a 
legislative purpose to refer to a particular kind of 
instructional setting. The legislature had 
historically insisted only that the instructional 
setting, whatever it may be, meet certain standards 
which ca.n be objectively determined and which require 
no subjective or philosophical analysis of what is or 
is not a "school."25 
Lastly, the Court in this case held that to interpret 
the compulsory attendance statutes as forbidding home 
instruction would raise constitutional questions. Although 
the Constitution of North Carolina empowers the General 
Assembly to educate the citizens of the state, any 
prohibition on home instruction is unclear. Also, Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters in 1925 and Wisconsin v. Yoder in 1972 
indicated that the United States Supreme Court upholds the 
fundamental right of parents to guide the religious future 
and education of their children. However, whether or not 
the United State Supreme Court would apply this concept 
24Ibid., p. 392. 
25ibid., p. 400. 
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to home instruction remains unclear.26 At any rate, these 
cases raised serious questions about the constitutionality 
of a state ban on home instruction. 
Discussion 
The Court upheld the trial court decision which 
accepted home instruction as a qualified non-public school. 
In the opinion of the Court, home instruction met standards 
established by the state, did not conflict with any state 
definition of a "school" since none had been adopted by the 
General Assembly, and complied with freedoms guaranteed in 
state and federal constitutions. 
Torts 
Overview 
Action against boards of education to recover for 
injury arising out of alleged negligence are among the 
subjects in the study of torts. The Supreme Court has ruled 
on the purchase of liability insurance by boards of 
education and the waiver of immunity authorized by state 
statute. Boards of education are immune from tort liability 
unless immunity is waived or unless liability arises out of 
the State Tort Claims Act. 
2^lbid., p. 401. 
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Fields v. Durham City Board of Education 
251 N.C. 699, 111 S.E. 2d 910 (1960) 
Facts 
An eleven-year-old student in the Durham City School 
System was injured during school hours. While on the school 
grounds, the student stepped through a break in an iron 
grate which was a part of the drainage system. The school 
system had corporate status, was administering the public 
schools, and exercised a necessary governmental function. 
The plaintiff claimed that the injury resulted from the 
negligence of the Durham City School System. The defendant 
board asserted that the board had not waived governmental 
immunity. The plaintiffs appealed. 
Decision 
The Court held that state law gave county and city 
boards of education corporate status. This status included 
,the right to sue and to be sued; on the other hand, insisted 
the Court, this "... does not mean that the Legislature 
has waived immunity from liability for torts for such 
boards."27 No liability exists except that which may be 
established by the Tort Claims Act or unless immunity from 
tort liability has been waived. Waiver of immunity from 
liability occurs only to the extent that a board of 
^Fields v. Durham City Board of Education, 251 N. C. 
699 (1960), p. 700. 
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education obtains liability insurance to cover negligence or 
torts. In summary, the Court held: 
It is clear that the Legislature has not waived 
immunity from tort liability as to county and city 
boards of education, except as to such liability as may 
be established under our Tort Claims Act,, but has left 
the waiver of immunity from liability for torts to the 
respective boards and then only to the extent such 
board has obtained liability insurance to cover 
negligence or torts.28 
Discussion 
The Court maintained and clarified the governmental 
immunity from suit which boards of education enjoy. 
Exceptions to the waiver of immunity occur only to the 
extent provided by law or by the purchase of liability 
insurance to cover negligence or torts. 
Finance 
Overview 
The power of taxation for school purposes is among the 
subjects in the study of finance. The Supreme Court of 
North Carolina has ruled on the manner in which a general 
and uniform system of public schools must be funded. In so 
doing, the Court reversed a previous decision and permitted 
county commissioners to levy annually a special tax which 
made possible the state-mandated school term. The special 
levy provided taxation to make up the deficiency in state 
28ibid., p. 701. 
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funding. The Court approved this levy, although such a levy 
violated constitutional taxing limitations, under the 
argument that other constitutional requirements for schools 
had equal weight with constitutional taxing limitations. 
Lane v. Stanly 
65 N.C. 153 (1871) 
Facts 
Taxpayers of Craven County brought action against - the 
Board of County Commissioners and tax collector to restrain 
the collection of certain taxes levied for school purpose in 
Township No. 3. The Board of Trustees of the township 
received from the school committee an estimate of expenses 
necessary to provide for schools in 1870. When a majority 
of the qualified voters rejected the proposal, the trustees 
forwarded the estimate to the Board of County Commissioners, 
who levied a tax on property to pay the expenses for a 
school in the township. The complaint alleged that the 
County Commissioners violated Article VII, Section 7, of the 
Constitution of North Carolina by levying a tax which had 
not been approved by a majority of the qualified voters and 
by disregarding the equation of taxation. The defendants 
argued that they had acted in accordance with the State 
Constitution as well as the Act of 1868-1869, which had been 
enacted to carry out its provisions, and therefore did not 
require voter approval or equation of taxation because the 
expenses were necessary. The presiding judge dissolved the 
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temporary injunction which the plaintiff taxpayers had 
obtained. 
Decision 
The North Carolina Constitution, Article VII, Section 
4, gave townships corporate powers for necessary purposes. 
In the Act of 1868-1869, the townships received authority to 
provide for certain expenses by levying a tax, even though 
no mention was made of schools or the poor.29 Schools were 
provided for elsewhere; according to Lane v. Stanly, 
We have already seen that public schools are not 
one of the enumerated subjects over which township 
trustees have control. But it is insisted that, as 
education is necessary to good government, they have 
implied power over it. This would be entitled to much 
consideration if public schools were not otherwise 
provided for. They are otherwise provided for.3® 
The school committee in each township was empowered to 
establish and maintain one or more schools in each district 
for four months out of every year. They were made 
corporations with management responsibility for the schools. 
The Township Trustees were excluded; otherwise, two bodies 
would have been given control over the same organization. 
While school committees retained management responsibility, 
supervision of the schools was entrusted to the County 
Commissioners, who could levy a school tax, keep the school 
fund, and disburse monies on order of school committees. 
^^Lane v. Stanly, 65 N. C. 153 (1871), p. 154. 
30Ibid. 
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Section 25 of the School Act provided that if the township 
failed to provide for the schools, the County Commissioners, 
acting on an estimate of expenses could levy a school tax. 
Meanwhile, the Court ruled that neither the school committee 
nor the Township Trustees had any taxing power for school 
purposes. But even the county commissioners did not have 
complete control over the public schools: "On the contrary, 
it was considered a matter of such paramount importance that 
its supervision is reserved to the State itself."31 Thus, 
the Constitution of North Carolina, Article IX, made it the 
responsibility of the General Assembly to provide by 
taxation and otherwise for a general and uniform system of 
public schools: 
So it will be seen that the Constitution establishes 
the public school system, and the General Assembly 
provided for it, by its own taxing power and by the 
taxing power of the counties and the State Board of 
Education, by the aid of school committees, manage it. 
It will be observed that it is to be a "system," it is 
to be "general," and it is to be "uniform." It is not 
to be subject to the caprice of localities, but every 
locality, yea, every child, is to have the same 
advantage and be subject to the same rules and 
regulations.3 2 
The Court reasoned that if every township could make 
its own rules and regulations, then there could be great 
variance in the education provided. As a consequence, there 
would be no uniformity whatsoever. Thus, it was up to the 
•^Ibid., p. 156. 
32Ibid. 
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State to take charge of education.33 In the words of Lane 
v. Stanly: 
The conclusion is that townships have not the 
power of taxation for school purposes, either through 
their trustees or committees. Nor has a county the 
power to lay township taxes, as distinguished from the 
general county tax for school purposes. And in laying 
the county tax for school purposes, the equation of 
taxation must be observed.- 4̂ 
The Court made the injunction permanent. 
Discussion 
The Court found that funding for a general and uniform 
system of public schools was primarily a state 
responsibility. Nothing in the Constitution of North 
Carolina gave to townships the authority to furnish monies 
for the public schools as a necessary expense. 
Collie v. Commissioners of Franklin County 
145 N.C. 170, 59 S.E. 44 (1907) 
Facts 
Plaintiff taxpayers sought restraint against the Board 
of Commissioners which had levied one cent per $100 worth of 
property and three cents on each taxable poll, even though 
the levy was for the support and maintenance of the public 
schools in Franklin County. The levy was in addition to and 
beyond the limit of 66-2/3 cents on $100 worth of property 
33lbid., p. 157. 
34Ibid. 
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and $2 on each taxable poll, which was for general state and 
county purposes. 
The presiding judge dissolved the injunction. The 
plaintiffs appealed. 
Decision 
The Court held that it was now called upon to disregard 
previous case precedents on the question of taxation which 
had been presented previously. The Court found it 
advantageous to review the previous cases and the precedents 
established: 
As those cases involve a construction of certain 
sections of the Constitution relating to a question of 
taxation, and involve no right affecting the life, 
liberty or property of the citizen, we can see no 
reason why they should continue to guide us if time and 
reflection have convinced us that they are not correct 
interpretations of the letter and spirit of our organic 
law.35 
The Court further established that former decisions should 
not be so firmly instilled that they prohibit carrying out 
other provisions of the Constitution of North Carolina which 
"promote the progress, prosperity and welfare of the 
people."3® 
Article IX of the North Carolina Constitution 
recognized that knowledge was necessary for good government 
and that education should be encouraged. It further 
35Collie v. Commissioners of Franklin County, 145 N. C. 
170 (1907), p. 171. 
36Ibid., p. 172. 
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provided that in order for education to be practicable, one 
or more public schools had to be maintained for at least 
four months of the year in each district. In addition, if 
the commissioners of a county failed to meet this 
requirement, then they were subject to indictment. The 
Court found legislative intent for counties to provide such 
funds when state resources were inadequate.37 The decision 
read: 
At every session the General Assembly has endeavored to 
give effect to this section of the Constitution by 
providing that, if the tax levied by the State for the 
support of the public schools is insufficient to enable 
the commissioners of each county to comply with that 
section, they shall levy annually a special tax to 
supply the deficiency, to the end that the public 
schools may be kept open for four months, as enjoined 
by the Constitution.3° 
The Court agreed that Article V of the Constitution of 
North Carolina was a limitation upon the taxing power of the 
General Assembly. However, this limitation was not intended 
to deny another article of the Constitution having equal 
importance.The important broadened view was as follows: 
We must not interpret the Constitution literally, but 
rather construe it as a whole, for it was adopted as a 
whole; and we should, if possible, give effect to each 
part of it. The whole is to be examined with a view to 
ascertaining the true intention of each part, and to 
giving effect to the whole instrument and to the 
intention of the people who adopted it.40 
37Ibid. 
38Ibid. 
3̂ Ibid., p. 173. 
40Ibid. 
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The Court held that the taxing limitation was not 
directed to expenses provided for by the Constitution. 
Rather, it was intended for legislative creations: 
The purpose of our people to establish by taxation a 
general and uniform system of public schools, wherein 
tuition shall be free of charge to all the children of 
the State, and that such schools should be open every 
year for at least four months, is so plainly manifest 
in Article IX of the Constitution that we cannot think 
it possible they ever intended to thwart their clearly 
expressed purpose by so limiting taxation as to make it 
impossible to give effect to their directions.41 
In addition, the Court held that the rate of tax to be 
levied for maintaining a four months1 term was left to the 
General Assembly. County Commissioners were in charge of 
maintaining the equation between property and poll tax. 
Once the four months' term was provided, any taxation beyond 
this limit could be considered void.^2 
Discussion 
The Court held that different provisions of the 
Constitution required equal consideration. As a 
consequence, taxation beyond constitutional limitation was 
necessary to provide a four months' term for the public 
schools. 
Property 
Overview 
School board judgments on building schoolhouses, site 
41Ibid., p. 174. 
42Ibid., pp. 176-177. 
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selection, and school consolidation are among the subjects 
addressed in the study of property. The Supreme Court of 
North Carolina has held that the courts will not supervise 
or restrain boards of education in their decision-making on 
school property unless there is misconduct or violation of 
state statutes. 
Pickler v. Board of Education of Davie County 
149 N.C. 221, 62 S.E. 902 (1908) 
Facts 
The Board of Education of Davie County had the duty to 
divide townships into school districts. However, by law no 
new school could be established within three miles by 
nearest traveled route of an already existing school in the 
township. The present school district had been laid off, 
site bought, and building erected fifty or sixty years 
previously. Repairs necessitated a decision by the Board of 
Education concerning the feasibility of moving the site and 
building to a new school a mile away. A hearing was held, 
after which the Board of Education decided not to change the 
site, but to build a new school building on the old site. A 
temporary restraining order was obtained, another hearing 
was held, and the order was dissolved. 
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Decision 
The Court held that dividing townships into school 
districts and the erection and maintenance of school 
buildings is best left to the judgment of a local board of 
education. Since there had been no allegation of misconduct 
or violation of state law by the Davie County Board of 
Education, the decision of the Board was not subject to 
supervision or restraint.^3 
Discussion 
The Court upheld its often stated legal principle of 
non-intervention in the discretionary power of local boards 
of education. Restraint by the courts could not occur 
unless there was board violation of statutes or misconduct. 
Lutz v. Gaston County Board of Education 
282 N.C. 208, 192 S.E. 2d 463 (1972) 
Facts 
The Board of Commissioners of Gaston County authorized 
a study of the organization, quality of educational program, 
population and fiscal policies of the Cherryville City Board 
of Education, the Gaston County Board of Education, and the 
Gastonia City Board of Education. The recommendations from 
the study were (1) consolidate three systems into one, 
(2) establish six comprehensive high schools, including one 
43pj.ckler v. Board of Education of Davie County, 149 N. 
C. 221 (1908), p. 222. 
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in the northwest section of Gaston County, and (3) provide 
adequate financial support for the recommendations. A 
citizens committee established by the Board of Commissioners 
to evaluate the feasibility of implementing the conclusions 
from the study approved, with some exceptions, those 
recommendations. It also approved adequate funding methods, 
the holding of an election on the questions of school 
consolidation, the issuance of bonds for school 
construction, and the levying of a uniform local 
supplementary school tax. Accordingly, the General Assembly 
authorized an election for these purposes. 
The voters approved the merger, the school construction 
bonds, and a uniform supplemental tax. An interim school 
board was created. As soon as the Division of School 
Planning of the North Carolina Department of Public 
Instruction had reviewed the previous study, the interim 
school board recommended construction of six comprehensive 
high schools including the one requested for the northwest 
section of the county. The permanent Gaston County Board of 
Education reaffirmed previous decisions and appointed a 
site selection committee for this high school in the 
northwest area was created. The committee recommended the 
purchase of certain property, the recommendation was 
approved by the Gaston County Board of Education, and the 
Board of Commissioners approved the expenditure of funds to 
purchase the property. A duly publicized hearing was held 
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by the Board of Education of Gaston County on the possible 
closing of Bessemer City Senior High School and Cherryville 
Senior High School, which would mean the transfer of 
students to the comprehensive high school in the northwest 
area of the county. After the hearing, the Board of 
Education voted for consolidation and merger of these 
schools into the proposed Northwest Senior High School. The 
State Board of Education approved this action. 
A temporary restraining order was issued enjoining the 
Board of Education from purchasing any lands for the 
proposed construction. The Superior Court concluded that 
(1) the public hearing complied with requirements of state 
statutes, (2) there was no manifest abuse of discretion by 
the Gaston County Board of Education, and (3) the proposed 
expenditure of funds was authorized by law. The temporary 
restraining order was dissolved and action dismissed. The 
Supreme Court of North Carolina allowed initial appellate 
review. 
Decision 
The Court held that the case revealed long and careful 
consideration of discontinuing the existing high schools and 
for consolidating them into a new Northwest Senior High 
School. Such action contradicted allegations that the Board 
had failed to make the studies required by statutes.̂ 4 In 
^Lutz v. Gaston County Board of Education, 282 N. C. 
208 (1972), p. 216. 
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carrying out its authority to consolidate schools, the Board 
used its sound discretion which the courts could not 
restrain without proof of violation of some provision of law 
or a manifest abuse of authority.In addition, the Court 
found that the entry of any order of consolidation came 
after a public hearing and that procedures for the hearing 
were reasonable and constituted compliance with the law.46 
Bond notices, bond election, and use of bond funds conformed 
with lawful requirements.47 Thus, the Gaston County Board 
of Education used its rightful discretion in determining the 
expenditure of bond money.4® 
Discussion 
The Court supported the discretionary power of boards 
of education unless there was a violation of law or the 
manifest abuse of powers. This case also gave the Court 
cause to clarify meaning in statutes which contain unclear 
or ambiguous language. 
45Ibid., p. 217. 
46Ibid. 
4̂ ibid., p. 219. 
48Ibid., p. 220. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
An examination of the history of American public 
education clearly evinces the authority of the states in the 
management and operation of their public schools. Based on 
an analysis and synthesis of the research presented in this 
study, it is apparent that the state courts — specifically, 
the highest state courts as evidenced by the decisions of 
the Supreme Court of North Carolina — have played a 
significant role in defining the State's role in public 
education. This study provides insight to educators, 
parents, students, legislators, and the public-at-large in 
the areas of (1) governance, (2) employees, (3) pupils, 
(4) torts, (5) finance, and (6) property as they have been 
adjudged by the Supreme Court of North Carolina. 
Summary 
The introductory material in Chapter I identified the 
historical and constitutional fact that education is 
primarily a function of the states. The power which the 
federal government has in education is implied from the 
preamble to and a clause in the Constitution of the United 
States. The federal government has only those delegated 
powers in the Constitution of the United States or those 
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implied powers which expand the role of the federal 
government. Education per se is not a power delegated to 
the federal government, but is a power reserved to the 
states. The states show more similarities than difference 
in carrying out this function. A framework for 
understanding this role in North Carolina is the study of 
court cases which define this function. This particular 
study is an analysis and synthesis of the cases which have 
been decided by the state's highest court, the Supreme Court 
of North Carolina. 
Chapter II presents the historical development of the 
public schools in North Carolina. This systematic account 
is used to give the reader a background and summary view of 
the public schools in the state. This study provides a 
framework for placing the decisions of the Court in the 
perspective of the historical development of North 
Carolina's public schools. 
This review reveals that North Carolina saw its first 
public schools created in the first half of the nineteenth 
century as a result of the work of Archibald D. Murphey, 
"Father of Public Education in North Carolina." The first 
common school law was enacted in 1939, but organizational 
and financial problems slowed the development of a true 
public school system. In spite of this lag, the common 
school system in North Carolina was one of the best in the 
South by the beginning of the Civil War. At the war's 
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conclusion the common school system collapsed. The 
Reconstruction North Carolina Constitution of 1868 
emphasized the importance of education but little concrete 
direction was established. In 1871 the Supreme Court of 
.North Carolina refused to approve funding for the public 
schools as necessary expenditures within the context of the 
Constitution. As a result, this and subsequent action by 
the Court stymied local support for the constitutionally 
mandated school term. It was 1907 before the Court resolved 
that constitutional provision for a general and uniform 
system of public schools carried the same weight as the 
constitutional limitations on taxation. The remainder of 
the twentieth century provided a renewed interest in public 
education highlighted by the progressive era of the early 
twentieth century and the emphasis on education of the 
19601s, 19701s, and 1980's. 
Chapter III of this study presents an historical report 
on the Supreme Court of North Carolina. It also provided a 
review of the literature which has evaluated the proceedings 
of the Court. North Carolina began as a grant to the eight 
Lords Proprietors from the King of England. It later became 
a crown colony. The court system of early North Carolina as 
a land grant, as a colony, and as a fledgling state of the 
United States was modeled after the European system in which 
the court system was dependent upon either the executive or 
the legislative branch of government. The Constitution of 
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1868 established the first real constitutional independence 
of the judiciary. From that time to the present the court 
system in the state has evolved into Superior Courts, Court 
of Appeals, and Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals and the 
Supreme Court represent the appellate process in North 
Carolina. Capital and life imprisonment cases are appealed 
directly to the Supreme Court, while other appeals must 
first go to the Court of Appeals. In some instances, of 
course, particularly important questions go to the Supreme 
Court. 
In view of the Court's history, one overriding 
principle emerges: the belief that the courts enforce the 
law rather than make it through judicial interpretation. 
Legislation is appropriately made by the General Assembly 
and not by the Supreme Court, although the justices may 
state an opinion on the need for legislative change. 
Literature on the subject of the Supreme Court presents a 
consistent picture of a Court of estimable reputation. At 
the same time, historians have pointed out the reactionary 
period from 1871 to 1907, during which time the Court 
thwarted local taxing support for the public schools. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has been praised for its 
reason and logic as evidenced by the few cases which have 
been appealed from the State to the United States Supreme 
Court. 
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As a guide to educational and legal research, four 
questions were formulated and listed in Chapter I of this 
study. Although Chapters II and III provide a perspective 
and general answers to these questions, most of the answers 
were found in Chapter IV, which intends to provide a 
reference for educators, parents, students, legislators, and 
the public-at-large. 
The first question listed in Chapter I is: What are 
the landmark decisions of the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina affecting the public schools? The chief Court 
decisions concerned the financing of the general and uniform 
system of public schools at the end of the nineteenth 
century and the beginning of the twentieth century. The 
history of public schools in North Carolina and evaluative 
views about this Court support this response. In addition, 
the degree to which the Court discussed the- issue of local 
financing for the mandated public school term reflected its 
concern. Furthermore, the reversal of an already 
established principle about limited taxation had 
far-reaching implications for the future of public education 
in North Carolina. 
The second question posed in the introductory chapter 
is: What legal principles affecting the public schools have 
been established by the decisions of the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina? 
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The major principles are grouped and discussed in the 
following: 
I. Power of the State and Its Agencies 
The General Assembly may delegate power to agencies of 
the State and to administrative officers of those agencies. 
In doing so, the General Assembly must develop standards for 
the exercise of discretionary judgment. Delegated power is 
absolute except to the extent that it is limited by the 
United States Constitution and the North Carolina 
Constitution. Any agency of the State which has received 
enumerated powers exercises constitutional authority to act 
if the General Assembly makes no decision. Special school 
districts are quasi-public corporations exercising a 
governmental function in the administration of public school 
laws. Boards of education are lawful, corporate bodies 
which may sue and be sued. They may enact necessary rules 
and regulations to achieve successful management, good 
order, and discipline in the public schools. The 
presumption exists that boards of education act in good 
faith and in accordance with the spirit and purpose of state 
statutes and existing conditions. Boards of education must 
judiciously exercise the powers conferred constitutionally. 
The Court will not substitute its judgment for that of 
boards of education unless extravagant expenditures, 
manifest abuse of power, a violation of law, bad faith, 
corruption by the board, misconduct, or the arbitrary 
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exercise of discretion can be proved. These boards of 
education may exercise power only as corporate bodies, only 
in regular or special meetings with the presence of a 
quorum, and only with a majority vote of the quorum present. 
Boards of education enjoy the authority of their 
predecessors and are the governing authorities to receive 
the clear proceeds of fines and forfeitures. In the absence 
of statutes' to the contrary, boards of education have the 
inherent right to contract for transportation. The power 
conferred cannot be transferred without standards or 
legislative guidance. Some actions are not discretionary 
but are ministerial or mandatory if required by state laws. 
II. Liability 
Boards of education as agencies of the state enjoy the 
same immunity from suit as the sovereign state. Immunity 
exists unless it is waived by statute or the Tort Claims 
Act, and it is not retroactive. However, the purchase of 
liability insurance by agencies of the state or boards of 
education removes governmental immunity. Public officials 
such as members of boards of education are not personally 
liable for mere negligence in undertaking official 
discretion and judgment. No liability exists unless the 
official acts corruptly or maliciously. Employees of boards 
of education enjoy immunity, but may be personally liable 
for negligence in carrying out prescribed duties. 
Contributory negligence may nullify recovery under the tort 
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law, although the evidence must always be considered in a 
light most favorable to the injured party. 
Ill. Judicial Interpretation 
The Court gives plain and definite meaning to unclear 
and ambiguous statutes. However, obscure construction which 
precludes enforcement necessitates a ruling of 
unconstitutionality. The Court will determine the 
legislative intent of unclear statutes by the caption of the 
law only if the contextual meaning of a statute is 
ambiguous. The Court uses the interpretation which holds 
law constitutional in accordance with the context of the 
Constitution and intent of legislators and citizens who 
ratify constitutional provisions. Interpretations which 
produce absurd consequences or impossibilities must be 
avoided. The Court considers specific provisions of the law 
and the application of the statute governing a particular 
subject, with the assumption that laws are constitutional 
unless the judicial interpretation appears clearly contrary. 
Doubt regarding constitutionality of a statute is usually 
resolved in favor of the statute's validity. The Court 
accepts the obligation to harmonize differences in statutes 
through fair and reasonable interpretation given to each 
one. Judicial restraint on the discretionary power occurs 
only after the State or its agencies have established a 
record upon which the courts may act. The Court does not 
take a broad view of constitutional interpretation and will 
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not amend the Constitution through judicial interpretation. 
Even though precedents are highly regarded, the Court will 
change its interpretations if it is convinced that the 
passage of time and appropriate reflection necessitate such 
a change. In considering the plain and positive language of 
the Constitution, the Court has ruled against dual 
office-holding. Similarly, it recognizes that local acts of 
the legislature prevail over those with statewide 
application. Moreover, the Court has clearly recognized the 
superiority of the United States Constitution over the North 
Carolina Constitution. 
IV. Dispute Resolution 
Boards of education may enter into contracts because of 
their corporate status. The Court considers the expressed 
and implied meanings of the contract in determining 
enforcement. It will apply a common sense approach and a 
standard of reasonableness in this enforcement. Hence, 
standards cannot be gratuitously discriminatory by class or 
violation of equal protection and due process provisions of 
the United States Constitution. The Court encourages the 
use of administrative remedy rather than a judicial one. In 
administrative hearings the Court expects sound judgment and 
compliance with the law. However, there is no 
constitutional right to an administrative hearing prior to 
personnel dismissal, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution is applicable only if there is 
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evident violation of a property or liberty issue. The 
requirements of due process may be met at a hearing before 
or a reasonable time after discharge. Boards of education 
may not remove a committeeman capriciously. Removal can 
occur only after due process notice of proceedings, charges, 
opportunities for a hearing, and determination following a 
full and fair hearing. The Court will consider both 
competent and incompetent evidence placed in a record. Even 
hearsay is allowable since the rules of evidence do not 
apply to boards of education hearings on dismissal. Of 
course, the Court must consider the substantiality of, 
evidence, with the understanding that speculative evidence 
requires a not guilty determination. In reviewing the 
board's judgment in dismissal cases, the "whole record" test 
should be used. The communication between school employees 
is qualified or conditional if the school system has acted 
in good faith. 
V. Role of Boards of Education 
City and county boards of education constitute separate 
and distinct government agencies having responsibility for 
the control and management of school funds. They may 
determine changes in the budget if the boards of county 
commissioners do not fully fund the request made by boards 
of education. The control over expenditures which boards of 
commissioners have may not be construed to interfere with 
the exclusive control of schools vested in boards of 
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education. Specifically, school boards determine the number 
of schools and their operation. The jurisdiction of county 
commissioners ends once they approve funding; the plan of 
execution is the responsibility of boards of education. 
Boards of education cannot transfer their authority to 
boards of county commissioners or to committees of the 
boards of education. 
VI. Role of Boards of County Commissioners 
Boards of county commissioners are administrative units 
of the State. In undertaking actions imposed upon them, 
they must comply with the Constitution. By taxation or 
otherwise, they must provide for the school expenses 
entrusted to them in regard to the state system of public 
schools: i.e., ejection, repair, and equipping 
schoolhouses. In levying taxes to pay principal and 
interest on bonds, counties act as administrative agencies 
of the State rather than as municipal corporations serving 
local government purposes. The legislature has the 
authority to direct counties to assume indebtedness for 
schoolhouses. 
VII. Funding 
At one time the Court held that schools were not a 
necessary expense. Fortunately, this view was reversed in 
1907. Boards of education that disagree with the provisions 
made by boards of county commissioners may appeal decisions 
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to clerks of Superior Court and from there to Superior Court 
itself. That court is limited to consideration of assigned 
errors and findings. Public schools may charge students 
incidental and instructional fees. However, boards of 
education must provide a waiver policy and procedures 
publicized to students and parents. 
VIII. Cooperation of Board of County Commissioners 
and Boards of Education 
The Court calls for cooperation between boards of 
county commissioners and boards of education. The Court has 
allowed approval for the use of funds approved for one 
purpose to be used for another comparable purpose provided 
there is.board of education request and subsequent approval 
by the board of county commissioners. 
IX. Welfare of Students 
Boards of education may not abdicate their 
responsibility to act in the best interest of children. 
Such a requirement is particularly important in determining 
school assignments for which rules and regulations should be 
developed. The Court has spoken forcefully against 
discrimination among the races, although at one time it 
disagreed with the interpretation placed on the Fourteenth 
Amendment in relation to the right of the state to determine 
whether children of different races should be taught in the 
same or separate public schools. Later, however, the Court 
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agreed that boards of education could no longer legally 
impose segregation. Local boards were admonished to get on 
with what was in the best interests of all the children. 
The Court also held that schoolhouses exist for the benefit 
of the citizens. 
X. Actions of School Officials 
The Court holds the presumption that public officers 
will act in due respect to the laws. They must demonstrate 
regularity in the performance of their duties and must 
provide for substantial compliance with the law. 
XI. Attendance in Public Schools 
The right to attend schools is not absolute. Boards of 
education may establish reasonable rules for attendance in 
public schools, but although the schools do have this 
inherent right to prescribe compulsory attendance, this 
attendance need not be in the public schools. In fact, 
compulsory attendance requirements cannot be applied to a 
particular instructional setting. Thus, there is no 
violation of compulsory school law unless there is evidence 
of unwillingness of parents to send the children under their 
control to a recognized school at the appropriate ages. In 
addition, the Court held that home instruction cannot be 
forbidden on the basis of the compulsory attendance 
standards. To do so would bring about conflict with the 
North Carolina Constitution, for home instruction may 
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constitute a non-public school. As yet, there is nothing so 
intrinsic about the word school to preclude home 
instruction. 
XII. Religious Objections 
to Vaccination/Immunization 
Juries must decide on a case-by-case basis whether 
religious teachings justify a position in opposition to 
vaccination or immunization. 
XIII. Condemnation of Property 
The legislative prerogative is limited by organic law. 
It must be used in appropriating property and in developing 
procedures for acquisition. 
XIV. Taxpayer Intervention 
Taxpayers may take action on behalf of a public agency 
or political subdivision when proper authorities neglect or 
refuse to act. 
The third question listed in Chapter I is: How do the 
decisions of the Supreme Court of North Carolina parallel or 
give direction to the development of the public schools of 
the state? 
In two areas it is quite clear that the decisions of 
the Supreme Court of North Carolina parallel the development 
of the public schools of the state. In regard to pupils, 
the school assignment cases fall into the period of school 
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desegregation. In the category of finance, twenty-three 
percent of the cases fall within the Depression Era. The 
surtimary of legal principles given in the answer to the third 
question clearly shows the direction given by the Court to 
the development of the public schools of North Carolina. 
The fourth question listed in Chapter I is: What are 
the trends or emerging issues evident in the decisions of 
the Supreme Court of North Carolina affecting the public 
schools? Of the 111 cases reviewed for this study, 
sixty-five, or fifty-eight and one-half percent, were 
affirmed by the Supreme Court of North Carolina. In all 
categories except pupils, the Court affirmed a majority of 
the decisions from lower courts coming before it. The 
greatest degree of approval of lower court decisions was in 
the categories of torts and property. Based on the most 
recent decisions of the Court according to the framework 
established by the scope of this study, two issues emerge in 
the categories of employees and pupils: the challenge to 
the traditional school setting for educating students and 
the challenge to employee dismissal actions in the state 
courts. In the former, the Court upheld home instruction 
and in the latter recognized the judicial standard of the 
"whole record" test. 
Chapter V presents cases which, because of their 
authoritative or illustrative value, amplify the findings in 
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Chapter IV. These cases enable a more comprehensive view of 
the decisions of the Supreme Court of North Carolina. 
Conclusions 
Coming to specific conclusions from legal research is 
difficult since differing circumstances affect the 
determinations which are made. However, based on the 
analysis of the cases studied and the principles arising 
from them, the following general conclusions can be made 
concerning the Supreme Court of North Carolina and the 
public schools: 
1. The Court has considered more questions related to 
finance than to any other issue. Forty-three (or 
approximately thirty-nine percent) of the cases studied 
concern finance. Governance represented the next highest 
interest, at twenty-one percent; 
2. The Court established an approval rate of 
fifty-eight and one-half percent for the decisions of lower 
court decisions. Taking into account decisions which were 
modified or affirmed in part, the approval rate of lower 
court decisions is even higher; 
3. The decisions of the Court on taxation stymied the 
growth of the public school system for a while and reflected 
the major involvement of the Supreme Court in the schools; 
4. Boards of education exercise discretionary power 
which the Court will usually not restrain except under very 
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specific conditions. This concept is the most pervasive 
legal principle identified; 
5. The Court gives meaning to the law and limits its 
interpretation to the specific reading of the United States 
Constitution, Constitution of North Carolina, state 
statutes, and legislative intent. The Court shows no 
attempt "to make" law. However, it does reverse precedents 
as changing circumstances and opinions necessitate; 
6. Boards of county commissioners and boards of 
education have prescribed roles in the operation of the 
public schools. To avoid a board of education conflict of 
interest, boards of county commissioners must exercise 
certain specific funding responsibilities. However, the 
management of the schools is a responsibility clearly 
residing with boards of education. Because of their 
mutuality of interest, responsibility, and authority, boards 
of county commissioners and boards of education should 
cooperate; 
7. In the management of the schools, boards of 
education must always act in the best interest of students; 
8. Boards of education must respond to alternative 
settings for the compulsory education of children and to 
questions concerning rights of personnel in employment. 
Recommendations 
The National Organization on Legal Problems of 
Education organizes its reporting system into the categories 
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of (1) governance, (2) employees, (3) pupils, (4) torts, 
(5) finance, (6) property, (7) bargaining, and (8) higher 
education. The last two are not appropriate for this study 
since the State of North Carolina prohibits collective 
bargaining and since higher education is not considered a 
part of the public school system. 
Recommendation No. 1 
One of the first six categories should be selected for 
a comprehensive analysis of the cases within that area and 
the judicial interpretations which establish the record and, 
consequently, the legal principles of the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina. Thus, the determinative record of the Court 
will be complete and comprehensive for that particular 
category of cases. In the absence of a criterion for 
limiting the scope of the study, such a decision is 
necessary since there are potentially 399 cases in all six 
categories. Based on the limitations set forth in this 
study, 111 cases were chosen to focus on. A more prescribed 
scope of study would make possible a more precise 
developmental record of Court decisions. 
Recommendation No. 2 
The second recommendation calls for the analysis of the 
cases which have gone from the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina to the United States Supreme Court. Such an 
extension of the study would provide the elaborative and 
evaluative judgment provided by the nation's highest court. 
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It would also establish the legal principles which have 
nationwide application. 
Recommendation No. 3 
Another means for providing evaluation of the decisions 
of the North Carolina Supreme Court is the comparison of 
selected cases in the six categories of the study with 
decisions determined by other states' highest courts. It 
has been established herein that the decisions of the 'state 
courts have more similarities than differences. As a 
result, a comparison would reveal the degree to which the 
decisions of the Supreme Court of North Carolina have 
comparability with other states, the category representing 
preponderance of decisions, and the degree of support for 
lower court decisions. Such a study must be based on the 
categories established by the National Organization on Legal 
Problems of Education and by the category assignment of 
cases in the various legal reporting systems. These 
requirements are necessary to provide a comparison basis. 
Concluding Statement 
The study of the decisions of the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina helps to identify and clarify the function of 
the State in carrying out its constitutional responsibility 
for education. It is an important and critical role in 
developing the foundation of school law upon which the 
public schools operate. 
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APPENDIX A 
Constitutional Provisions on Education 
CONSTITUTION OF NORTH CAROLINA OF 1776 
41. That a school or schools shall be established by 
the legislature, for the convenient instruction of youth, 
with such salaries to the masters, paid by the public, as 
may enable them to instruct at low prices; and, all useful 
learning shall be duly encouraged and promoted in one or 
more universities. 
CONSTITUTION OF NORTH CAROLINA OF 1868 
Article I 
Declaration of Rights 
Section 27. The people have a right to the privilege 
of education, and it is the duty of the State to guard and 
maintain that right. 
Article V 
Revenue and Taxation 
Section 2. The proceeds of the State and County 
capitation tax shall be applied to the purposes of education 
and the support of the poor, but in no one year shall more 
than twenty-five per cent, thereof, be appropriated to the 
latter purpose. 
269 
Article VII 
Municipal Corporations 
Section 2. It shall be the duty of the Commissioners 
to exercise a general supervision and control of the penal 
and charitable institutions, schools, roads, bridges, 
levying of taxes and finances of the county, as may be 
prescribed by law. The Register of Deeds shall be ex 
officio. Clerk of the Board of Commissioners. 
Section 5. ... In every township there shall also be 
biennially elected a School Committee consisting of three 
persons whose duties shall be prescribed by law. 
Article IX 
Education 
Section 1. Religion, morality, and knowledge being 
necessary to good government and happiness of mankind, 
schools, and the means of education, shall forever be 
encouraged. 
Section 2. The General Assembly at its first session 
under this Constitution, shall provide by taxation and 
otherwise for a general and uniform system of Public 
Schools, wherein tuition shall be free of charge to all the 
children of the State between the ages of six and twenty-one 
years. 
Section 3. Each County of the State shall be divided 
into a convenient number of Districts, in which one or more 
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Public Schools shall be maintained, at least four months in 
every year; and if the Commissioners of any County shall 
fail to comply with the aforesaid requirement of this 
section, they shall be liable to indictment. 
Section 4. The proceeds of all lands that have been, 
or hereafter may be, granted by the United States to this 
State and not otherwise specially appropriated by the United 
States or heretofore by this State; also all monies, stocks, 
bonds, and other property now belonging to any fund for 
purposes of Education; also the net proceeds that may accrue 
to the State from sales of estrays or from fines, penalties 
and forfeitures; also the proceeds of all sales of the swamp 
lands belonging to the State; also all money that shall be 
paid as an equivalent for exemptions from military duty; 
also, all grants, gifts or devises that may hereafter be 
made to this State, and not otherwise appropriated by the 
grant, gift or devise, shall be securely invested and 
sacredly preserved as an irreducible educational fund, the 
annual income of which, together with so much of the 
ordinary revenue of the State as may be necessary, shall be 
faithfully appropriated for establishing and perfecting, in 
this State, a system of Free Public Schools, and for no 
other purposes or uses whatsoever. 
Section 5. The University of North Carolina with its 
lands, emoluments and franchises, is under the Control of 
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the State, and shall be held to an inseparable connection 
with the Free Public School System of the State.. 
Section 7. The Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, 
Secretary of State, Treasurer, Auditor, Superintendent of 
Public Works, Superintendent of Public Instruction and 
Attorney General, shall constitute a State Board of 
Education. 
Section 8. The Governor shall be President, and the 
Superintendent of Public Instruction shall be Secretary, of 
the Board of Education. 
Section 9. The Board of Education shall succeed to all 
the powers and trusts of the President and directors of the 
Literary Fund of North Carolina, and shall have full power 
to legislate and make all needful rules and regulations in 
relation to Free Public Schools, and the Educational fund of 
the State; but all acts, rules and regulations of said Board 
may be altered, amended, or repealed by the General 
Assembly, and when so altered, amended or repealed by the 
General Assembly, and when so altered, amended or repealed 
they shall not be reenacted by the Board. 
Section 10. The first session of the Board of 
Education shall be held at the Capital of the State, within 
fifteen days after the organization of the State Government 
under this Constitution; the time of future meetings may be 
determined by the Board. 
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Section 11. A majority of the Board shall constitute a 
quorum for the transaction of business. 
Section 12. The contingent expenses of the Board shall 
be provided for by the General Assembly. 
Section 17. The General Assembly is hereby empowered 
to enact that every child of sufficient mental and physical 
ability, shall attend the Public Schools during the period 
between the ages of 'six and eighteen years, for a term of 
not less than sixteen months, unless educated by other 
months. 
Amendments of 1875 
XXVI. AN ORDINANCE TO AMEND SECTION TWO, ARTICLE NINE, OF 
THE CONSTITUTION. 
The people of North Carolina in Convention assembled do 
ordain. That section two of the ninth article of the 
Constitution, be amended by adding the following words: 
And the children of the white race and the children of 
the colored race shall be taught in separate public schools, 
but there shall be no discrimination made in favor of, or to 
the prejudice of, either race. 
XXVII. AN ORDINANCE TO AMEND ARTICLE NINE OF THE 
CONSTITUTION, PROVIDING FOR THE PRESERVATION AND INVESTMENT 
OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOL FUND. 
The people of North Carolina in Convention assembled do 
ordain, That section four of article nine of the 
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Constitution be stricken out, and two new sections be 
inserted in said article in lieu thereof, as follows: 
Section The proceeds of all lands that have been or 
hereafter may be granted by the United States to this State, 
and not otherwise appropriated by this State or the United 
States; also, all moneys, stocks bonds and other property 
now belonging to any State fund for purposes of education; 
also the net proceeds of all sales off the swamp lands 
belonging to the State, and all other grants, gifts or 
devises that have been or hereafter may be made to this 
State and not otherwise appropriated by the State or by the 
term of the grant, gift or devise, shall be paid into the 
State treasury; and, together with so much of the ordinary 
revenue of the State as may be by law set apart for that 
purpose, shall be faithfully appropriated for establishing 
and maintaining in this State a system of free public 
schools, and for no other uses or purposes whatsoever. 
Section All moneys, stocks, bonds and other 
property belonging to a county school fund; also, the net 
proceeds from the sale of estrays; also, the clear proceeds 
of all penalties and forfeitures, and of all fines collected 
in the several counties for any branch of the penal or 
military laws of the State; and all moneys which shall be 
paid by persons as an equivalent for exemption from military 
duty, shall belong to and remain in the several counties, 
and shall be faithfully appropriated for establishing and 
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maintaining free public schools in the several counties of 
the State: Provided, That the amount collected in each 
county shall be annually reported to the Superintendent of 
Public Instruction. 
Amendment of 1915 
AN ACT TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF NORTH 
CAROLINA. 
The General Assembly of North Carolina do enact; 
I. By adding at the end of Article II a new section, 
to wit: 
Section 29. The General Assembly shall not pass any 
local, private or special act or resolution: . . . 
Erecting new townships, or changing township lines, or 
establishing or changing the lines of school districts; . . 
• 
Amendments of 1917 
II. AN ACT TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF NORTH CAROLINA SO 
AS TO INSURE A SIX MONTHS SCHOOL TERM. 
The General Assembly of North Carolina do enact: 
Section 1. That section three, article nine of the 
Constitution of North Carolina be and the same is hereby 
amended by striking out there from the words "four months" 
and inserting in lieu thereof the words "six months." 
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Amendments of 1941 
I. AN ACT TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDING FOR THE 
ORGANIZATION OF THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE POWER 
AND DUTIES OF THE SAME. 
The General Assembly of North Carolina do enact: 
Section 1. That Article IX, Sections eight and nine, 
of the Constitution of North Carolina be amended by 
substituting for the said sections the following: 
Section 8. State Board of Education. The general 
supervision and administration of the free public school 
system, and of the educational funds provided for the 
support thereof, shall, from and after the first day of 
April, one thousand nine hundred and forty-three, be vested 
in a State Board of Education to consist of the Lieutenant 
Governor, State Treasurer, the Superintendent of Public 
Instruction, and one member from each Congressional District 
to be appointed by the Governor. The State Superintendent 
of Public Instruction shall have general supervision of the 
public schools and shall be secretary of the board. There 
shall be a comptroller appointed by the Board, subject to 
the approval of the Governor as director of the Budget who 
shall serve at the will of the board and who, under the 
direction of the board, shall have supervision and 
management of the fiscal affairs of the board. The 
appointive members of the State Board of Education shall be 
subject to confirmation by the General Assembly in joint 
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session. A majority of the members of said board shall be 
persons of training and experience in business and finance, 
who shall not be connected with the teaching profession or 
any educational administration of the State. The first 
appointments under this section shall be members from odd 
numbered Districts for four years and, thereafter, all 
appointments shall be made for a term of four years. All 
appointments to fill vacancies shall be made by the Governor 
for the unexpired term, which appointments shall not be 
subject to confirmation. The board shall elect a chairman 
and a vice-chairman. A majority of the board shall 
constitute a quorum for the transaction of business. The 
per diem and expenses of the appointive members of the board 
shall be provided by the General Assembly. 
Section 2. That Article IX, Sections ten, eleven, 
twelve and thirteen, of the Constitution of North Carolina, 
be amended by substituting thereof one section, to be 
designated as Section nine, which shall be as follows: 
Section 9. Powers and Duties of the Board. The State 
Board of Education shall succeed to all the powers and 
trusts of the President and Directors of the Literary Fund 
of North Carolina and the State Board of Education as 
heretofore constituted. The State Board of Education shall 
have power to divide the State into a convenient number of 
school districts; to regulate the grade, salary and 
qualifications of teachers; to provide for the selection and 
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adoption of the text books to be used in the public schools; 
to apportion and equalize the public school funds over the 
State; and generally to supervise and administer the free 
public school system of the State and make all needful rules 
and regulations in relation thereto. All the powers 
enumerated in this section shall be exercised in conformity 
with this Constitution and subject to such laws as may be 
enacted from time to time by the General Assembly. 
Section 3. That Sections fourteen and fifteen of 
Article IX of the Constitution of North Carolina shall be 
changed to Sections ten and eleven of Article IX of the 
Constitution of North Carolina. 
Amendments of 1943 
III. AN ACT TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDING FOR THE 
ORGANIZATION OF THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION. 
The General Assembly of North Carolina do enact: 
Section 1. Article IX, Section eight, of the 
Constitution of North Carolina is hereby amended by 
substituting for the said section the following: 
Section 8. State Board of Education. The general 
supervision and administration of the free public school 
system, and of the educational funds provided for the 
support thereof, except those mentioned in Section five of 
this Article, shall, from and after the first day of April 
one thousand nine hundred and forty-five, be vested in the 
State Board of Education to consist of the Lieutenant 
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Governor, State Treasurer, the Superintendent of Public 
Instruction, and ten members to be appointed by the 
Governor, subject to confirmation by the General Assembly in 
joint session. The General Assembly shall divide the State 
into eight educational districts, which may be altered from 
time to time by the General Assembly. Of the appointive, 
members of the State Board of Education, one shall be 
appointed from each of the eight educational districts, and 
two shall be appointed as members at large. The first 
appointments under this section shall be: Two members 
appointed from educational districts for terms of two years; 
two members appointed from educational districts for terms 
of four years; two members appointed from educational 
districts for terms of six years; and two members appointed 
from educational districts for terms of eight years. One 
member at large shall be appointed for a period of four 
years and one member at large shall be appointed for a 
period of eight years. All subsequent appointments shall be 
for terms of eight years. Any appointments to fill 
vacancies shall be made by the Governor for the unexpired 
term, which appointments shall not be subject to 
confirmation. The State Superintendent of Public 
Instruction shall be the administrative head of the public 
school system and shall be secretary to the board. The 
board shall elect a chairman and vice-chairman. A majority 
of the board shall constitute a quorum for the transactions 
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of business. The per diem and expenses of the appointive 
members shall be provided by the General Assembly. 
Amendment of 1956 
AN ACT TO AMEND ARTICLE IX OF THE CONSTITUTION OF NORTH 
CAROLINA SO AS TO AUTHORIZE EDUCATION EXPENSE GRANTS AND TO 
AUTHORIZE LOCAL OPTION TO SUSPEND OPERATION OF PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS. 
The General Assembly of North Carolina do enact: 
Section 1. Article IX of the Constitution of North 
Carolina is hereby amended by adding a Section 12 which 
shall read as follows: 
S12. Education expense grants and local option. 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution, 
the General Assembly may provide for payment of education 
expense grants from any State or local public funds for the 
private education of any child for whom no public school is 
available or for private education of a child who is 
assigned against the wishes of his parents, or the person 
having control of such child, to a public school attended by 
a child of another race. A grant shall be available only 
for education in a nonsectarian school, and in the case of a 
child assigned to a public school attended by a child of 
another race, a grant shall, in addition, be available only 
when it is not reasonable and practicable to reassign such 
child to a public school not attended by a child of another 
race. 
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Notwithstanding any other provision of this 
Constitution, the General Assembly may provide for a uniform 
system of local option whereby any local option unit, as 
defined by the General Assembly, may choose by a majority 
vote of the qualified voters in the unit who vote on the 
question to suspend or to authorize the suspension of the 
operation of one or more or all of the public schools in 
that unit. 
No action taken pursuant to the authority of this 
Section shall in any manner affect the obligation of the 
State or any political subdivision or agency thereof with 
respect to any indebtedness heretofore or hereafter created. 
CONSTITUTION OF NORTH CAROLINA OF 1971 
Article I 
Declaration of Rights 
Section 15. Education. The people have a right to the 
privilege of education and it is the duty of the State to 
guard and maintain that right. 
Article V 
Finance 
Section 1. Capitation tax. 
(2) Proceeds. The proceeds of the State and county 
capitation tax shall be applied to the purposes of education 
and the support of the poor, but in no one fiscal year shall 
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more than 25 per cent thereof be appropriated to the latter 
purpose. 
Article IX 
Education 
Section 1. Education encouraged. Religion, morality, 
and knowledge being necessary to good government and the 
happiness of mankind, schools, libraries, and the means of 
education shall forever be encouraged. 
Section 2. Uniform system of schools. 
(1) General and uniform system; term. The General 
Assembly shall provide by taxation and otherwise for a 
general and uniform system of - free public schools, which 
shall be maintained at least nine months in every year, and 
wherein equal opportunities shall be provided for all 
students. 
(2) Local responsibility. The General Assembly may 
assign to units of local government such responsibility for 
the financial support of the free public schools as it may 
deem appropriate. The governing boards of units of local 
government with financial responsibility or public education 
may use local revenues to add to or supplement any public 
school or post-secondary school program. 
Section 3. School attendance. The General Assembly 
shall provide that every child of appropriate age and of 
sufficient mental and physical ability shall attend the 
public schools, unless educated by other means. 
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Section 4. State Board of Education. 
(1) Board. The state Board of Education shall consist 
of the Lieutenant Governor, the Treasurer, and eleven 
members appointed by the Governor, subject to confirmation 
by the General Assembly in joint session. The General 
Assembly shall divide the State into eight educational 
districts. Of the appointive members of the Board, one 
shall be appointed from each of the eight educational 
districts and three shall be appointed from the State at 
large. Appointments shall be for overlapping terms of eight 
years. Appointments to fill vacancies shall be made by the 
Governor for the unexpired terms and shall not be subject to 
confirmation. 
(2) Superintendent of Public Instruction. The 
Superintendent of Public Instruction shall be the secretary 
and chief administrative officer of the State Board of 
Education. 
Section 5. Powers and duties of Board. The State 
Board of Education shall supervise and administer the free 
public school system and the educational funds provided for 
its support, except the funds mentioned in Section 7 of this 
Article, and shall make all needed rules and regulations in 
relation thereto, subject to laws enacted by the General 
Assembly. 
Section 6. State school fund. The proceeds of all 
lands that have been or hereafter may be granted by the 
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United States to this State, and not otherwise appropriated 
by this State or the United States; all moneys, stocks, 
bonds, and other property belonging to the State for 
purposes of public education; the net proceeds of all sales 
of the swamp lands belonging to the State; and all other 
grants, gifts, and devises that have been or hereafter may 
be made to the State, and not otherwise appropriated by the 
State or by the terms of the grant, gift, or devise, shall 
be paid into the State Treasury and, together with so much 
of the revenue of the State as may be set apart for that 
purpose, shall be faithfully appropriated and used 
exclusively for establishing and maintaining a uniform 
system of free public schools. 
Section 7. County school fund. All moneys, stocks, 
bonds, and other property belonging to a county school fund, 
and the clear proceeds of all penalties and forfeitures and 
of all fines collected in the several counties for any 
breach of the penal laws of the State, shall belong to and 
remain in the several counties, and shall be faithfully 
appropriated and used exclusively for maintaining free 
public schools. 
Amendments of 1969 
(To The 1971 Constitution) 
V. AN ACT TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF NORTH CAROLINA TO 
REVISE ARTICLE V CONCERNING STATE AND LOCAL FINANCE. 
The General Assembly of North Carolina do enact; 
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Section 1. The Constitution of North Carolina, as 
revised and amended by a revision and amendment submitted to 
the qualified voters by An Act to Revise and Amend the 
Constitution of North Carolina, H.B. 231, enacted as Chapter 
1258 of the Session Laws of 1969, is amended as follows: 
(a) Article V is rewritten to read as follows: 
Article V 
Finance 
Section 1. No capitation tax to be levied. No poll or 
capitation tax shall be levied by the General Assembly or by 
any county, city or town, or other taxing unit. 
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APPENDIX B 
Constitution Provisions on the Supreme Court 
CONSTITUTION OF NORTH CAROLINA OF 1776 
A Declaration of Rights 
A Declaration of Rights, made by the Representatives of 
the Freeman of the State of North Carolina. 
4. That the legislative, executive and supreme 
judicial powers of government, ought to be forever separate 
and distinct from each other. 
THE CONSTITUTION 
13. That the general assembly shall, by joint ballot 
of both houses, appoint judges of the supreme courts of law 
and equity, judges of admiralty and attorney-general, who 
shall be commissioned by the governor, and hold their 
offices during good behavior. 
9. That no judge of the supreme court of law or 
equity, or judge of admiralty, shall have a seat in the 
senate, house of commons, or council of state. 
Amendments of 1835 
Article III 
Section 1. The governor, judges of the supreme court, 
and judges of the superior courts, and all other officers of 
this State (except justices of the peace and militia 
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officers), may be impeached for willfully violating any 
article of the constitution, maladministration, or 
corruption. 
Section 2. Any judge of the supreme court, or of the 
superior courts, may be removed from office for mental or 
physical inability, upon a concurrent resolution of 
two-thirds of both branches of the general assembly. The 
judge, against whom the legislature may be about to proceed, 
shall receive notice thereof, accompanied by a copy of the 
causes alleged for his removal, at least twenty days before 
the day on which either branch of the general assembly shall 
act thereon. 
The salaries of the judges of the supreme court, or of 
the superior courts, shall not be diminished during their 
continuance in office. 
CONSTITUTION OF NORTH CAROLINA OF 1868 
Article I 
Declaration of Rights 
Section 8. The legislative, executive, and supreme 
judicial powers of the government ought to be forever 
separate and distinct from each other. 
Section 35. All courts shall be open, and every person 
for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or 
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and 
right and justice administered without sale, denial, or 
delay. 
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Article IX 
Judicial Department 
Section 4. The Judicial power of the State shall be 
vested in a court for the trial of impeachments, a Supreme 
Court, Superior Courts, Courts of Justices of the Peace, and 
Special Courts. 
Section 8. The Supreme Court shall consist of a Chief 
Justice and four Associate Justices. 
Section 9. There shall be two terms of the Supreme 
Court held at the seat of Government of the State in each 
year, commencing on the first Monday in January, and first 
Monday in June, and continuing "as long as the public 
interest may require. 
Section 10. The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction 
to review, upon appeal, any decision of the courts below, 
upon any matter of law or legal inference; but no issue of 
fact shall be tried before this court: and the court shall 
have power to issue any remedial writs necessary, to give it 
a general supervision and control of the inferior courts. 
Section 11. The Supreme Court shall have original 
jurisdiction to hear claims against the State, but its 
decision shall be merely recommendatory: no process in the 
nature of execution, shall issue thereon; they shall be 
reported to the next session of the General Assembly for its 
action. 
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Section 23. The General Assembly shall prescribe and 
regulate the fees, salaries, and emoluments of all officers 
provided for in this Article; but the salaries of the Judges 
shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. 
Section 26. The Justices of the Supreme Court shall be 
elected by the qualified voters of the State, as is provided 
for the election of members of the General Assembly. They 
shall hold their offices for eight years. The judges of the 
Superior Courts shall be elected in like manner, and shall 
hold their offices for eight years; but the Judges of the 
Superior Courts elected at the first election under this 
Constitution, shall after their election, under the 
superintendance of the Justices of the Supreme Court be 
divided by lot into two equal classes, one of which shall 
hold office for four years, the other for eight years. 
Section 31. All vacancies occurring in the offices 
provided for by this article of this Constitution, shall be 
filled by the appointment of the Governor, unless otherwise 
provided for, and the appointees shall hold their places 
until the next regular election. 
Amendments of 1875 
XI. AN ORDINANCE TO AMEND SECTION FOUR, ARTICLE FOUR, OF 
THE CONSTITUTION. 
The people of North Carolina in Convention assembled do 
ordain. That section four, article four, of the Constitution 
be amended so as to read as follows: 
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The Judicial power of the State shall be vested in a 
Court for the trial of Impeachments, a Supreme Court, 
Superior Courts, Courts of Justices of the Peace, and such 
other Courts inferior to the Supreme Court as may be 
established by law. 
XII. AN ORDINANCE TO AMEND SECTION EIGHT, ARTICLE FOUR OF 
THE CONSTITUTION. 
The people of North Carolina in Convention assembled do 
ordain, That section eight, of article four, of the 
Constitution be amended so as to read as follows: 
The Supreme Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and 
two Associate Justices. 
XIII. AN ORDINANCE TO AMEND SECTION NINE, ARTICLE FOUR OF 
THE CONSTITUTION. 
The people of North Carolina in Convention assembled do 
ordain, That section nine, of article four, of the 
Constitution of North Carolina be abrogated, and the 
following substituted thereof: 
The terms of the Supreme Court shall be held in the 
city of Raleigh, as now, until otherwise provided by the 
General Assembly. 
XIV. AN ORDINANCE TO AMEND ARTICLE FOUR, SECTION TEN, OF 
THE CONSTITUTION OF NORTH CAROLINA. 
The people of North Carolina in Convention assembled do 
ordain. That article four, section ten, of the Constitution, 
be amended to read as follows: 
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And the jurisdiction of said Court over "issues of 
fact" and "questions of fact," shall be the same exercised 
by it before the adoption of the Constitution of one 
thousand eight hundred and sixty eight, and the Court shall 
have the power to issue any remedial writs necessary to give 
it a general supervision and control over the proceedings of 
the inferior Courts. 
XVIII. AN ORDINANCE TO AMEND ARTICLE FOUR OF THE 
CONSTITUTION, BY STRIKING OUT SECTIONS TWENTY-SIX AND 
TWENTY-SEVEN, AND INSERTING ANOTHER IN LIEU THEREOF. 
The people of North Carolina in Convention assembled do 
ordain. That sections twenty-six and twenty-seven, article 
four of the Constitution be stricken out, and insert the 
following: 
The Justices of the Supreme Court shall be elected by 
the qualified voters of the State, as is provided for the 
election of members of the General Assembly. They shall 
hold their offices for eight years. 
The Judges of the Superior Courts, elected at the first 
election under this amendment, shall be elected in like 
manner as is provided for Justices of the Supreme Court, and 
shall hold their offices for eight years. The General 
Assembly may, from time to time, provide by law that the 
Judges of the Superior Courts, chosen at succeeding 
elections, instead of being elected by the voters of the 
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whole State, as in herein provided for, shall be elected by 
the voters of their respective districts. 
XIX. AN ORDINANCE TO AMEND SECTION THIRTY-ONE, ARTICLE 
FOUR, OF THE CONSTITUTION. 
The people of North Carolina in Convention assembled do 
ordain, That section thirty-one, article four of the 
Constitution of this State, be stricken out and the 
following inserted in its stead, to wit: 
All vacancies occurring in the offices provided for by 
this article of the Constitution shall be filled by the 
appointments of the Governor, unless otherwise provided for, 
and the appointees shall hold their places until the next 
regular election for members of the General Assembly, when 
elections shall be held to fill such offices. If any 
person, elected or appointed to any of said offices, shall 
neglect and fail to qualify, such office shall be appointed 
to, held and filled as provided in case of vacancies 
occurring therein. All incumbents of said offices shall 
hold until their successors are qualified. 
XXII. ORDINANCE TO ADD TWO SECTIONS TO ARTICLE FOUR OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF NORTH CAROLINA. 
The people of North Carolina in Convention assembled do 
ordain, That the following sections be added to article four 
of the Constitution: 
Section _. Any judge of the Supreme Court of the 
Superior Courts, and the presiding officers of such Courts 
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inferior to the Supreme Court as may be established by law, 
may be removed from office for mental or physical inability 
upon a concurrent resolution of two-thirds of both houses of 
the General Assembly. The judge or presiding officer, 
against whom the General Assembly may be about to proceed, 
shall receive notice thereof, at least twenty days before 
the day on which either House of the General Assembly shall 
act thereon. 
Amendment of 1887 
The General Assembly of North Carolina do enact; 
Section 1. That article four of the constitution of 
the state be amended as follows: In section six strike out 
the word "two" and insert instead thereof the word "four." 
Amendments of 1935 
II. AN ACT TO AMEND SECTION SIX OF ARTICLE FOUR OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF NORTH CAROLINA RELATING TO THE SUPREME 
COURT, AND TO AMEND SECTION FIVE OF ARTICLE FIVE OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF NORTH CAROLINA AUTHORIZING THE GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY TO PASS LAWS EXEMPTING FROM TAXATION NOT EXCEEDING 
ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($1,000.00) IN VALUE OF PROPERTY HELD 
AND USED AS PLACE OF RESIDENCE OF THE OWNER. 
The General Assembly of North Carolina do enact: 
Section 1. That section six of article four of the 
Constitution of North Carolina be stricken out and the 
following inserted in lieu thereof: 
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Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall consist of a 
Chief Justice and four Associate Justices. The General 
Assembly may increase the number of Associate Justices to 
not more than six when the work of the Court so requires. 
The Court shall have power to sit in divisions, when in its 
judgment this is necessary for the proper dispatch of 
business, and to make rules for the distribution of business 
between the divisions and for the hearing of cases by the 
full Court. No decision of any division shall become the 
judgment of the court unless concurred in by a majority of 
all the justices; and no case involving a construction of 
the Constitution of the State or of the United States shall 
be decided except by the Court in banc. All sessions of the 
Court shall be held in the City of Raleigh. This amendment 
made to the Constitution of North Carolina shall not have 
the effect to vacate any office now existing under the 
Constitution of the State, and filled or held by virtue of 
any election or appointment under the said Constitution, and 
the laws of the State made in pursuance thereof. 
Amendments of 1953 
I. AN ACT TO AMEND ARTICLE IV, SECTION 6, OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF NORTH CAROLINA RELATING TO THE RETIREMENT OF 
MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT AND THE RECALL OF RETIRED 
MEMBERS TO SERVE ON SAID COURT IN LIEU OF ANY ACTIVE MEMBER 
WHO FOR ANY CAUSE IS TEMPORARILY INCAPACITATED. 
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The General Assembly of North Carolina do enact: 
Section 1. Article IV, Section 6, of the Constitution 
of North Carolina be, and the same is hereby, amended by 
adding at the end of said Section 6 the following: 
The General Assembly is vested with authority to 
provide for the retirement of members of the Supreme Court 
and for the recall of such retired members to serve on said 
Court in lieu of any active member thereof who is, for any 
cause, temporarily incapacitated. 
Amendments of 1961 
I. AN ACT TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF NORTH CAROLINA BY 
REWRITING ARTICLE IV THEREOF AND MAKING APPROPRIATE 
AMENDMENTS OF OTHER ARTICLES SO AS TO IMPROVE THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN NORTH CAROLINA. 
The General Assembly of North Carolina do enact: 
Section 1. The Constitution of North Carolina is 
amended by rewriting Article IV thereof to read as follows: 
Section 5. Appellate Division. The appellate division 
of the General Court of Justice shall consist of the Supreme 
Court. 
Section 6. Supreme Court. 
(1) Membership. The Supreme Court shall consist of a 
Chief Justice and six Associate Justices, but the General 
Assembly may increase the number of Associate Justices to 
not more than eight. In the event the Chief Justice is 
unable, on account of absence or temporary incapacity, to 
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perform any of the duties placed upon him, the senior 
Associate Justice available is authorized to discharge such 
duties. The General Assembly may provide for the retirement 
of members of the Supreme Court and for the recall of such 
retired members to serve on that Court in lieu of any active 
member thereof who is, for any cause, temporarily 
incapacitated. 
(2) Sessions of the Supreme Court. The sessions of the 
Supreme Court shall be held in the City of Raleigh unless 
otherwise provided by the General Assembly. 
Section 9. Assignment of Judges. The Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court, acting in accordance with rules of the 
Supreme Court shall make assignments of Judges of the 
Supreme Court and may transfer District Judges from one 
district to another for temporary or specialized duty. The 
principle of rotating Superior Court Judges among the 
various districts of a division is a salutary one and shall 
be observed. For this purpose the General Assembly may 
divide the State into a number of judicial divisions. 
Subject to the general supervision of the Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court, assignment of District Judges within each 
local court district shall be made by the Chief District 
Judge. 
Section 10. Jurisdiction of the General Court of 
Justice. 
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(1) Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall have 
jurisdiction to review upon appeal any decision of the 
courts below, upon any matter of law or legal inference. 
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over "issues of fact" 
and "questions of fact" shall be the same exercised by it 
prior to the adoption of this Article, and the Court shall 
have the power to issue any remedial writs necessary to give 
it a general supervision and control over the proceedings of 
the other courts. The Supreme Court shall have original 
jurisdiction to hear claims against the State, but its 
decisions shall be merely recommendatory; no process in the 
nature of execution shall issue thereon; the decisions shall 
be reported to the next Session of the General Assembly for 
its action. 
Section 11. Forms of action, rules of procedure. 
(2) Rules of procedure. The Supreme Court shall have 
exclusive authority to make rules of procedure and practice 
for the appellate division. The General Assembly shall have 
authority to make rules of procedure and practice for the 
Superior Court and District Court divisions, and the General 
Assembly may delegate this authority of the Supreme Court. 
No rule of procedure or practice shall abridge substantive 
rights or abrogate or limit the rights of trial by jury. If 
the General Assembly should delegate to the Supreme Court 
the rule-making power, the General Assembly may, 
nevertheless, alter, amend, or repeal any rule of procedure 
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or practice adopted by the Supreme Court for the Superior 
Court or District Court divisions. 
Section 14. Term of office and election of Justices of 
Supreme Court and Judges of Superior Court. Justices of the 
Supreme Court and regular Judges of the Superior Court shall 
be elected by the qualified voters and shall hold office for 
terms of eight years and until their successors are elected 
and qualified. Justices of the Supreme Court shall be 
elected by the qualified voters of the State. Regular 
Judges of the Superior Court may be elected by the qualified 
voters of the State or by the voters of their respective 
districts, as the General Assembly may provide. 
Section 15. Removal of judges and clerks. 
(1) Justices of Supreme Court and Judges of Superior 
Court. Any Justice of the Supreme Court may be removed from 
office for mental or physical incapacity by joint resolution 
of two-thirds of both houses of the General Assembly. Any 
Justice or Judge against whom the General Assembly may be 
about to proceed shall receive notice thereof, accompanied 
by a copy of the causes alleged for his removal, at least 
twenty days before the day on which either house of the 
General Assembly shall act thereon. Removal from office for 
any other cause shall be by impeachment. 
Section 17. Vacancies. Unless otherwise provided in 
this Article, all vacancies occurring in the offices 
provided for by this Article shall be filled by appointment 
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of the Governor, and the appointees shall hold their places 
until the next election for members of the General Assembly 
that is held more than thirty days after such vacancy 
occurs, when elections shall be held to fill such offices: 
Provided, that when the unexpired term of any of the offices 
named in this Article of the Constitution in which such 
vacancy has occurred, and in which it is herein provided 
that the Governor shall fill the vacancy, expires on the 
first day of January succeeding the next election for 
members of the General Assembly, the Governor shall appoint 
to fill that vacancy for the unexpired term of the office. 
If any person elected or appointed to any of the said 
offices shall neglect and fail to qualify, such office shall 
be appointed to, held, and filled as provided in case of 
vacancies occurring therein. All incumbents of said offices 
shall hold until their successors are qualified. 
Section 19. Fee, salaries, and emoluments. The 
General Assembly shall prescribe and regulate the fees, 
salaries, and emoluments of all officers provided for in 
this Article; but the salaries of judges shall not be 
diminished during their continuance in office. In no case 
shall the compensation of any judge or magistrate be 
dependent upon his decision or upon the collection of costs. 
Section 21. Schedule. Immediately upon the 
certification by the Governor to the Secretary of State of 
the amendments constituting this Article, the Supreme Court 
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and the Superior Courts shall be incorporated within the 
General Court of Justice, as provided in this Article. All 
Justices of the Supreme Court and Judges of the Superior 
Court shall continue to serve as such within the General 
Court of Justice for the remainder of their respective 
terms. 
Amendment of 1965 
An Act To Amend Article IV of The Constitution of North 
Carolina To Authorize Within The Appellate Division of the 
General Court of Justice An Intermediate Court of Appeals. 
The General Assembly of North Carolina do enact: 
Section 1. Article IV of the Constitution of North 
Carolina is amended as follows: 
(2) Section 5 is rewritten to read as follows: 
Section 5. Appellate Division. The Appellate Division 
of the General Court of Justice shall consist of the Supreme 
Court and, when established by the General Assembly, an 
intermediate Court of Appeals. 
(d) Section 14 is rewritten to read as follows: 
Section 14. Terms of office and Election of Justices 
of the Supreme Court, Judges of the Court of Appeals, and 
Judges of the Superior Court. Justices of the Supreme 
Court, Judges of the Court of Appeals and Judges of the 
Superior Court shall be elected by the qualified voters and 
shall hold office for terms of eight years and until their 
successors are elected and qualified. Justices of the 
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Supreme Court and judges of the Court of Appeals shall be 
elected by the qualified voters of the State., Regular 
Judges of the Superior Court may be elected by the qualified 
voters of the State or by the voters of their respective 
districts, as the General Assembly may provide. 
(e) The caption and first sentence of subsection (1) of 
Section 15 is rewritten to read as follows: 
Justices of the Supreme Court, Judges of the Court of 
Appeals, and Judges of Superior Court. Any Justice of the 
Supreme Court, Judge of the Court of Appeals or Judge of the 
Superior Court may be removed from office for mental or 
physical incapacity by Joint Resolution of two-thirds of 
both houses of the General Assembly. 
CONSTITUTION OF NORTH CAROLINA OF 1971 
AN ACT TO REVISE AND AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF NORTH 
CAROLINA. 
The General Assembly of North Carolina do enact: 
Section 1. The Constitution of North Carolina is 
revised and amended to read as follows: 
Article I 
Declaration of Rights 
Section 6. Separation of powers. The legislative, 
executive, and supreme judicial powers of the State 
government shall be' forever separate and distinct from each 
other. 
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Section 18. Courts shall be open. All courts shall be 
open; every person for an injury done him in his lands, 
goods, person, or reputation shall have remedy by due course 
of law; and right and justice shall be administered without 
favor, denial, or delay. 
Article IV 
Judicial 
Section 1. Judicial power. The judicial power of the 
State shall, except as provided in Section 3 of this 
Article, be vested in a Court for the Trial of Impeachments 
and in a General Court of Justice. The General Assembly 
shall have no power to deprive the judicial department of 
any power or jurisdiction that rightfully pertains to it as 
a co-ordinate department of the government, nor shall it 
establish or authorize any courts other than as permitted by 
this Article. 
Section 2. General Court of Justice. The General 
Court of Justice shall constitute a unified judicial system 
for purposes of jurisdiction, operation, and administration, 
and shall consist of an Appellate Division, a Superior Court 
Division, and a District Court Division. 
Section 5. Appellate division. The Appellate Division 
of the General Court of Justice shall consist of the Supreme 
Court and the Court of Appeals. 
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Section 6. Supreme Court. 
(1) Membership. The Supreme Court shall consist of a 
Chief justice and six Associate Justices, but the General 
Assembly may increase the number of Associate Justices to 
not more than eight. In the event the Chief Justice is 
unable, on account of absence or temporary incapacity, to 
perform any of the duties placed upon him, the senior 
Associate Justice available may discharge those duties. 
(2) Sessions of the Supreme Court. The sessions of the 
Supreme Court shall be held in the City of Raleigh unless 
otherwise provided by the General Assembly. 
Section 7. Court of Appeals. The structure, 
organization, and composition of the Court of Appeals shall 
be determined by the General Assembly. The Court shall have 
not less than five members, and may be authorized to sit in 
divisions, or other than en banc. Sessions of the Court 
shall be held at such times and places as the General 
Assembly may prescribe. 
Section 8. Retirement of Justices and Judges. The 
General Assembly shall provide by general law for the 
retirement of Justices and Judges of the General Court of 
Justice, and may provide for the temporary recall of any 
retired Justice or Judge to serve on the court from which he 
was retired. 
Section 11. Assignment of Judges. The Chief Justice 
of the Supreme Court, acting in accordance with rules of the 
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Supreme Court, shall make assignments of Judges of the 
Superior Court and may transfer District Judges from one 
district to another for temporary or specialized duty. The 
principle of rotating Superior Court Judges among the 
various districts is a salutary one and shall be observed. 
For this purpose the General Assembly may divide the State 
into a number of judicial divisions. Subject to the general 
'supervision of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, 
assignment of District Judges within each local court 
district shall be made by the Chief District Judge. 
Section 12. Jurisdiction of the General Court of 
Justice. 
(1) Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall have 
jurisdiction to review upon appeal any decision of the 
courts below, upon any matter of law or legal inference. 
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over 'issues of fact' 
and 'questions of fact' shall be the same exercised by it 
prior to the adoption of this Article, and the Court may 
issue any remedial writs necessary to give it general 
supervision and control over the proceedings of the other 
courts. 
Section 13. Forms of action, rules of procedure. 
(1) Forms of Action. There shall be in this State but 
one form of action for the enforcement of private rights or 
the redress of private wrongs, which shall be denominated a 
civil action, and in which there shall be a right to have 
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issues of fact tried before a jury. Every action prosecuted 
by the people of the State as a party against a person 
charged with a public offense, for the punishment thereof, 
shall be termed a criminal action. 
(2) Rules of procedure. The Supreme Court shall have 
exclusive authority to make rules and procedure and practice 
for the Appellate Division. The General Assembly may make 
rules of procedure and practice for the Superior Court and 
District Court Divisions, and the General Assembly may 
delegate this authority to the Supreme Court. No rule of 
procedure or practice shall abridge substantive rights or 
abrogate or limit the right of trial by jury. If the 
General Assembly should delegate to the Supreme Court the 
rule-making power, the General Assembly may, nevertheless, 
alter, amend, or repeal any rule of procedure or practice 
adopted by the Supreme Court for the Superior Court or 
District Court Divisions. 
Section 16. Terms of office and election of Justices 
of the Supreme Court, Judges of the Court of Appeals, and 
Judges of the Superior Court. Justices of the Supreme 
Court, Judges of the Court of Appeals, and regular Judges of 
the Superior Court shall be elected by the qualified voters 
and shall hold office for terms of eight years and until 
their successors are elected and qualified. Justices of the 
Supreme Court and Judges of the Court of Appeals shall be 
elected by the qualified voters of the State. Regular 
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Judges of the Superior Court may be elected by the qualified 
voters of the State or by the voters of their respective 
districts, as the General Assembly may prescribe. 
Section 17. Removal of judicial officers. 
(1) Justices of Supreme Court. Judges of the Court of 
Appeals, and Judges of Superior Court. Any Justice of the 
Supreme Court, Judge of the Court of Appeals, or Judge of 
the Superior Court may be removed from office for mental or 
physical incapacity by joint resolution of two-thirds of all 
the members of each house of the General Assembly. Any 
Justice or Judge against whom the General Assembly may be 
about to proceed shall receive notice thereof, accompanied 
by a copy of the causes alleged for his removal, at least 
twenty days before the day on which either house of the 
General Assembly shall act thereon. Removal from office for 
any other cause shall be by impeachment. 
Section 19. Vacancies. Unless otherwise provided in 
this Article, all vacancies occurring in the offices 
provided for by this Article shall be filled by appointment 
of the Governor, and the appointees shall hold their places 
until the next election for members of the General Assembly 
that is held more than 30 days after the vacancy occurs, 
when elections shall be held to fill the offices. When the 
unexpired term of any of the offices named in this Article 
of the Constitution in which a vacancy has occurred, and in 
which it is herein provided that the Governor shall fill the 
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vacancy, expires on the first day of January succeeding the 
next election for- members of the General Assembly, the 
Governor shall appoint to fill that vacancy for the 
unexpired term of the office. If any person elected or 
appointed to any of these offices shall fail to qualify, the 
office shall be appointed to, held, and filled as provided 
in case of vacancies occurring therein. All incumbents of 
these offices shall hold until their successors are 
qualified. 
Section 21. Fees, salaries, and emoluments. The 
General Assembly shall prescribe and regulate the fees, 
salaries, and emoluments of all officers provided for in 
this Article, but the salaries of Judges shall not be 
diminished during their continuance in office. In no case 
shall the compensation of any Judge or Magistrate be 
dependent upon his decision or upon the collection of costs. 
Amendments of 1971 
II. AN ACT TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF NORTH CAROLINA 
AS AMENDED EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 1971, TO REQUIRE THE GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY TO PRESCRIBE MAXIMUM AGE LIMITS FOR SERVICE AS A 
JUSTICE OR JUDGE. 
The General Assembly of North Carolina do enact: 
Section 1. Article IV, Section 8 of the Constitution 
of North Carolina, as amended effective July 1, 1971, is 
rewritten to read as follows: 
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Section 8. Retirement of Justices and Judges. The 
General Assembly shall provide by general law for the 
retirement of Justices and Judges of the General Court of 
Justice, and may provide for the temporary recall of any 
retired Justice or Judge to serve on the court from which he 
was retired. The General Assembly shall also prescribe 
maximum age limits for service as a Justice or Judge. 
III. AN ACT TO AMEND ARTICLE IV OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
NORTH CAROLINA AS AMENDED EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 1971, TO 
AUTHORIZE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO PRESCRIBE PROCEDURES FOR 
THE CENSURE AND REMOVAL OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES OF THE 
GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE. 
The General Assembly of North Carolina do enact; 
Section 1. Article IV, Section 17 of the Constitution 
of North Carolina, as amended effective July 1, 1971, is 
rewritten to read as follows: 
Section 17. Removal of Judges, Magistrates and Clerks. 
(1) Removal of Judges by the General Assembly. Any ' 
Justice or Judge of the General Court of Justice may be 
removed from office for mental or physical incapacity by 
joint resolution of two-thirds of all the members of each 
house of the General Assembly. Any Justice or Judge against 
whom the General Assembly may be about to proceed shall 
receive notice thereof, accompanied by a copy of the causes 
alleged for his removal, at least 20 days before the day on 
which either house of the General Assembly shall act 
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thereon. Removal from office by the General Assembly for 
any other cause shall be by impeachment. 
(2) Additional method of removal of Judges. The 
General Assembly shall prescribe a procedure, in addition to 
impeachment and address set forth in this Section, for the 
removal of a Justice or Judge of the General Court of 
Justice for mental or physical incapacity interfering with 
the performance of his duties which is, or is likely to 
become, permanent, and for the censure and removal of a 
Justice or Judge of the General Court of Justice for willful 
misconduct in office, willful and persistent failure to 
perform his duties, habitual intemperance,, conviction of a 
crime involving moral turpitude, or conduct prejudicial to 
the administration of justice that brings the judicial 
office into disrepute. 
Amendment of 1979 
AN ACT TO AMEND ARTICLE IV OF THE CONSTITUTION OF NORTH 
CAROLINA, TO REQUIRE JUSTICES AND JUDGES OF THE GENERAL 
COURT OF JUSTICE TO BE AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE LAW. 
The General Assembly of North Carolina enacts; 
Section 1. Article IV of the North Carolina 
Constitution is hereby amended by adding a new section at 
the end thereof to read as follows: 
Section 22. Qualification of Justices and Judges. 
Only persons duly authorized to practice law in the courts 
of this State shall be eligible for election or appointment 
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as a Justice of the Supreme Court, Judge of the Court of 
Appeals, Judge of the Superior Court, or Judge of District 
Court. This section shall not apply to persons elected to 
or serving in such capacities on or before January 1, 1981. 
Amendment of 1981 
AN ACT TO AMEND ARTICLE IV OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION TO 
PERMIT RECALL OF RETIRED SUPREME COURT JUSTICES OR COURT OF 
APPEALS JUDGES TO SERVE TEMPORARILY ON EITHER APPELLATE 
COURT. 
The General Assembly of North Carolina enacts; 
Section 1. Article IV, Section 8 of the Constitution 
of North Carolina is amended by rewriting the first sentence 
thereof to read as follows: The General Assembly shall 
provide by general law for the retirement of Justices and 
Judges of the General Court of Justice, and may provide for 
the temporary recall of any retired Justice or Judge to 
serve on the court or courts of the division from which he 
was retired. 
